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Abstract
The study of the movement toward political liberalisation and démocratisation in Taiwan 
is exceptionally interesting. First, the KMT is the only example of a ruling Leninist party 
which has successfully transformed itself into a competitive party while in power. 
Second, the KMT is the only case of a Leninist party in a capitalist setting. Third, 
Taiwan's international political status is unique. Furthermore, the Taiwanese case raises 
broader theoretical issues about the process of démocratisation. In particular, Taiwan's 
political development might also raises important comparative questions with those 
countries that are of one-party system and that have pursued similar development 
strategies.
A variety of theories have been considered to study the origins and process of 
Taiwan’s démocratisation. Modernisation theory posits that Taiwan’s democratic 
transition was a consequence of rapid economic growth and social change; the transition 
approach focuses on the institutional efforts of the political opposition; one form of 
démocratisation theory emphasises the key role of an individual leader, in this case 
Chiang Ching-kuo; and the structural approach calls for attention to the analysis of 
external influence
However, most of the existing predominant theories in the study of Taiwan's 
démocratisation only provide static analyses of Taiwan's movement toward 
démocratisation. They seem insufficient to explain how Taiwan's democratic threshold 
was actually crossed As a result, this study is aimed at re-examining the origins and 
process of Taiwan's democratic transition through a different approach, i.e the 
factionalism approach, which primarily assumes a situation where political elites and 
political institutions rely exclusively upon clientelist ties to structure political action.
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My fundamental research hypothesis is: the change of the KMT's clientelist alliance 
relations with its institutional clients in the local units, i.e. local factions was the most 
crucial factor of Taiwan’s démocratisation. In other words, I presuppose that the key to 
Taiwan's democratic transition was the conflict and disunion within the KMT's ruling 
structure. The fracture of the clientelist alliance relations between the KMT and local 
factions in the late 1970s, when the KMT central authority adopted a faction replacement 
policy to reduce the overall power of local factions, provided fertile ground for the rise of 
the political opposition whose strategic interaction with the regime finally drove Taiwan 
toward democracy.
Thus, this study focuses on the processes by which changes occurred in the 
clientelist alliance (patron-client) relations between the KMT and local factions as part of 
the movement toward democracy The factionalism approach leads to an investigation of 
the relationships among the KMT’s mainlander ruling elites, among Taiwan's indigenous 
elites, and between the KMT regime and local factions. Through the analysis of changes 
of the clientelist relationships between the KMT and local elites, the questions of how the 
KMT’s authoritarian rule over Taiwan could be maintained for four decades and how the 
democratic threshold in Taiwan was finally crossed can be explained This study offers a 
new as well as fresh contribution to the study of Taiwan’s démocratisation
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction: A Different Approach fo r  Study o f Taiwan’s 
Démocratisation
In the 1997 year-end elections for county magistrates and city mayors In 
Taiwan, the major opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), 
won 12 of 23 seats by gaining 43.32 per cent of the popular vote. By contrast, 
the ruling KMT took only 8 seats with 42.12 per cent of the popular vote, while 
independents gained 3.' This election marked the first time that the KMT lost to a 
second party. Since the election, the DPP has effectively administered local 
areas accounting for a majority of the Taiwanese population, or 72.59 per 
cent.2 Although local success can not be translated Into a change of national 
government, the DPP's striking victory did imply a high potential for the party to 
substitute the KMT as a ruling power in the near future.
The DPP's remarkable growth was unpredictable when Taiwan's politics 
began to open up 10 years ago. Before then, several scholars posited that 
Taiwan would move to a system like the Japanese one-party dominant one in 
which the ruling conservative KMT would continue to dominate the political 
scene through its electoral support, as the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) had 
done in Japan since 1955.3 The KMT possessed a great deal of strength, both 
politically and economically. This allowed the party to run election campaigns 
with enormous organisational and financial resources that are necessary for.
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yet cannot guarantee, electoral success. The KMT's success In leading Taiwan's 
economy toward rapid development also gave the party significant prestige 
which helped it to obtain the electoral support of the public.
Moreover, the existing single non-transferable-vote multiple-member 
electoral system for legislatures at all levels (as it was for the LDP) was 
advantageous for the KMT. The KMT was able to remain the ruling authority by 
controlling local and national assemblies even if It lost the executive offices to 
the opposition. Furthermore, the low level o f overlap of social and political 
cleavages in Taiwan offset the mobilisation capacity of opposition parties. The 
DPP had generally been viewed as too fragmented and structurally 
disadvantaged to constitute a viable alternative. Similarly, Its strong Ideological 
stance on Taiwan independence and Its previous Image of resorting violent 
protests to achieve its ends had been thought to prevent the DPP from 
developing very much further since those tend to turn away stability-minded 
business elites and the middle class.
The DPP's remarkable achievement in the 1997 elections revealed the 
success of its transformation from an ideological party toward a new stage of 
maturity, responsibility, and policy leadership. Undoubtedly, a bl-party system 
dominated by both the KMT and the DPP has now come about in Taiwan after 
the 1997 elections. As Pao Tzung-ho, professor and chairman of the Department 
of Political Science at National Taiwan University mentioned, the outcome of 
the 1997 local executive elections is an indication that democracy is maturing 
in Taiwan. It could be viewed as a new landmark in Taiwan's democratic 
development.4
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1.1 Research Motives and Purposes
The study of the movement toward political liberalisation and démocratisation 
in Taiwan is exceptionally interesting. First, the KMT is the only example of a ruling 
Leninist party which has successfully transformed itself into a competitive party 
holding power via the ballot box. The KMT is also the only case of a ruling 
Leninist party in a capitalist setting. Furthermore, Taiwan's international political 
status is unique.5 The Taiwanese case raises broader theoretical issues about the 
process of démocratisation. In addition, Taiwan's political development also 
raises important comparative questions with those countries that also have one- 
party systems, such as Mexico, and that have pursued similar development 
strategies, such as South Korea.6
A variety of theories have been considered to study of the origins and 
process of Taiwan's démocratisation. Modernisation theory posits that Taiwan's 
democratic transition was a consequence of rapid economic growth and 
social change; the transition approach focuses on the institutional efforts of the 
political opposition; one form of démocratisation theory emphasises the key 
role of an individual leader. In this case Chlang Ching-kuo; and the structural 
approach calls for attention to the analysis of external influence.
However, most of the existing predominant theories in the study of 
Taiwan's démocratisation only provide static analyses of Taiwan's movement 
toward démocratisation. They seem Insufficient to explain how Taiwan's 
democratic threshold was actually crossed. As a result, this study is aimed at re­
examining the origins and process of Taiwan's democratic transition through a 
different approach, i.e. the factionalism approach, which primarily assumes a 
situation where political elites and political institutions rely exclusively upon
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clientelist ties to structure political action, i.e. what Robert A. Scalapino terms 
'  informal politics' .7
As I will discuss in depth later, although the KMT after 1949 sought to stamp 
out factionalism within Its own ranks, it actively encouraged a depollticised form 
of factionalism in society more generally. The KMT deliberately institutionalised its 
connections with local factions through a patronage system. By way of 
clientelist alliances with local factions, the KMT could obtain necessary support 
from the grassroots through elections so as to legitimise its rule in Taiwan. 
However, the influence of local factions was gradually enhanced with Taiwan's 
political and economic changes over time. The KMT became worried by the 
growth potential o f local factions and tried to curb them. Thus, the clientelist 
alliance relations between the KMT and local factions were fractured.
My fundamental research hypothesis is: the change of the KMT's clientelist 
alliance relations with its institutional clients In the local units, i.e. local factions 
was the most crucial factor of Taiwan's démocratisation. In other words, I 
presuppose that the key to Taiwan's democratic transition was the conflict and 
disunion within the KMT's ruling structure. The fracture of the clientelist alliance 
relations between the KMT and local factions in the late 1970s, when the KMT 
attempted to reduce the overall power of local factions, brought about 
resentment from local factions which worked to undermine the KMT's own 
unity. This provided fertile ground for the rise of the political opposition whose 
strategic Interaction with the regime finally drove Taiwan toward democracy.
Thus, this study focuses on the processes by which changes occurred in 
the clientelist alliance (patron-client) relations between the KMT and local 
factions as part of the movement toward democracy. In order to study the 
KMT's factional politics and to investigate the dynamics o f the KMT-local
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factions alliance relationships, the factionalism approach is here adopted as 
the major research perspective. My research interests and hypothesis are 
developed on the basis of an Intensive literature review of Taiwan's 
démocratisation. Yet a general review of démocratisation theories are required 
before we have an overview of literatures of Taiwan's démocratisation.
1.2 Three Theoretical Approaches of Démocratisation Studies
According to David Potter et al„ the word démocratisation refers to political 
changes moving in a democratic direction. “ The character of such movement 
over time Is from less accountable to more accountable government, from less 
competitive (or non-existent) elections to freer and fairer competitive elections, 
from severely restricted to better protected civil and political rights, and from 
weak (or non-existent) autonomous associations in civil society to more 
autonomous and more numerous associations."8
A great number of ideas and explanatory generalisations used to explain 
patterns of démocratisation can be grouped Into three general types of 
theoretical approach: the modernisation approach, transition approach and 
structural approach. Although there can be important theoretical differences in 
each of these theoretical approaches, they tend to share certain ideas and 
analytical procedures not characteristic of the other two. Although each 
approach does not offer a totally different type of explanation from the other 
two, the emphasis of each one is certainly different.
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The Modernisation Approach
The explanatory focus of the modernisation approach is socio-economic 
development. Modernisation theorists posit that democracy is related to a 
country's economic development or level o f modernisation. It emphases a 
number of social and economic requisites either associated with existing liberal 
democracies or necessary for successful démocratisation.’ Although many 
other variables are also brought into the explanation, the extent of 
modernisation (or level of socio-economic development) is the key. The essay 
'Economic Development and Democracy' by Seymour Martin Upset in his 
book Political Man (1960) is the founding work of the modernisation approach. 
In that essay, Upset argued that '  the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the 
chances that it will sustain democracy."10
Quantitative evidence is essential to explanations in the modernisation 
approach. There is a preoccupation with indicators that can be measured. 
Also, each indicator or “ requisite" of democracy is expressed as a variable. The 
explanatory procedure consists of identifying significant corrections between a 
number of discrete socio-economic variables each of which is associated with 
a democracy variable." Socio-economic correlates of democracy offered by 
theorists of the modernisation approach generally include: high levels of 
urbanisation, industrialisation, rising per capita income, high literacy rates and 
mass communication.
There are two important characteristics about the correlative explanations 
of the modernisation approach, mentioned D. Potter. First, each one is 
expressed in a universal form. The relationships have a law-like quality and they 
supposedly apply to all countries. Second, each correlational statement also 
assumes linearity. The statement of a relationship between two variables
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assumes that the variation can be plotted on a single line or continuum, up or 
down.'2 However, the modernisation approach Is questioned from time to time 
as certain correlations may not hold for all countries due to important regional 
differences in the world. What is more, the central assumption of the 
modernisation approach ignores various others possibilities; for example, that 
increasing levels of socio-economic development may have a negative impact 
on democracy.'3
The Transition Approach
An influential challenge to the modernisation approach was made by 
Dankwart Rustow in his article "Transitions to Democracy" (1970). He argued 
that any genetic theory of democracy would do well to assume a two-way 
flow of causality, or some form of circular interaction, between politics on the 
one hand and economic conditions on the other hand.'4 Although he 
recognised a linkage between politics and economics, he denied that this 
linkage runs in only one direction. While there exist many cases of economic 
development leading to democracy, there are also cases of democracy 
leading to economic development. Thus, he emphasised that socio-economic 
development is affected by démocratisation as much as démocratisation is 
affected by socio-economic development.'5
Proponents of the transition approach disagree that modernisation will 
inevitably lead to political démocratisation. As Adam Przeworskl and Fernando 
Umongl argued, * only once democracy Is established do economic constraints 
play a role: the chances for the survival of democracy are greater when the 
country Is richer."'6 Transition theorists are interested in the question of 'how  a 
democracy comes into being in the first place' rather than “ what factors can 
best preserve or enhance the health and stability of a democracy" (as
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modernisation theorists are). To deal with this kind of question, they argue that a 
historical approach provides a sounder basis for analysis.
Based on holistic considerations of different countries as case studies, 
transition theorists posit that democracy is born of conflict, never as a result of 
simply peaceful evolution. Although each country may go through a different 
struggle, there is always major group conflict between the ruling and opposing 
groups. The adoption of democratic rules, which give each some share in the 
polity, is always a conscious decision by political elites to cushion intense 
struggle. However, the conscious adoption of democratic rules may be seen by 
the ruling group and the opposition as necessary rather than desirable changes 
due to compromises that had to be made. Gradually, democratic rules, once 
made, become a habit. With that, a democratic regime may be said to 
become established.’7
In general, the transition approach claims that democracy Is not a by­
product of modernisation. Rather, democracy is the outcome of tacit 
bargaining among contending political forces. Its explanatory focus is historical 
political processes marked by social conflict. What drives these historical 
processes Is the agency of political elites In conflict, but not the people. It 
believes that certain actions, choice and strategies of political elites are 
beneficial to democratic transition, others are not. To express it simply, in the 
view of the transition approach, démocratisation is largely contingent on what 
elites and individuals do when, where and how.18
The Structural Approach
The basic assumption of the structural approach to démocratisation is that the 
particular interrelationships between certain structures of power in the
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economic, social, and political spheres over time provide constraints and 
opportunities that drive political elites and others along a historical trajectory 
leading towards democracy. Thus, the historical route to liberal democracy is 
determined fundamentally by changing structures, not by elite initiatives and 
choices." Since structures of power normally change gradually through history, 
the explanatory focus here is long-term processes of historical change. The 
explanatory procedure o f this approach is thus comparative historical analysis 
of whole countries aimed at discerning historical causes of démocratisation.20
Structural theorists posit that démocratisation processes are explained not 
by the agency of political elites but primarily by changing structures of power. 
A country's historical trajectory towards liberal democracy or some other 
political form is finally shaped by changing structures of class, state and 
transnational power driven by a particular history of capitalist development.2’ A 
classic starting work o f the structural approach is Barrington Moore's Social 
Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the 
Modern World (1966), where the author concluded that common changing 
relationships between peasants, lords, urban bourgeoisie and state led towards 
the political form of liberal democracy.22
The role of the state is significant in the explanatory focus of the structural 
approach. Structural theorists believe that the changing structure and form of 
state power has been fundamental to démocratisation. For example, they 
assume that a very powerful and almost entirely autonomous state in relation to 
social classes and groups has provided a most uncongenial setting for 
démocratisation. This has been especially so where the military and the police 
have been strong within the state apparatus. What Is more, démocratisation 
has had more chance of success In the middle ground between not enough 
and too much state power.“
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The structural approach also emphasises Influence beyond the country 
boundaries, l.e. international and transnational interactions. It believes that 
external events can help to trigger démocratisation. Even more importantly, 
changing geopolitical and International processes can profoundly affect 
domestic states and class structures In the longer term and propel them In a 
democratic direction.24 The most recent structural explanation by Dietrich 
Rueschemeyer et al. (1992) points out that changing configurations o f 
transnational power can affect class alignments and the changing nature o f 
the state, and indirectly the historical trajectory toward democracy or other 
political patterns.25
For example, Paul Cammack's research suggests that transnational 
economic relations between advanced capitalist countries and dependent 
Latin America countries weakened the pro-democracy forces in the latter, as 
they delayed industrialisation and limited the size of the working classes.26 
Similarly, my study In the following chapters will show that Taiwan's geopolitical 
dependence on the US In the 1950s and 1960s was unfavourable to its 
democratic prospects as massive US military and economic aid strengthened 
the KMT regime, thus affecting the domestic balance of class forces. However, 
the downgrading of Taiwan's strategic importance In the US global defence 
policy in the early 1970s caused Taiwan's diplomatic setbacks, created 
disturbances to the credibility of the KMT regime, and finally triggered Taiwan's 
democratic transition.
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1.3 Literature Review of Taiwan's Démocratisation
Many theories have been put forward to explain the origins and process of 
Taiwan's political liberalisation and démocratisation. One among them, 
modernisation theory, claims that democracy is a consequence of rapid 
economic growth and social change in a capitalist economy. As Lucian Pye 
suggested, "Taiwan is possibly the best working example of the theory that 
economic progress should bring In Its wake democratic inclinations and a 
healthy surge of pluralism, which in time will undercut the foundations of the 
authoritarian rule common to developing countries."27 Michael Ying-mao Kau 
also emphasised the dialectical relationship in the interaction between Taiwan's 
economic modernisation and political development.28
With Taiwan's economic takeoff, the literacy rate increased, mass 
communication intensified, per capita income rose, and a professional middle 
class merged. These conditions are auspicious for the advance of a 
modernising democracy. On the other hand, Taiwan's economic development 
has two special features. First, businesses in Taiwan are small and unorganised, 
and therefore they are also beyond the reach of the government. Second, 
because national politics was reserved for malnlanders, the Taiwanese pursued 
economic advancement. The bifurcation of political and socio-economic elites 
muted Taiwan's ethnic cleavage.29 The characteristics of Taiwan's economy 
also appeared to be conducive to the emergence of a more liberal politics.
Economic modernisation does not necessarily ensure political 
démocratisation, however. As Goran Therborn emphasised, many countries 
democratised not because of modernisation, but because o f wars, economic 
crises, foreign pressures, or the collapse of dictatorship.30 Samuel P. Huntington 
also stated that modernisation does not necessarily lead to increased
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démocratisation although he agreed that there did seem to be a high 
correlation between democracy and the precondition of wealth since socio­
economic changes tend to encourage the public's desire for political change 
or reforms.31
Guillermo O'Donnell argued, rapid development can itself be destabilising 
because "social and economic modernisation might politicise dissatisfactions 
and put burdens on the state that the state is not prepared to carry."32 On the 
other hand, Peter R. Moody, Jr. claimed that economic modernisation may 
stabilise an authoritarian regime and provide the strength to suppress 
destructive pressures for participation instead of fostering democracy.33 In the 
case of Taiwan, from the start the KMT pursued policies that were generally 
favourable to private sector growth. There were thus few incentives for the 
private sector to attem pt to reshape the political order.34 Despite the contrary, 
they all agreed that economic modernisation does not certainly bring about 
démocratisation.
In particular, two historical legacies are disadvantageous for Taiwan's 
progress toward democracy. First, the KMT's powerful organisational reach and 
Its dominant ideology pose greater difficulties for démocratisation than is the 
case in one-party regimes dominated by the military. As a Leninist party, the 
KMT may do its utmost to resist fundamentally institutional transformation from a 
hegemonic party into an ordinary party in a competitive political arena.35 As 
the KMT has been incorporated greatly Into the state in organisational and 
personnel terms, " separation between the party and state, the de-politicising of 
the state bureaucracy and especially the military-security apparatus will 
represent the most formidable hurdle for the pact negotiation of 
démocratisation. ' 35
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Second, Taiwan's colonial legacy makes démocratisation difficult. Unlike 
some other third-world countries, Taiwan had little prior experience of 
democracy. Institutional diffusion during the colonial era came from an 
authoritarian Japan rather than from a liberal democratic Western power, as 
was the case in the Philippines. Post-war Taiwan did not inherit any democratic 
infrastructures. Although Taiwan was decolonised through a wholesale transfer 
of power and resources from the defeated Japanese to the KMT after the 
World War Two, the KMT has in many ways resembled a colonial regime 
through its tight political control of domestic politics. Thus, the process of 
democratic transition became much more laborious.37
Theorists of the transition approach (such as Adam Przeworskl and 
Guillermo O'Donnell) claimed that democratic rules and Institutions are 
outcomes of implicit or explicit bargaining between the ruling elites and the 
opposed. Their explanatory focus is on the processes by which democratic 
forces in society emerge, grow, and outmanoeuvre the regime to establish a 
new institutional framework.38 As Cheng Tun-Jen and Stephan Haggard pointed 
out, ” the democratic transition in Taiwan was advanced by the ability of the 
opposition to set the agenda, to use extralegal methods, to shift bargaining 
arenas, and eventually to push the ruling elite toward new rules of the game."
Both of them argued that the KMT's agreement to expand political 
participation and initiate democratic reforms would not have been possible 
without the efforts of the political opposition.3'7 Cheng Tun-jen and Stephan 
Haggard's views were shared with Edward Friedman who asserted that Taiwan 
should be comprehended as a country in which démocratisation was made 
not by economic growth but by political struggle between the ruling elites and 
the democratic opposition resulting in a compromise pact in which anti­
democratic intransigents among elites and challenges began to be
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forces in society emerge, grow, and outmanoeuvre the regime to establish a 
new Institutional framework.38 As Cheng Tun-jen and Stephan Haggard pointed 
out, " the democratic transition In Taiwan was advanced by the ability of the 
opposition to set the agenda, to use extralegal methods, to shift bargaining 
arenas, and eventually to  push the ruling elite toward new rules of the game."
Both of them argued that the KMT's agreement to expand political 
participation and initiate democratic reforms would not have been possible 
without the efforts of the political opposition.59 Cheng Tun-jen and Stephan 
Haggard's views were shared with Edward Friedman who asserted that Taiwan 
should be comprehended as a country In which démocratisation was made 
not by economic growth but by political struggle between the ruling elites and 
the democratic opposition resulting In a compromise pact in which anti­
democratic intransigents among elites and challenges began to be
marginalised.®
With Taiwan's rapid economic growth In the 1960s, a new group of middle- 
class intellectuals emerged. Differing from the old opposition elites group which 
consisted of a few malnlander liberal intellectuals and Indigenous elites who 
pursued democracy in the 1950s, leaders of the new democratic movement 
were rooted In local society and better equipped with organisational skills.'1 The 
opposition's victory In 1977 elections created a phase of strategic interaction 
between the opposition and the regime. The opposition's subtle setting of a 
negotiation agenda, and its skillfully coordinated mass movement in the streets 
and opposition in the Legislative Yuan eventually forced the KMT to address the 
issues of démocratisation.42 Internal debate between the KMT's hard-liners and 
soft-liners also advanced the process of the opposition's strategic interaction 
with the regime.43
Indeed, the opposition could generate pressures to enlarge the 
discrepancy among ruling elites. However, they were unable to Initiate 
democratic transition. As Wang Cheng-huan claimed, the initiative for 
democratic reforms is always in the hands of the ruling elites rather than the 
opposition or the rank-and-file. In his view, Taiwan's démocratisation was a 
passive revolution initiated by the KMT leadership to preserve their privileges 
and interests by way of institutional reforms and ruling strategy changes 
designed to block and absorb dissatisfactions from below. Therefore, he 
argued Taiwan's political démocratisation was a case of revolt from above, not 
below.44 Samuel P. Huntington, and Andrew J. Nathan and Helena Ho also 
agreed that Taiwan's democracy was contributed by the KMT elites taking the 
lead in bringing about democracy.45
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Undoubtedly. Chiang Ching-kuo played an Indispensable personal role in 
the process of Taiwan's démocratisation. As Tien Hung-mao pointed out, 
Chiang Ching-kuo steered Taiwan's political development in a reformist 
direction by initiating a Taiwanisation policy after he came to power in the 
1970s. In 1986, two years before his death, Chiang Ching-kuo instructed the KMT 
Central Standing Committee (CSC) task force to study reform measures. He also 
authorised a formal channel o f communication with the opposition leaders in 
an effort to maintain an orderly reform process, and held meetings with civilian 
and military leaders to hold off a possible crackdown on the opposition 
following the formation of the DPP.46
However, the view that Taiwan's political reforms were caused by a single 
personality seems inadequate as an explanation of why and how the 
democratic progress was Initiated. As Chou Yangsun, Andrew J. Nathan and 
Chu Yun-han mentioned, no power-holder is willing to give up power 
voluntarily. Without the KMT's legitimacy beginning to be exposed to serious 
challenges, its efforts to adapt the party-state apparatus would not have been 
possible.47 Indeed, the KMT would never have agreed to expand political 
participation before the upsurge of strong pressure form the political 
opposition.48 A similar view Is argued by Chen Ming-tung, who refers to Chiang 
Ching-kuo's “ mercy" to the opposition movements.45
Another category of démocratisation studies, the structural approach, 
views Taiwan's democratic transition as a consequence of international and 
transnational influence. For example, Chu Yun-han, Hu Fu and Moon Chung-li 
suggested that international development whether political, economic, or 
technological can create pressures and incentives amenable to democracy. 
Also, transnational ideological and cultural flows can enhance 
démocratisation.50 That is very true that, in reality, Washington's policy
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orientations toward the two Chinese governments on both sides of the Taiwan 
Straits had significant influence on Taiwan's political development for the time 
being, especially Taiwan's political opening in the late 1980s.5'
Cheng Tun-jen shared a similar view to that o f Chu, Hu and Moon, 
claiming that the KMT's decision to open up Taiwan's politics in the late 1980s 
arose because of the incentives to shore up its relations with Washington In the 
light o f the regime's damaged international image caused by the killing of 
several Chinese-Amerlcans through the security apparatus.“  Hermann 
Halbelsen and Peter Ferdinand also suggested that the victory of the peaceful 
democratic revolution of Mrs Aquino over President Marcos In the Philippines 
had a cheering. Inspirational effect on Taiwan's démocratisation. The decrease 
of the apparent threats of invasion from the mainland as a result of China's 
modernisation was also conducive to Taiwan's political opening up.53
Admittedly, external resources can originate Incentives, constraints, and 
conditions for a country's domestic political development. International political 
and economic forces, global trends toward economic liberalism, 
demonstration effects abroad. Intensified international exchanges, and 
communication have all generated certain Incentives to move Taiwan toward 
political liberalisation and démocratisation. However, the view of 
démocratisation steered from the outside is insufficient to elucidate the 
democratic breakthrough in Taiwan. "Unless there is a direct intervention by 
foreign actors, as in Germany or Japan, or cataclysmic external events, as In 
Argentina's military loss to Britain, external factors are unlikely to determine the 
process of démocratisation."54
29
1.4 A Different Approach: The Factionalism Approach
A recent approach for study of the origins of Taiwan's démocratisation has 
been offered by Chen Ming-tung. Through the historical studies of Taiwan's 
political dynamics upon the factionalism approach, Chen Ming-tung 
concluded that conflict within the KMT ruling structure was the crucial factor for 
Taiwan's democratic transition.“  His views coincide with Wang Cheng-huan 
who proposed that a change of state apparatus is normally caused by conflict 
and disunion between ruling elites.“  In terms of explanatory focus, this 
approach is close to the transition approach.
In practice, clientelism was an important concept to investigate the KMT's 
governing In Taiwan for the past four decades. Researchers such as Chen Ming- 
tung, Chu Yu-han and Wakabayashi Masatake all highlighted the importance 
of clientelism for the KMT's political management during the period of 
authoritarian rule. Clientelism was particularly useful in explaining the KMT's 
dominance over local political society. Through the regime patronage system 
linking with local elites, the KMT could penetrate Taiwanese society, where the 
KMT had no popular base or experience in governing, and could obtain 
necessary support from the grassroots to legitimise its rule in Taiwan. This is why 
the KMT was able to maintain Its authoritarian control before Taiwan's 
démocratisation.57
However, the KMT's clientelist alliances with local factions was not 
unbreakable. Basically, there were two underlying problems existing In the KMT- 
local factions clientelist alliance structure: the Taiwanese-mainlander rift and 
the institutional autonomy of local factions. With Taiwan's political and 
economic changes over time, the Influence of local factions was enhanced. 
Thus, they became more and more independent of the KMT. The emergence
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of the political opposition also changed the relationship between the KMT and 
local factions. It became a three-player game. The patron-client relations 
between the KMT and local factions profoundly changed.
According to Cheng Mlng-tung's research o f Taiwan's factional politics, 
the KMT's large-scale attempts to reduce the overall power of local factions In 
the late 1970s fractured Its alliance relations with those factions. Local factions 
reacted to KMT central authority by supporting the opposition in the 1977 
elections in which the opposition scored their first electoral victory. The 1977 
elections expanded the opposition's capacity and political space. After the 
elections, the opposition became a political force capable of compelling the 
KMT to introduce political changes.
In retrospect, the opposition's breakthrough in the 1977 elections was 
crucially important for the growth of the democratic movement. However, the 
opposition was unable to  score this electoral victory without the support of 
local factions. Before the 1977 elections, the opposition had still not gained 
sufficient capability and momentum to challenge the KMT central authority.58 
Support from local factions certainly contributed to the rise of the opposition In 
the 1977 elections.
Afterwards, the political opposition continued to expand through elections 
despite the KMT's repression known as the Kaohsiung Incident in December 
1979 and institutionalised barriers to electoral contests. Increasingly, popular 
support for the opposition reduced the KMT's electoral superiority and 
accelerated the KMT's weakening authoritarianism. The KMT's concerns about 
the possibly high costs o f any crackdown on the extralegal establishment of the 
DPP (In September 1986) resulted In the staged victory of democratic 
development. Subsequently, the KMT began to address issues and Initiate
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démocratisation strategies.
What is noteworthy is that, clientelism leads to political factionalism. Due to  
the KMT's adoption of clientelism for its political management, factions exist 
everywhere in Taiwan's politics. Factionalism has existed not only between the 
KMT's political elites at the centre, but also between those local elites. Political, 
social and cultural factors also play conducive roles in the development o f 
factional politics in Taiwan. Most important is the regime's regular holding of 
direct elections for both executive and legislative positions at the county and 
sub-county levels, and for the Taiwan Assembly since 1950, thus providing fertile 
ground for the development of factionalism at the local level.
In short, the factionalism approach, which focuses on the coalitions and 
conflicts between political elites and the effects of factionalism on political 
development, facilitates an Investigation of the movement among the KMT's 
mainlander ruling elites, Taiwan's local elites, and between the KMT regime and 
local factions. Through the analysis of changes of the clientelist relationships 
between the KMT and local elites, is it possible to conclude how the KMT's 
authoritarian rule over Taiwan could be maintained for four decades and how 
the democratic threshold in Taiwan was finally crossed. Certainly, the approach 
of démocratisation theory, which I have already reviewed will be applied in this 
study as well. This study offers a new as well as fresh contribution to the study of 
Taiwan's démocratisation.
One question that arises from this research is how far my study differs from 
that of Chen Ming-tung. My study basically adopts Chen Ming-tung's theory to 
examine the correlation between changes in the KMT's factional politics and 
Taiwan's democratic transition. In Chen Ming-tung's book. Factional Politics 
and Political Dynamics of Taiwan (1995), he posits that the growth and
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development of the KMT's factions at both national and local levels (the 
former refers to the KMT malnlander factions and the latter means Taiwanese 
local factions) were closely affiliated with the political characteristics of the KMT 
regime and its authoritarian management o f Taiwan.
From this point of view, Chen Ming-tung divides the past four decades of 
KMT rule in Taiwan into four periods: post-war Taiwan (1945-1949), the re­
establishment o f the KMT regime (1949-1960), the consolidation of the KMT's 
authoritarian rule (1960-1988), and Taiwan's democratic transition (1988-1995). 
Based on this périodisation, Chen Ming-tung thoroughly analyses the patron- 
client relationships among the KMT's mainlander ruling elites and Taiwan's local 
elites, and the relationships between the KMT regime and its factions a t both 
national and local levels in each of the four periods, so as to study Taiwan's 
political dynamics.
General speaking, my study is similar to  Chen Ming-tung's work as both our 
studies look into the political dynamics of Taiwan through analyses of changes 
within the KMT's factional politics. But although Chen Ming-tung pinpoints the 
importance of the relationship between the change in the KMT's cllentelist 
alliances with local factions and the strength of its authoritarian rule, and 
concludes that the fracture of the KMT's cllentelist alliances with local factions 
was the crucial factor of Taiwan's démocratisation, his study does not clarify 
how the conflict within the KMT's ruling structure, i.e. between the KMT and 
local factions, contributed to Taiwan's democratic transition.
In other words, Chen Ming-tung's study highlights the significance of the 
phenomena of factional politics in Taiwan's political development. More 
Importantly, his study incisively examines the patron-client relationships among 
the KMT's malnlander ruling elites and Taiwan's local elites, and between the
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KMT regime and its factions. His study is indeed an exceptional work concerning 
the KMT's factional politics in the past four decades of the KMT rule in Taiwan. 
However, his work does not study in depth how the change of the KMT's 
clientelist alliances with local factions brought about Taiwan's democratic 
transition.
As a result, Chen Ming-tung's study is unable to explain why the KMT was 
at first able to exert tight control over local factions as well as the political 
opposition, but was then unable to continue doing so after the 1970s. It cannot 
explain how local factions' support of the opposition triggered Taiwan's 
democratic transition. And it is silent on the question of why the KMT had to 
restore its coalition ties with local factions after the collapse of authoritarian rule 
despite its attempts to reduce the overall power of local factions in the late 
1970s and 1980s.
In summary, my research focuses on how changes in the KMT's factional 
politics and especially its clientelist alliances with local factions let to Taiwan's 
democratic transition. This study not only adopts the factionalism approach to 
investigate the KMT's factional politics, but also takes account of the socio­
economic, institutional, and external influence on Taiwan's démocratisation. I 
attempt to offer a dynamic study of Taiwan's démocratisation by examining 
the relationship between the change of the KMT's factional politics and 
Taiwan's democratic transition.
1.5 Research Notes
it is useful to note that the patron-client relationships studied here contain two 
types. As I will discuss in detail in Chapter Two, the definition of patron-client
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relationship (or clientelism) can be expanded from a strictly dyadic relationship 
between two persons to a dyadic relationship between two institutions (or 
groups). Hence, the term * patron' may mean an individual political leader or 
an institution, i.e. party. Similarly, “ client" may mean an individual faction 
leader or an entire faction.55 In this study, the patron-client relationships 
discussed include the dyadic alliances of faction Individuals and also the 
dyadic alliance between the KMT and local factions as a whole.
The historical approach serves as the major research method in this study. 
Through historical analysis, we can clearly see the long-term course of changes 
in the KMT-local factions alliance structure, the dynamics of the KMT's factional 
politics, and the cause of Taiwan's transition to democracy. Also, this study will 
depend on qualitative analysis method although some quantitative data will 
be used to  illustrate political changes affecting and being affected by the 
process of Taiwan's démocratisation, and the clientelist alliance relationships 
between the KMT and local factions. The simple reason for this is, as Cheng Ten- 
jen and Brantty Womack mentioned, that information, in large part, concerning 
"informal politics" is unspoken which makes it nearly impossible to acquire 
reliable quantifiable statistics.“
This research will derive from Information published in books, journals, 
government documents, and interviews with scholars, journalists, party officials 
and politicians from both national and local levels of government in Taiwan. 
Research materials mainly come from the ROC Academic Sinica, the ROC 
National Library, the ROC Legislative Yuan, the ROC Information Office, the 
ROC Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), the KMT Historical Department, the KMT 
Committee for Mainland Affairs, the KMT Committee for Cultural Affairs, the 
National Taiwan University, the Institute of International Relations and the 
Faculty o f Social Science of National Chengchi University, and the Public
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Opinion Survey Centre of Shih-hsin University.
The main study in this thesis begins in Chapter Three, where the 
development of the KMT's factional politics at the time of the regime's 
authoritarian establishment is investigated. Chapter Four focuses on the role of 
local factions under the KMT regime and the structural dilemma of the KMT's 
clientelist alliances with local factions. Chapter Five is mainly concerned with 
the questions of: why the KMT's clientelist alliance with local factions changed, 
and how the change initiated Taiwan's democratic transition. Studies of the 
KMT's factionalism and the development of local factions after the collapse of 
authoritarian rule follow in Chapters Six and Seven. In the final chapter, the 
research findings are presented; the main research contributions and limitations 
are delineated; the future of the KMT's factional politics and Taiwanese local 
factions are considered; and issues for further research are discussed.
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CHAPTER 2
Literature Survey and Research Framework
Elite analysis has been a recurring theme in the history of political thought since 
Plato's time, but became theoretically systematic only after the efforts of 
Mosca, Pareto, and Michels in the late nineteenth century. The basic 
assumption of the elite approach claims that every political system in 
governance terms involves a distinction between tw o groups: the ruler and the 
ruled. The former may be termed the political elite. Elite theorists posit that 
politics is mainly the activities of political elites who dominate major resources 
and make key decisions of the state. Their researches thus focus on the 
behaviour o f political elites since they believe tha t this determines political 
process and content.’
Certainly, the basis of politics is conflict. The divergences of social 
background, political orientation (role perceptions, attitudes, beliefs and 
values) and, more importantly, interest concerns can bring about both 
consensus and conflict among political elites. Conflict is particularly prevalent 
while intense competition over interests occurs. Under such circumstance, 
political elites organise themselves in different forms to engage in conflict, 
mobilise resources for struggle, and compete for spoils. A faction, a political 
structure based on a particular type of clientelist relationship, is one such form 
of organisation.
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Both party and faction are motivated essentially by way of clientelist ties. 
Whereas a party is seen as a legitimate form of political aggregation, a faction 
is generally regarded as selfish, non-constructive. and disruptive. Traditionally, 
factions have been considered a kind of disease within organisations, 
damaging organisational unity and efficiency. They are said to produce 
conflict, and cause divisiveness and discord. However, factions play an 
important part in the organisation of political activity. Conflict between factions 
has certain consequences for policy outcomes and the management of 
political organisations.
2.1 The Definition of Faction
The Structure of Factions
It is difficult to define the term 'faction' precisely because of the phenomenal 
variety of political activity that take place in political parties and the 
divergence of viewpoints of observers. For example, V. O. Key, A. S. Zuckerman, 
G. Sartori, and R. A. Scalapino treat faction as a political group within a party or 
a party sub-unit; S. P. Huntington considers faction as independent political 
organisation; H. Herzog view faction as a quasi-party organisation; W.N. 
Chambers defines faction as a premature political organisation.2 The lack of 
agreement in defining the concept of faction is one of the important reasons 
for the lack of generalisations or theories regarding political factionalism.*
The basic structure of faction is the dyadic alliance. * A dyadic alliance is a 
voluntary agreement between two individuals to exchange favours and to 
come to each other's aid in time of need."4 Two individuals are connected by
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a direct personal tie rather than an organisational relationship with each other. 
The expectation of altruism toward each other distinguishes a dyadic alliance 
from a contractual relationship in which the obligations of the contractual 
parties are clearly delimited. The exchange of favours is one of the purposes of 
dyadic alliances, but it also serves as a means of maintaining a dyadic alliance 
by binding two allies together. The continuity of favour exchange demonstrates 
an individual's interest in the alliance and serves as a public display of the 
alliance.5
Dyadic alliance-building is a strategy of first choice for the lone individual 
seeking to pursue private interests or goals. First, an individual reserves for himself 
the right to set his own goals while building the dyadic alliance. Second, it 
allows an individual to  give unequivocal priority to  the pursuit of the objectives 
which he deems to  be important. Third, dyadic alliance-building allows an 
individual a lot o f freedom to choose his own tactics and change power 
relationships in his own interests and in relation to his own goals. Fourth, the 
technique of dyadic alliance-building is rather simple. There are no 
organisational trappings, but the alliance gives a certain strength as the 
exchange continues.6
For these reasons, dyadic alliance relationships have advantages over 
rigid 'contractual relations' because they are more flexible, require a lower 
degree of consensual agreement, and are able to alter specific goals more 
readily, especially in terms of specific goals. Therefore, to some extent, dyadic 
alliance relationships offer both allied parties a degree of flexibility, a 
prerequisite for sustaining long life and enduring a changing political 
environment.7
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However, dyadic alliance-building has three limitations. It is ill suited to  the 
mobilisation of a large number of people for the pursuit of collective goals 
because of the small size of dyads, the nature of the process of dyadic alliance 
building, and the organisational characteristics of dyads. Moreover, It depends 
on the willingness of others to ally themselves with an individual. If a person can 
not afford something which is of value to another person, then the latter is 
unwilling to become his ally. Furthermore, the reliability and trustworthiness of a 
dyadic alliance are questionable because the maintenance of the alliance 
depends on the willingness of both allies to maintain it. Dyadic alliances are 
voluntary relationships without clearly delineated obligations. They are absent 
of legal impediments.’
Dyadic alliances appear as addenda to institutionalised relationships. They 
are created in the absence of effective corporate institutions or organisations, 
revealing the latter's inadequacies. On the other hand, dyadic alliances must 
be supported by a framework of institutionalised relationships. The 
interconnection between dyadic alliances and institutionalised relationships 
can be expected to promote the reliability of the alliances. The most obvious 
institutionalised relationships are constituted upon organisations of primary ties 
such as lineage, marriage, religion and region. In addition to institutionalised 
relationships, the innovation of norms, for example, the norm of reciprocity and 
the norm of personal loyalty, serves as a method to strengthen the reliability of 
dyadic alliances.'
Dyadic alliances are of two types: horizontal dyadic alliances, and vertical 
dyadic allidnces. Both types of alliances share similar structural characteristics: 
they involve the direct personal attachment of two individuals to each other, 
and they exist for the purpose of exchonging favours and providing mutual 
assurances of aid. However, the socio-economic status and resources of allied
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persons in the vertical dyadic alliances are unequal. The superior member of 
such an alliances is called a patron. By contrast, the inferior member Is called 
his client. As a result, a verticdl dyadic alliance is termed a patTon-cllent 
relationship or clientelist relationship.
The clientelist relationship is different from other kinds of relationships such 
as the exchange (generic) relationship and the power relationship. Nearly all 
social processes can be regarded In terms of exchange. The clientelist 
relationship is also founded on exchange, but Is an exchange relationship of a 
limited and specific kind. It takes different forms and is explicitly recognised, 
legitimised and reinforced. For this reason, Andrew J. Nathan points out that the 
clientelist tie is a special, quasi-contractual sub-type of exchange relationship.10 
At the other extreme, the clientelist tie sets up well-understood, although seldom 
explicit rights and obligations between the partners. It can be abrogated by 
either member at will. If the subordinate has no choice but obedience, the 
consequences of the relationship is a power relationship of imperative co­
ordination rather than clientelist relationship."
Yes, it is important to note that the definition of clientelism (or patron-client 
relationship) can also be expanded from a strictly dyadic relationship between 
two persons, as Bruce Jacobs defines it, to a dyadic relationship between two 
institutions (or groups), as John Duncan Powell asserts. For this reason, the term 
■patron” may mean an individual political leader or an institution, i.e. party. By 
the same token, '  client” may refer to either an individual faction member or an 
entire faction. This expanded definition helps explain the situation in Taiwan, 
where the KMT patron had one-to-one relationships with their clients, i.e. local 
faction leaders, who in turn are responsible for mobilising the membership of 
their factions into effective voting blocs for the KMT.’2
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The relationship between patrons and clients is certainly not 
unchangeable. The assignment of roles o f the patron and the client may be 
unstable. The client may leap ahead o f his patron, rising to a higher position. 
This is particularly likely in a political environment of free competition such as 
that of electoral politics. The relationship between patron and client may also 
change if the patron can no longer supply benefits to his client, if the patron's 
rewards become less attractive, or if a rival patron can provide high rewards at 
low cost to the client. In other words, the pdtron-client relationship becomes 
tenuous when the leadership of the patron loses strength or must compete with 
other patrons. A major shift in the power of either the patron or the client or 
both may necessitate a drastic readjustment or even abandonment of the 
patTon-client relationship.15
A faction is a complex network which is constituted by a number of dyadic 
alliances, both horizontal and vertical, through one or more nodes. The network 
includes all individuals who find themselves in a given field, and who are within 
direct or indirect reach of each other. Members are recruited and co­
ordinated on the basis of a one-to-one structure rather than a corporate 
pattern of relationships. They are not totally isolated from each other. They 
serve as arenas for all their interactions. The more extended the complex 
faction becomes, the greater the number of subordinate leaders it contains 
and the further removed faction members are from the primary leaders. The 
leader of each simple faction within the complex faction is primarily responsible 
to his own followers for political spoils.14
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Classifications of Factions
The term 'faction' in Chinese (pai-hst) is ambiguous in its meanings. It can be 
used as the same to describe any kind of organised group both within or 
outside the formal structure of institutions. This study is going to examine two sets 
of factions, i.e. factions within the KMT and factions in Taiwan's local units. As a 
result, a discussion of the various possible classifications of factions is necessary 
to clarify the differences between the forms of factions analysed in this study. 
According to the level of institutionalisation, factions can be classified into three 
types: factional cliques or tendencies, personal or client-group factions, and 
institutionalised or organisational factions.16
Factional cliques or tendencies are organised by a group of people on the 
basis of a shared ideology, policy goal or interest, centred on personal 
characters. They are either almost totally unorganised or else they are very 
ephemeral organisations, and they are typically quite informal without a 
faction symbol, name, headquarters, regular meeting, or known membership, 
The duration of factional cliques or tendencies is normally short. The right wing 
of Ihe Conservative Party in Britain, the conservatives and liberals of both the 
Democratic Party and Republican Party in the United States, and the 
mainstream and non-mainstream factions of the KMT in the post-Chiang Ching- 
kuo time are typical examples of this kind.16
Personal or client-group factions are determined by their leaders and the 
hierarchy of personal sub-leaders within them. Organisationally, client-group 
factions reflect the specific characteristics of their personal, leader-follower, i.e. 
patron-client, structure. Followers are directly recruited by leaders. They have a 
simple structure through which members are positioned hierarchically in a rigid 
pyramid. However, they have no scheduled meetings, formal votes, designated
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meeting places, or established factional headquarters. Most of the decisions 
are usually made by 1he leaders although they will consult some of their 
important members. Factions o f this kind are usually named by the surnames of 
their originators, or others which can symbolise characteristics of the factions. 
Such faction examples are found within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 
within the pro-1949 KMT, and in Taiwan's local units.17
With respect to institutionalised factions, they are distinct as a faction type 
primarily because of their highly developed organisational structure and their 
relative formality. Allhough they are basically of the generic client-group type, 
they are more public and symbolic than personal and private. Power tends to 
be dispersed rather than concentrated in one position. The leader tends to be 
attentive to the interests and opinions of the middle echelons. Such factions are 
highly institutionalised. They have formal political entities with headquarters, 
regular meetings, fixed and known memberships, an established structure, line 
officers, publications, firm discipline, and regular sources of funds.
Unlike factions of the other two kinds, institutionalised factions are the 
organised groups within existing political parties, institutions, etc. They perform 
clear functions in a political system. They offer the same kind of political 
programme as a party would. Likewise, they are able to carry out some of the 
functions of parties in a coalition cabinet system government. Factions in the 
Japanese Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) are weIPknown cases of 
institutionalised factions.16 The KMT's subgroups in the Legislative Yuan in the 
1990s can also be viewed basically as factions of this kind, but less capable and 
organised than factions in the Japanese LDP.
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According to the motive for faction formation, factions can also be 
classified into two groups: ideological factions and spoil factions. Ideological 
factions are built upon shared ideology or policy goals. In contrast, spoil 
factions mainly pursue power and interests. However, a water-light distinction 
between the two groups of factions seems problematic. A given factional 
system is more likely to  be a mixture of the two than a pure type. Most factions 
are motivated by shared ideologies, policy goals, and common interests. In 
particular, factions often resort to ideological concerns to legitimise their pursuit 
of spoils in political struggle in general, ideological factions are ideal types of 
non-corporate groups based on patron-client relationships. By contrast, spoil 
factions work for the advancement of particular interests although they are also 
built upon clientelist ties."
Factions can be also catagorised according to the arenas in which they 
move. For example, Chen Ming-tung divides factions into national factions and 
local factions two groups. National factions are those whose activities are in the 
national arena and are composed of predominately national elites Local 
factions, on the other hand, are based on local units and their memberships 
consist only of local elites. Furthermore, local factions compete for 
governmental and quasi-governmental resources, such as budgets for public 
works, at the local level, National factions, however, have more concerns with 
the interests of national political institutions.®
The Structural Characteristics of Factions
It also follows that the structure of factions has particular characteristics. First, 
factions are extremely flexible. In factional cliques and client-group factions, 
communication within the complex faction tends to  follow the lines of 
recruitment. This is because factions remain structured along the lines of the
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original ties which formed the bases of recruitment. The factional members 
never meet. Their activities are co-ordinated through individual communication 
with the leader and sub-leaders. The leader directs the activities of each 
member for the overall good of the faction. Thus, the faction is capable of 
great flexibility in seizing political opportunities and engaging in political 
activities.’'
Yet institutionalised factions such as factions in the Japanese LDP are 
exceptional. Their formal political entities, regular meetings, known 
memberships, established structures, and other institutionalised characteristics 
make these factions formal political organisations within the party. Factional 
activities and communication between factional members are open. However, 
despite the high level of institutionalisation of these factions, their capabilities of 
engaging in political activities are still greater than the party in terms of the 
organisational flexibility.
Second, the levels at which factions can become corporate entities and 
the degree to which factions can engage in finely co-ordinated activities are 
limited because of the boundaries of their extent, co-ordination, their one-to- 
one communication structure, and their tendency towards breakdown. In 
addition, foctions are limited in size, follower commitment, and stability by the 
principles of their own organisation. In olher words, factions enjoy less power 
capability than formal organisations, and they are limited in the amount and 
kinds of power they can wield and generate.“  Although institutionalised 
factions may enjoy greater organisational capability than factional cliques and 
client-group factions, their organisational capability are still less compared with 
the party as a whole.
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Third, the leader plays a significant role behind the faction's development. 
As a faction is founded upon exchange relationships, the leader's ability to 
secure and distribute rewards to his followers is directly linked to the growth and 
continuity of the faction. According to Chen Ming-tung, there is a relatively 
close relationship between the strength of the leadership and the coherence of 
the faction. When the leader has greater capability to wield control over, and 
more resources to  reward his followers, then the faction tends to be more 
coherent.“
Nevertheless, a faction cannot survive Its leader. The death or retirement 
of the leader does not halt the movements of the faction. The members of the 
faction continue in political activities. Members may associate for a time and 
continue to be known by the original name or signal of the faction. They may 
join other factions or seek to found their own faction. However, the faction 
cannot be completely restructured or taken over as a whole by the successor 
since the set o f clientelist ties on which it is founded forms a unique 
configuration centred on the leader.“
One thing which must not be forgotten is that interest discrepancies 
between different sets of leaders In the complex faction exist all the time. This 
creates potential internal conflicts within the factional organisation inasmuch as 
leaders of lower segments may betray the interests of the faction as a whole in 
order to secure greater rewards for the segments below them. Likewise, the sub­
leaders and their followers are capable of operating as distinct factions If they 
free themselves from the larger faction.“
Fourth, factions are most likely to develop within formal organisations. This is 
because the intra-organisational communications network can aid In co­
ordinating the activities between faction members. Moreover, the hierarchical
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authority pattern of formal organisations strengthens the personal loyalty of 
faction leaders at lower levels to leaders at higher levels. Furthermore, the 
hierarchy and authority flow bring interests of faction leaders at various levels of 
the existing organisation into harmony. Briefly, the established communications 
and hierarchical power arrangements of the existing organisation help the 
complex faction to extend Its informal relationships, personal loyalties, and 
relations.26
Fifth, large favours tend to cause difficult problems of factional 
management. The increases in the scale and number of resources of the 
faction enhance the tendency for divergent interests to emerge among 
component sub-leaders in various segments of the complex faction. On the 
other hand, factions tend to expand with the increase of resources. This may 
weaken the leader's position vis-à-vis his subordinates and deprive the leader 
himself of direct control over component units. This is to say. the growth of the 
faction may expand beyond the borders of an internally unified factional base. 
Thus, faction division and decline can become possible as a result of an 
increase in resources.
Faction versus Party
Factions and parties were both Indiscriminately deplored when the modem 
political party was bom.27 Factions are commonly founded in democratic 
parties inasmuch as the encouragement of diversity and dissent within parties is 
an integral part of their democratic credentials. However, in an authoritarian 
party where power is highly centralised and factionalism specially proscribed, 
political leaders frequently place a faction of their supporters in strategic 
positions to back them in their claims for high offices.
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Parties and factions share similar structural characteristics. Both are
motivated essentially by clientelist ties. However, parties are corporate groups 
which pursue support, especially for elections, with particularistic rewards 
distributed through a leader-follower network of clientelist ties. On the other 
hand, most factions lack the distinguishing characteristics of fully corporate 
groups: undivided common property, aims and duties, and uniform linkage 
through common membership in the group as such.2* To express it differently, 
parties are functionally specialised organisations compared with factions. Their 
clear boundaries, their high degree of control over participants, and their 
engagement in feats of mobilisation, indoctrination and co-ordination are 
beyond the capacities of factions.* However, parties themselves may 
approximate to factions in much of their behaviour where they remain weakly 
institutionalised
In most cases, factions have neither commonly recognised recruitment 
mechanisms nor defined memberships. Nor do they have fixed organisations 
and established management regulations. However, they remain structured 
and are capable of fulfilling the functions of corporate groups. This is why 
Mayer treats factions as quasi-groups or informal groups.3' Despite the 
deficiency of functionalisation, factions are capable of influencing political 
development. For example, factionalism can often change the policy-making 
decision and the personnel appointments of a government or a party.
A different pattern, already mentioned above, can be found in Japan 
where most political parties contain a number of factions that have existed for 
decades. These factions are well institutionalised and may be regarded as an 
integral part of the political system. They belong to a large party patronage 
machine which functions to channel electoral funds and provide political 
positions for their members. Policy differences may be distinguished along
54
ideological lines in left-wing parties, but are much less significant between the 
major factions of the Japanese LDP.“
However, institutional factions as Japanese cases are still different from 
parties In organisational flexibility and capability terms. As I have pointed out, 
institutional factions' capabilities of engaging in political activities are greater 
than parties in terms of organisational flexibility and institutional factions' 
organisational capability are less compared with the party as a whole, based 
on the structural characteristics of factions.
2.2 The Causes of Factions
A variety of factors which contribute to the development of factions can be 
grouped into two general categories: socio-cultural causes and political 
causes. Cultural peculiarities have some clear implications for factional 
development. As Zariski states, * cultural norms are one of the factors 
determining the origination, organisation, cohesion, and durability of 
factions."”  According to  him, the indigenous cultural norms have profound 
effects on factionalism in a given society. Especially significant are the 
characteristics toward divisiveness, fission or internal conflict, etc., and the 
native forms of group formation.”
Lu Va-li also draws attention to the significance of socio-cultural factors for 
the development of factions. He suggests that the reason why factions are 
more active in one counfry 1han in anolher is 1hat there are differences of 
cultural structure between countries. He argues that factions are more likely to 
develop in o society where fomllies trodltionolty have more influence on 
personal activities such as Taiwan, Soulh Korea, Japan, and China.”  Seongyi
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Yun shares a similar view with Lu as he points out that cultural roots, such as 
strong family and group loyalties and cultural norms, have a certain correlation 
with the growth of factions.“
Contributory factors related to political attributes include the 
characteristics of the parly system (1his refers to the relative strength of parties) 
and the characteristics of the electoral system. According to Yun Seongyi, 
factions are more prevalent in caucus-type parties than in mass-type parties. In 
mass-type parties, the party structure is normally tightly organised and well- 
articulated. Those conditions limit the development of factions. In contrast, the 
organisational structure of caucus-type parties is looser and less clearly 
delineated. Caucus-type parties are also less oriented toward ideology. These 
conditions are viewed as auspicious for the growth of factions.57
A distinct relationship between elections and political factionalism is 
observable. Elections serve as an important mechanism for power distribution In 
democratic politics. However, elections also encourage the development of 
intra-party factions as party members often group themselves to compete with 
others in the same party for party tickets to run for election campaigns This 
inevitably leads to the growth of intTa-party factions. Elections can contribute to 
party integration around party leaders If the latter are capable of rewarding 
their followers through elections. Nevertheless, elections also generate factional 
recrimination against party leaders and between factions If the party's 
electoral performance is poor.“
Moreover, the form of electoral system also has an impact on the 
development of factions. A study by Halbeisen and Ferdinand Indicates that 
the multi-member single-vote electoral system for members to legislatures at 
various levels In Japan and Taiwan provides fertile ground for the growth of
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factions.5' Under ttnis system, candidates of the same party have to fight with 
each other for their own name recognition and candidate identification in the 
same constituencies. In order to distinguish themselves from other competitors 
of the same party, 1hey usually form their own small political platforms with 
campaign organisations. This inevitably contributes to the growth of intra-party 
factions.“
What is noteworthy is that the multi-member single-vote constituency 
election system might also lead to the upsurge of new parties based on groups 
of disenchanted party members. So long as there is a demand for more groups 
or parties, a group or party structured by ethnic, religious, linguistic, regional, or 
other social cleavages, by itself or in combination, can continue to emerge." 
As a result, the multi-member single-vote constituency election system is also 
conducive to the rise of a multiparty system.
Finally, factions are more likely to grow during a time of rapid political 
change, i.e. power iransliions. A power vacancy and the process of power 
realignment provide considerable opportunities for political elites. They often 
group themselves to  enter into conflict, mobilise support, and compete for 
spoils. In the period of political transition, factions relate to the broader process 
of political changes and become an integral part of that change."
2.3 The Characteristics of Factional Politics
Factions are limited In the size of their organisations due to  structurol limitations. 
Since factions can only comprise a group of participants, other people may 
create new factions If they deem It is worth doing so. Thus, any factional arena 
has more than one faction. While several factions compete for limited resources
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and spoils a t tne same time, conflict in tne given political system becomes 
apparent. For this reason, Raleph W. Nicholas stresses that factional politics are 
full of conflict "  However, no faction is able to achieve and maintain 
overwhelmingly superior power and none is capable of eliminating the others “  
Factional conflict is therefore guided by d code of civility so 1bot. for example, 
factions seldom kill or joil their opponents wllhin the system "
Moreover, defensive strategies predominate over political initiatives in 
frequency and importance since factions are incapable of building sufficient 
power to overthrow the political system where factions themselves exist. 
Factions rely on secret preparation and surprise offensives when they seek to 
take the political initiative. Therefore, factions are obliged to enter into a series 
of constantly shifting defensive alliances since the political life of a factional 
system consists of occasional initiatives by consistent factions. As a result, 
factional alliances cannot remain stable. It is impossible for factions to make 
ideological agreements for alliances with other factions "
Factional political systems tend to prevent the emergence of strong 
factions because a strong faction constitutes a threat to 1he other factions' 
opportunities for power, likewise, factions tend to amalgamate in order to 
defend against other factions doing the same thing If there are a very large 
number of factions in the political system. The incentive to amalgamate 
continues until 1t>e total number o f factions has been reduced to the point 
where most of the component factions enjoy enough strength to launch a 
political initiative and defend themselves This is why the number of factions in a 
given arena is unlikely to be vary large."
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Factional elites are not permitted to question the legitimacy upon which 
the factions base their claim to  a role in the larger society. Since this can cause 
problems of continuity of the factional system, whoever challenges the 
legitimacy of the factional system will be destroyed by other factional elites. The 
lack of extreme sanctions employed in a faction's struggle and a faction's 
tendency to defend its existence against rival factions or external threats 
contribute to the stability o f the factional systems. Factional systems try to 
reassert their equilibrium rather than change their internal structure while 
responding to challenges from the political environment. Unless there is an 
overwhelmingly destructive force, such as foreign conquest, rebellion or military 
coup, the factional system cannot easily be overthrown ®
According to the modes of factional conflict mentioned above, politics 
under factional systems is unproductive. The most commonly known 
phenomenon of factional politics is political corruption. The nature of factions is 
founded on the exchanges o f favours through a large number of non-ascriptive 
two-person relationships. In order to maintain the continuity of factions 
themselves, faction leaders often use public resources to reward their followers 
once they control governmental authority or power. Typical forms of political 
corruption include bribery, venality, nepotism, and misappropriation, leading to 
partisan politics and bureaucratic capitalism. The latter refers to the 
institutionalised combination of governmental resources and factions' interests 
through bureaucratic structures.®
Moreover, issues which arise in the political system are resolved only slowly 
and with difficulty as a result of the nature of factionalism. Since every decision, 
for example, policy decisions, personnel appointments, and resolutions of 
conflict, are more advantageous to some factions than to others, the 
consensus which is necessary for action is difficult to achieve. Such
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circumstances can result in a policy-making stalemate.“
One issue closely related to the above-mentioned discussion is that 
factional conflict often causes the weakness of a government's competence 
to  deal with political challenges. Although factions may unite to fight against 
internal or external sources which challenge the existence of the political system 
under political crises, they do not cease to mobilise resources to compete with 
others. This is because the actions which carry the political system through the 
crisis inevitably have implications for all factions in the system: they benefit some 
factions more than others. As a result, some factions will act to block the efforts 
o f the leading faction to strengthen itself and the factional consensus declines. 
For this reason, the political system's capacity to resolve political crises is always 
limited.51
Furthermore, ideological issues serve as strategic contrivances for factions 
to  engage in conflict with others. Although the real distance between factions 
in ideology and political programme may be small, and although no faction is 
likely to be able to carry out an innovative political programme, grand polices 
and broad programmes are articulated and debated. In factional politics, 
factions tend to exaggerate small differences in ideological positions and 
political programmes which have strategic implications for factional power.“
Andrew J. Nathan points that such behaviour serves several purposes. First, 
it distinguishes one faction from one another whose image is similar. Second, it 
provides a rationale for the faction to engage in continued struggle. Third, it 
provides an opportunity to discredit other politicians and to justify oneself. 
Fourth, to couch struggle in abstract terms is really over the advantages of a 
policy to one side or the other since the broad programmes often include 
inconspicuous provisions of true strategic political importance.“
Research by Pu Chuang-tsai also shows that conflicts of ideology, policy 
and power, by itself or in combination, serve as major resources for struggle 
between factions. However, ideology and policy themselves do not produce 
factional conflict although they frequently become a cause initiating 
factionalism. This is because in reality factions seldom directly claim their desire 
for power. Besides, a legitimate name can advance a faction's capacity to 
mobilise resources as well as support to carry out conflict. In most cases, power 
conflict is the genuine factor of struggle between factions.54
Admittedly, some positive consequences flow from factional competition. 
Factions are conducive to the stability of 1he political system as they can 
channel the different interests of various social groups within parties. Through a 
party's institutionalised movement and regulations, the needs of small social 
groups can be perceived by the government. In this sense, factions reduce 
potential social tensions. Likewise, faction formation can cross the boundaries of 
regions, religions, ethnic groups, and so on. The structural characteristics of 
factions have a similar effect on the maintenance o f integration of the political 
system.55
Moreover, factions may contribute to 1he establishment of party politics. If 
intra-party factions do not make use of the party in which they exist to pursue 
their particular interests, but fuse with other more or less organised groups with a 
view to form a party faction, they can play a constructive role in the creation 
of a parly system. In other words, if the centrifugal forces of factions to form an 
independent party can be effectively marginalised and if the consensus on 
party unity prevails over factional conflict and disagreement, factions have 
Integral functions in maintaining rather than undermining a party's unity.55
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Furthermore, factional competition fulfils the positive functions of party 
competition in a single dominant party. Factions perform as quasi-parties to 
aggregate various demands from, and distribute interests among, different 
political as well as social forces. More importantly, factional competition 
prevents dictatorship within the dominant party and keeps the party flexible 
enough to respond to political changes.57 Face-to-face interaction between 
factional leaders also contributes to communication within parties. It bridges 
the distance between leaders and indirectly supports the effectiveness of policy 
formulation and implementation.
Finally, in highly institutionalised parties such as the Japanese LDP. factions 
become an integral part of the political system. They function as channels to 
raise electoral funds from corporations and businesses to  assist their members to 
run for public offices. Also, factions serve as a stairway to top party and 
governmental positions for factional members. Institutionalised procedures and 
rules of factional competition contribute to the development o f democratic 
credentials.
2.4 Research Agendas and Framework
On the basis of the above review of theories, the subjects which are due to be 
examined in the coming chapters can be categorised as follows.
1. The development of factional politics during the re-establishment of 1he 
ROC (referring to the early period of the KMT's rule in post-war Taiwan, i.e. the 
1950s). It concerns the KMT's campaigns against factionalism within its own 
ranks and the development o f factionalism in the local units at that time.
2. The origins of Taiwanese local factions, organisational characteristics 
and operations of the factions. 1he interaction wllhln local factions and
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between local factions and the KMT. political contents of the KMT's 
establishment of alliance relationships with local factions.
4. Factions at the central level of the KMT after the collapse of strongman 
politics, i.e. factionalism between the mainstream and non-mainstream factions 
in the post-Chiang Ching-kuo era. and its effects on Taiwan and the KMT's 
political development.
5. The significance of change in the KMT-local factions clientelist alliances 
for Taiwan's democratic transition and the development of local factionalism 
after the collapse o f KMT authoritarian rule. i.e. the changing patron-client 
relationships between the KMT and local factions in the new political era.
In general, this study deals with two spheres of clientelism in Taiwan: 
patron-client relationships between the KMT and local factions and clientelism 
within local factions (between factional leaders and their clients, i.e. their 
factional members).
In order to deal with the effects of change in the KMT-local factions 
alliance relations on Taiwan's democratic transition, I adopt Chen Ming-tung's 
perspective as main research framework. According to Chen Ming-tung, the 
change of the KMT's clientelist alliances with local factions has significant 
Implications for the regime's democratic transformation. He argues that the 
KMT's establishment of clientelist alliances with local factions was the most 
important reason why the KMT was able to maintain its authoritarian control in 
Taiwan for the past decades. Through the patronage system, the KMT 
successfully controlled the state apparatus, penetrated Taiwanese society, and 
legitimised itself through elections. For this reason, the question of whether the 
structure of the KMT-local factions alliance functions effectively has profound 
implication for the KMT's ruling power.5*
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Furthermore. Chen Ming-tung points out that the more stable the structure 
of the KMT's alliances with local factions, the stronger the KMT's authoritarian 
control, and vice versa.”  Figure 2.1 reveals a clear relationship between the 
performance of the KMT's cllentelist alliances with local factions and the 
strength of its political control. However, the relationship is seen as a curved line 
rather than a straight one.
Figure 2.1 The Relationship between the Change of the KMT-Local Factions 
Alliance and the Strength of the KMT's Authoritarian Control
When the stability of the alliance structure rises from S3 to S4. the strength o f the 
KMT's control only increases from A2 to A l. This is because the ruling strength 
generated from cllentelist methods is limited compared with the ruling strength 
which other forms of regime, for example, a monarchical regime or dictatorial
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government, can generate. By contrast, when the degree of stability falls from 
S2 to SI, the strength of the KMT's control reduces from A3 to A4, thus 
accelerating the decline of the ruling power since conflict inside the alliance 
structure can offset its functional strength outside. The alliance structure 
functions less well when its instability Increases “
The point has been already made several times that factions are based on 
a relationship of interest exchange. In the exchange process, the client's loyalty 
to the patron depends on the resources which the latter can offer to the former 
as a reward. However, conditions for the olliance between the patron and 
client change over time. When the initial alliance conditions are transformed, 
the existing alliance structure also alters. For example, the patron may lose his 
resources or power, and the client's power or resources may increase to 
equalise or even surpass those of the patron with a change of political context, 
Under such circumstances, the positions between the patron and client can be 
reversed.
However, there are still several important questions to be answered In the 
following chapters. Which factors constituted the formation of the cllentelist 
alliance between the KMT and local factions? What were the essence and 
contents of the KMT-local factions alliance structure? Which factors caused the 
change of alliance structure. Initiating Taiwan's democratic transition? How 
would the KMT-local factions alliance relationship and the KMT's factional 
politics develop after the collapse of the regime's authoritarian control?
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2.5 Studies of Taiwanese Factional Politics
The subject of factional politics in Taiwan did not attract much academic 
interest till 11 years ago. Two of the very few examples of studies of Taiwan's 
factional politics before 1987 were Bernard Gallin's Hsin Hsing. Taiwan: A 
Chinese Village in Change (1966) and Bruce Jocobs's Local Politics in A Rural 
Chinese Cultural Setting: A Field Study of Mazu Township, Taiwan (1980). 
Through their respective field researches in Hsin Hsing and Mazu, two townships 
in Chiayl Country, they both argued tha t local socio-cultural roots were 
transformed into social and political cleavages between local elites under 
circumstances of excessive electoral competition. Therefore, they concluded, 
traditional social-cultural characteristics contributed to the creation of Taiwan's 
local factions.
Native literature of Taiwan's factional politics was first seen when Chao 
Yung-mao published his book The Relationship between Local Factions and 
Construction in Taiwan (1978). Chao's research used quantitative studies. By 
way of many surveys in Taiwan's local areas, he effectively showed the 
negative effects of local factions on local development both political and 
economic. Chao claimed that factionalism is more intense in areas whose 
development is inferior. But, intense factionalism in turn also hinders the 
development of the areas. This book was re-written and re-edited into The 
Change and Characteristics of Taiwan's Local Politics, published in 1997.
In 1985, China Times, one of the major newspapers in Taiwan, published a 
book titled The Analysis of Taiwanese Local Factions, focusing on Taiwan's local 
factions. This book provided a historicdl review of local factions in Taiwan since 
1949. The significance of those factions was also examined. A similar book was 
published by United News in 1996. titled Local Factions and Taiwanese Politics.
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The authors of these two books were local political corespondents of the two 
newspapers who had first-hand experiences with local politicians. However, 
these two books were written for the layman so they are broad in scope, but 
do not provide in-depth analysis.
After 1987, a few scholars and graduate students have focused on the 
subject of Tdiwan's factional politics. Wu Nai-teh published his PhD thesis titled 
‘ The Politics of A Regime Patronage System: Mobilisation and Control within on 
Authoritarian Regime' (1987) at Chicago University. His research was the first 
study which systematically analysed the KMT's control o f Taiwan during the 
authoritarian years through the concept of the factionalism approach, i.e. 
patTon-client relations. Wu argued that the KMT deliberately encouraged and 
manipulated local factions through a patronage system, a system which 
successfully maintained this émigré regime's authoritarian control in Taiwan for 
the past four decades.
In 1989, Chu Yun-hon published an article titled "Monopolised Economy 
and Authoritarian Political System.' Basically, the research approach applied in 
Chu's drticle was nor far different from that in We Nai-teh's doctoral thesis. 
However, Chu Yun-han's study mainly focused on the economic aspect of the 
KMT's clientelist management of its relations with local factions in the 
authoritarian era. His research also emphasised the significance of cllentellsm in 
explaining the KMT's political management before Taiwan's démocratisation.
Chen Ming-tung published his PhD thesis titled "The Mobilisation of 
Taiwan's Local Elites under the Authoritarian Regime (1945-1986)" at National 
Taiwan University in 1990. Through analyses of the mobilisation of Taiwan's 
provincial assemblymen (termed senators before 1950) between 1946 and 1986. 
Chen Ming-tung made several important explanations of how the KMT won
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local factional support in elections, thus gaining political control and legitimacy. 
Based on this thesis, he wrote a paper with Chu Yun-han entitled * Localised 
Economic Monopoly, Local Factions, and Provincial Legislature Elections,' in 
1992. This paper emphasised again the importance of the KMT’s clientelist 
alliances with local factions in its authoritarian control.
During the early 1990s, the eruption of intra-KMT factionalism in the post- 
Chiang Ching-kuo era drew great attention from Taiwanese analysts. A number 
of books, containing a great deal of information about factionalism between 
the KMT mainstream and non-mainstream factions were published. Well-known 
examples of them included: The One Hundred Days of Lee Teng-hui (Chou Yu- 
kou, 1993), Lee Teng-hui's Strategy (Chang Yu-yeh, 1994), and Political Tour of 
Hao Pai-tsun (Wang Li-hsing, 1994). However, a major drawback of these books 
is that they were not academic works; they were produced by correspondents 
and their contents were descriptive rather than analytical.
Academic studies of intra-KMT factionalism In the early 1990s were limited. 
Steven J. Hood's article titled ‘ Political Change in Taiwan: The Rise of 
Kuomintang Factions' (1996) was one of the very few examples. In this article. 
Hood argued that ethnic cleavage between Taiwanese and mainlanders and 
the process of Taiwan's démocratisation were the two major factors of intra- 
KMT factionalism in the post-Chiang Ching-kuo era. He concluded that the rise 
of the then-factionalism within the KMT was a reflection of the difficulty the 
party had in confronting two related issues: the Taiwanese-mainlander rift in the 
KMT and the problem of Taiwan's political identify.
In 1992, Joseph Bosco published a paper titled ‘ Taiwan Factions: Guanxi, 
Patronage, and the State in Local Politics," (1992). In this paper, he rejected the 
idea that Taiwanese local factions should be seen primarily as products o f its
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traditional socio-cultural roots. Bosco also refuted the Idea that local factions 
were created only because of KMT Institutionalised designs. He argued that 
Taiwanese local factions were institutions developed under Taiwan's special 
political, economic, social, and historical backgrounds. His paper concluded 
that Taiwanese local factions would eventually break up with increasing levels 
of socio-economic modernisation and political démocratisation.
Two years later, in 1994, Bosco published another paper on the subject of 
Taiwan's factional politics titled 'Factions versus Ideology: Mobilisation 
Strategies In Taiwan's Elections." Bosco claimed that Taiwanese local factions 
were originally fostered and manipulated by the KMT to allow the immigrant 
elites to rule the native population. Factional politics in Taiwan's local areas was 
based on patronage to win elections and deliver resources. Factional elections 
were presented to the outside world as evidence of democracy so as to 
legitimise the KMT's rule in Taiwan. Besides, he argues, local elections tended to 
be dominated by factions, the networks of social ties and patronage that keep 
them powerful.
A paper titled "The Case Study of the Origins of Taiwan's Local Factions: 
Tanshu." written by Tsai Ming-hui and Chang Mao-kel was published In 1994. 
This paper highlighted the weakness of both the socio-cultural and political 
perspectives in the explanation of the origins of Taiwan's local factions. They 
suggested that Taiwan's local factions were neither simply the product of a 
concentration of traditional socio-cultural roots and relationships nor the 
outcome of the KMT's Institutional designs and political management. Sharing 
Bosco's view, they concluded that Taiwanese local factions were Institutions 
developed through certain historical, social, economic, and political 
circumstances.
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Chen Ming-tung published his book named Factional Politics and Political 
Dynamics of Taiwan in 1995. He argued that the existence of factions within the 
KMT's own ranks and in Taiwan's local units was closely affiliated with the 
political characteristics of the KMT regime and its authoritarian management of 
Taiwan. By way of a historical perspective, he adopted the factionalism 
approach to analyse the dynamic of Taiwan's politics in the past four decades. 
He concluded that changes in the clientelist alliance relations between the KMT 
and local factions was the key factor in initiating Taiwan's démocratisation.
A very recent work in the study of Taiwan's local factions is Shih Wei- 
chuan's MA dissertation titled * Local Factions" (1996). Shih adopted the 
concept of informal politics to  replace authoritarian theories to explain how 
Taiwanese local factions emerged and how they have changed over time. He 
argues that authoritarianism theories effectively explain how the KMT immigrant 
elites could rule the native population. However, they are insufficient to 
account for the activities of local society and local factions. He concluded that 
the significance of study of local factions has declined compared to state- 
business relationship, since the importance of business groups in the KMT's 
efforts to maintain its legitimacy has been gradually superceding that of local 
factions in present-day Taiwan.
Wang Chen-shiuen's PhD thesis named “ Faction Politics in Taiwan: A 
Perspective on Patron-client Theory" (1996) published by the University of 
Kansas is another very new work focusing on Taiwan's factional politics. In this 
thesis, Wang adopted the patron-client theory to examine local factions and 
the relationships between the KMT and local factions. His research focused on 
changes in the KMT's clientelist relations with local factions in the process of 
Taiwan's démocratisation. Differing from my study, which adopts the 
factionalism approach to explain how Taiwan's democracy was actually
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achieved. Wang Chen-shiuen's study only examines one aspect of the KMT's 
clientelist management with, and changes of, Taiwanese local factions.
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CHAPTER 3
The K M T ’s Factionalism in the Re-establishment o f the 
R O C
In 1949 the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) established its regime on the 
mainland following its military triumph in the civil war against the KMT. The KMT 
then retreated to Taiwan. The CCP maintained military attacks on Taiwan's 
territory and Washington's attitude remained that of a neutral. Together, these 
factors caused crucial problems for the regime's survival. However, the eruption 
of the Korean War in 1950 elevated Taiwan's strategic importance in US global 
defence policy. The KMT's durability was confirmed after Washington reasserted 
its strategic alliance with the KMT regime. Taiwan thus became involved in the 
confrontation between the Western democratic and Eastern communist blocs.
The US government announced its decision to station the Seventh Fleet in 
the Taiwan Straits to defend against CCP invasion in 1950. In 1954 Washington 
further concluded a mutual defence treaty with Taipei. Moreover, the United 
States provided Taiwan with more than US$ 2.5 billions of military aid between 
1950 and 1974, and US$ 1.5 billions in economic aid between 1950 and 1965.' 
America also helped Taiwan to reform its land and agriculture, and to establish 
an industrial infrastructure. More importantly, the United States strongly 
supported Taiwan's representation in the international community, especially In 
the UN, helped the KMT to legitimise its governing In Taiwan.
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As Wang Cheng-huan points out. Taiwan's survival in the early 1950s would 
not have been possible without help from the United States.2 Indeed, military, 
economic and political support from Washington in the 1950s and 1960s 
provided the KMT regime with the necessary surroundings and resources to 
establish its legitimacy at home. It also greatly helped the regime to consolidóte 
its authority. However, the United States' involvement a t that time also 
proscribed the KMT's military recovery of the Chinese mainland, creating a 
separation across the Taiwan Straits which has persisted to the present day.
This chapter begins with a retrospective analysis of the process of the KMT's 
re-establishment of its regime in the early 1950s. This review provides a 
conceptualisation of the political system of the KMT as an authoritarian regime. 
Next, the discussion turns to the regime's re-organisation of its ruling elite 
structure, by the elimination of factionalism during the period of the re­
establishment of the ROC. Then, the KMT's organisation of local political elites is 
considered. This offers a starting-point toward a discussion of the KMT's 
establishment of clientelist alliance relationships with local factions.
3.1 The KMT's Political Re-establishment
After the KMT retreated to Taiwan. Its political objectives replaced military ones 
as primary goal. This was the first step toward the regime's recovery of the 
mainland and the completion on national construction. Political re­
establishment was also necessary for the KMT to restore its political capacity 
and to establish its rule over Taiwan, where the KMT had no experience in 
governing and where the people generally remained hostile to the regime.5 
With the United States' strong support abroad, political re-establishment was
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vigorously Implemented at home.
Political re-establlshment had already been initiated in the midst of full- 
scale civil war. In the summer of 1947, the first National Assembly (controlled by 
the KMT) announced the Period of National Mobilisation for Suppression of the 
Communist Rebellion. Subsequently, in April 1948 It adopted the Temporary 
Provisions, which replaced or superseded many important provisions of the ROC 
Constitution and put the country into a permanent state of emergency.' The 
Temporary Provisions on the other hand provided the ” legal basis" for the KMT 
to centralise power under its leader Chlang Kai-shek. Under these provisions, the 
President was endowed with extra-ordinary powers subject to no constitutional 
check. Restrictions on the President to two terms In office were abandoned. The 
President was also given the power to adjust governmental institutions and to 
control the Legislative Yuan and National Assembly.5
Moreover, the government was free of all constitutional restrictions to 
promulgate laws and regulations under the emergency rule. For example. 
Martial Law was declared in May 1949, and used to crush political dissent and 
maintain the KMT's dominance over society. Under Martial Law, the Garrison 
Command assumed a major responsibility In security-related civilian affairs 
"from exit and entry visa permission, border control, coast guard, surveillance 
over political dissidents, eavesdropping on serious activities, random screening 
of mail and telephones, spying on Intellectuals, censorship o f publication and 
mass media, detention o f political prisoners and serious criminals, crackdown 
on organised crime, to supervision of civilian policy force."5 All sedition cases 
were prosecuted by the military and tried by the military-court system before 
1984/
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Other important decrees endorsed by the Temporary Provisions included 
the National Mobilisation Law, the Law on the Organisation of Civil Groups, and 
the Statutes for the Purging of Communist Agents. Under the series of 
emergency decrees, the public's freedom to speak, publish, associate, and 
rally was restricted. The formation of new political parties or groups was 
banned. Important civil societies (such as business associations and industrial 
associations) were directly or indirectly controlled by the KMT in order to 
prevent the emergence of opposition forces. Political opposition was tolerated 
only if it was individual-based, fragmented, and locally oriented.8 Two parties, 
the Young China Party and the Chinese Democratic Socialist Party, were 
allowed to exist since they posed no threat to the KMT, but helped the KMT to 
-justify" its democracy.
After the KMT moved to Taiwan, it claimed that it was still the legitimate 
government of the whole of China. As the presence of members of the three 
national representative institutions (the National Assembly, the Legislative Yuan 
and the Control Yuan) elected on the mainland in 1947-48 might symbolise the 
ROC government's continuity and claim to the Chinese mainland, the KMT 
undercut the representative nature of the three national representative 
institutions on Taiwan. For this reason, the legislative institutions at the national 
level were not subject to elections and continued to consist of the 
representatives chosen throughout China on a province-by-province basis in 
the elections of 1947.
Though elections for supplementary seats in national representative bodies 
were held from 1972, representatives of the Island of Taiwan were always In a 
small minority in the legislative institutions. This situation remained unchanged 
until 1992.'’ Also, direct popular elections for executive posts were limited a t the 
sub-national level only and provincial governors were appointed by the KMT
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although during the early 1950s the KMT began to Institute local and provincial 
elections on Taiwan. Those arrangements served as means of maintaining the 
KMT's dominance of national power.
In addition to the deprivation of political pluralism as endorsed by the 
Constitution, the KMT re-organised itself in the early 1950s. Party re-organisation 
was in fact proposed by Chiang Kai-shek as early as In 1947. However, the 
advent of the Chinese civil war interrupted the process. After the KMT moved to 
Taiwan, the party re-initiated Its pdrty reforms. A study group was formed in 
January 1950 to draft operational measures for party re-organisation. The 
Central Re-organisation Committee (CRC) was established on 5,h August 1950. 
The CRC also created a provincial re-organisation committee which was in 
charge of separate re-organisation commissions in each county.10 The CRC 
served as a political mechanism to re-organise its ruling society and to help the 
KMT to  infiltrate Taiwanese society.
Although the KMT had originally adopted Leninist organisational principles 
under Sun Ydt-sen in 1924 to restore its party organisation and adjust its 
dependence on the military, it did not gain success. Excessive intra-KMT 
factionalism after the death of Sun Yat-sen, the eruption of the Sino-Japanese 
war, and the mounting losses of the civil war hindered the KMT's organisational 
strengthening. As a result, Leninist organisational principles did not take root In 
the KMT before it retreated to Taiwan. In contrast, the CCP was established on 
the model of the Soviet Communist Party. Its organisation was fundamentally 
guided by Leninist principles. The whole of the CCP's organisation was 
dominated by Leninist-style pdrty management.
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As Chiang Kai-shek believed that the communist victory was due to their 
superior organisational power rather than military factors, this led to the KMT's 
re-adoption of Leninist methods to reform itself from 1949. Leninist methods also 
suited Chiang Kai-shek's personal desire for power and the KMT regime's 
governing task in Taiwan." According to Leninist methods, the KMT created a 
network of party cells throughout the government, military, and civil society to 
which each party member had to belong.12 A Party cadre system was also 
created. The Revolutionary Practice Institute, the Circuit Training Commission, 
and the Taiwan Provincial Re-organisation Commission were created to take 
responsibility for cadre training at all levels.13
Moreover, the CRC approved the 'Scheme for the Returning of Party 
Members and the Plan for the Purging of Party Members' in September 1950, 
serving as a way to re-organise and tidy up its party membership. According to 
the measure, members who had lost contact with the party during the 
confusion of the civil war and the regime's retreat to Taiwan were asked to re­
register with the party. Afterwards, 20,258 KMT members applied and were 
given new cards. 118 members were excluded from the party. Those who did 
not register were automatically expelled.’4 At the same time, the KMT initiated 
the recruitment of new party members. Membership Increased by 2 per cent to 
a new total of 919,327."
Furthermore, the party established various branches at the different 
administrational levels, i.e. the national, provincial, city-county, and hsiang- 
township levels. Below the sub-country branch were cells. All KMT members 
were asked to join a party cell and attend its meetings. The cell also became 
both the basic organisational and training unit in charge of actual party work 
and recruitment. The KMT also re-organised its cadre system along 
occupational-functional lines." After the re-organisation, the new KMT consisted
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of cross-cutting functional units organised alone both geographical and 
corporatist lines.’’ Figure 3.1 shows the KMT's organisational structure after re­
organisation.
Figure 3.1 The KMT's Organisational Structure
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Source:
Chung kuo kuomintang chien chieh [An Introduction to the KMT], (Taipei: The Central Committee o f the KMT,
1984) , 4 .
Furthermore, the KMT passed the " Outline of Party-Government Relations" on 
28 February 1951. According to the Outline, the KMT's organs within national 
government organs were subordinate to the Party committee of that organ. 
Party committees at all levels were the decision-making bodies. In addition, 
party committees were in charge of supervising the working of the government 
and representative bodies. By contrast, party members in administrative and all 
representative organs were responsible for carrying out policies approved by 
party committees at those levels."
Under such circumstances, no branch of the state apparatus, not even 
the Judiciary, was completely free of the penetration of party organisations and 
the Influence of party bureaucrats. All major government appointments and 
decisions had to be approved by the central decision-making body of the 
party. The state at all levels provided the necessary material and personnel 
support for the operation of party cells and party activities. Through the state 
apparatus, the party could preserve its institutional prerogatives.'’
Finally, the KMT assembled its seventh Party Congress in October 1952. 
There, the party restored Its claims to being a revolutionary-democratic party. 
Such reconfirmation of the party's traditional role enabled the KMT to shoulder 
the self-imposed historical mission of retaking the mainland and completing 
national construction.20 Also, the party re-invigorated itself by adopting 
democratic centralism as its main principle of decision-making and 
organisation. Although democratic centralism was Just a means by which the 
party's high levels dominated the entire organisation, party elites engaged in
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economic policy enjoyed a fair amount of autonomy from those higher levels.21 
After the party Congress, the CRC was replaced by a newly-elected Central 
Standing Committee (CSC).
Political re-establishment was also implemented in the military in order to 
restore party-military relations. The KMT established a system of political 
commissars inside the military. This task was undertaken by the General Political 
Work Department (renamed the General Political Warfare Department of the 
military) that was established in March 1950. The Department was headed by 
Chiang Chlng-kuo. The KMT established a network of Party cells directed by the 
political commissars in all military units. Party work moved under the system of 
political commissars who were responsible for implementing the policy of the 
KMT's leadership. A Political Work Cadre School was also established In 
November 1951 in charge of political commissars' training.22
In terms of the establishment of control In the economic realm, the 
Inheritance of Japanese colonial properties and the flow of foreign aid (an 
economic payoff for political Incorporation into the Western alliance during the 
cold war) made the KMT resource-rich to achieve these tasks.23 Economic 
resources were monopolised by the KMT regime under a form of state 
capitalism. Under authoritarian rule, all foreign exchange derived from aid and 
state-managed agrarian export was controlled by the regime. Financial and 
state-owned enterprises, which accounted for half of total industrial 
production, were also controlled by the KMT.24
In addition, the KMT exercised control o f the economy through such 
methods as state licensing, foreign currency allocation, tariff regulation, and 
public works contracting. Judicial use of economic reward and punishment 
was employed by the KMT to bring the business community and private sector
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in line with KMT policy and political command as well. The KMT also maintained 
an enormous sector of state and party enterprises that it used systematically to 
enforce Its industrial policy and political discipline.25 A number of organisations 
representing capital and labour were allowed, but controlled by the party 
through pre-emptive incorporation of industrial and business associations.25
Moreover, the KMT extended its control to  students and youth who were 
organised under the National Salvation Anti-Communist Youths Corps (NSAYC 
or China Youth Corps), founded In May 1952. It was also an organisation 
established to consolidate Chiang Chlng-kuo's personal Influence as well as 
power base, one of the steps toward Chiang Ching-kuo's succession. The 
NSACY established its cells in every university, college, and high school. Students 
were organised into different teams using military organisational methods. It 
became a part of the education system. Expenditures for the NSACY were 
supported by the government's educational budgets.27 After the time moved to 
the 1980s. the NSAYC's political commissions faded. It was gradually 
transformed to a complex enterprise of leisure, youth education, and publishing 
work.
Furthermore, the KMT established its cultural control by way of political 
restrictions, publication and medid controls, and especially education. 
Educational staff in schools were carefully selected. Curricula were designed in 
order to instil students with the KMT's official Ideologies. The registration of new 
newspapers was not allowed. Television and broadcast companies were 
supervised. The party leaders, Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo, were 
deified through the media and educational programmes. Sun Yat-sen's three 
principles of the people (son min chu I) constituted the dominant ideology that 
precluded the advocacy of other ideology. Local dialects and cultures were 
suppressed. Cultural hegemony was created in order to Impose KMT Ideology
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on civil society.28
Finally, any space not reached by indoctrination or co-optation of the KMT 
was filled by the KMT-controlled security authorities. Security forces were widely 
established throughout the civilian administrations to ensure political control. 
Peak Intelligence and security agencies were controlled by active-duty 
general-level officers, who reported directly to the paramount leader.29 
According to one study, around 120,000 organised security staff existed in 
Taiwan in the 1950s and 1960s. If cells are included, the number of security staff 
reached 550,OOO.30 Security offices were set up in many schools, governmental 
bodies at all levels, and state-owned or party-owned enterprises. They were 
responsible for overseeing the words and actions of students, academics, and 
administrative staff. Signs of political opposition or dissent movements were 
invariably treated with harsh measures of intimidation or Imprisonment known as 
"white terror."81
Through several steps mentioned above, the KMT established a modern 
authoritarian regime in Taiwan. Nonetheless, Cheng Tun-Jen pointed put the 
inadequacy to describe the KMT regime in Taiwan between 1950 and the mid- 
1980s as authoritarian. He argued that Juan Linz's definition of an authoritarian 
regime as once "characterised by a limited but not responsible pluralism, a 
mentality rather than an ideology, and control rather than mobilisation" does 
not fit exactly the case of the then-KMT. "Intra-elite pluralism was punished; 
social conformity and national unity were emphasised; and Sun Yat-sen's three 
principles of the people constituted the dominant ideology.” The KMT sought to 
penetrate all organisations in order to prevent political competition and to 
secure resources for regime-defined political goals.82
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Chen Tun-Jen posited out that the then-KMT was similar to a Leninist regime 
in terms of party structure and the party-state relationship. There was 
organisational parallelism between the party and the state: party organs 
controlled administrative units at various levels of the government as well as the 
military via a commissar system. Decision-making within the party was achieved 
by democratic centralism. Party cadres were socialised as revolutionary 
vanguards. Party cells penetrated the existing social organisations. The KMT was 
an elitist party using mass organisations to mobilise support from large segments 
of the population for the national tasks that the regime imposed on society. 
Opposition parties were marginalised and transformed into friendship parties of 
the ruling KMT.”
However, he argued that two structural features distinguished the KMT 
from other Leninist regimes. First, the KMT did not subscribe to the principle of 
proletarian dictatorship or the monopoly of political power by a communist 
party. Rather, the KMT's ideology advocated democracy. For example, the 
KMT permitted elections at sub-national level while suspending national 
elections. Direct elections for both executive and council positions at the sub­
national levels have been held regularly since 1950. Second, the KMT never 
embraced the Ideological goal of the Leninist state. While not lacking in socialist 
ideas, the KMT regime was embedded In a capitalist economy In which private 
ownership and market exchange were the norm, and state ownership and 
exchange by decree were exceptions. Accordingly, Cheng Tun-Jen described 
the then-KMT as a ‘ quasi-Leninist' party-state system.”
Yet the KMT's adoption of a capitalist economy differed from those 
totalitarian regimes that embraced a socialist economy and it led to the 
emergence o f independent competitors and social elites outside the political 
domain. In addition, the holding of elections at sub-national levels also
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gradually encouraged democratic competition and sentiment.35 These two 
structural features match the characteristics of an authoritarian regime with 
limited pluralism as suggested by Juan J Linz. However, Chen Tun-jen clearly 
highlighted the main characteristics of the KMT regime.
What is noteworthy is that, the whole of Taiwan in the 1950s and 1960s 
operated under a basic policy known as 'Recovery of the M ainland.' All 
actions and policy decisions were directly or indirectly aimed at strengthening 
the military, economic, and political forces of Taiwan in order to retake the 
mainland. Political control was high. Major infrastructure projects were 
appraised in terms of economic benefits and their impact on military 
preparedness. The military budget took about 80 per cent of the government's 
total budget every year. Cross-Straits exchanges were strictly proscribed. 
Foreign policy was guided by the principle of ’  either-you-or-me" (hen-tsei-pu- 
Hang-li). The recovery policy was intact and continuously fortified by political 
means and education of the public though the possibility of military recovery 
was very low.
In the period of authoritarian rule, the KMT's mainland policy Indirectly 
provided the ideological Justification for its political monopoly. Under the 
objective of retaking the mainland and completing national construction, 
political control and a freezing of democracy became reasonable; political 
doors were closed to Taiwanese while mainlanders dominating national politics; 
home rule was confined; the Judiciary was paralysed by the military; economic 
monopolisation was rationalised; the public's freedoms as defined in the 
Constitution were deprived; and social control was justified by the fear of 
infiltration by the communists. For these reasons, the KMT's mainland policy had 
highly political sensitivity and close links with Taiwan's democratic development.
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3.2 The Elimination of Factionalism in the Political Re-establishment
Following the KMT's retreat to Taiwan In 1949, leaders and members of factions 
within the KMT Its own ranks, i.e. KMT mainlander factions, also moved to the 
Island. When political re-establishment was in place, the KMT's political system 
changed profoundly. Eliminating factionalism was high on the KMT's political re­
establishment agenda. This was because Chiang Kai-shek deemed that the 
excessive conflict between the KMT's factions was a crucial factor that 
contributed the party's defeat on the mainland.
The KMT was not an integrated organisation at the beginning of its 
establishment, but consisted of several revolutionary forces. In spite of the KMT's 
three party re-organisatlons (In 1911, when the KMT's forerunner, the Tung-meng 
Hui. merged with the other two parties, the United Republic Party and the 
Nationalist Common Party, to organise a modern political party, I.e. the 
Nationalist Party; in 1914 when the Nationalist Party was re-organlsed to 
become the Chinese Revolutionary Party; and in 1919, when the Chinese 
Revolutionary Party was re-formed to become the Chinese Nationalist Party), 
the party's power centre was still controlled by several distinct political forces. 
The party founder Sun Yat-sen once decided to accept Chinese communists as 
members in 1923 In order to re-lnvigorate the party and gain support from the 
former Soviet Union.“
In addition, regional warlords exerted a great deal of Influence and power 
within the KMT. Warlords exercised sovereign powers in each of the provinces of 
China based on their armed forces and co-operation with local gentry and 
local bureaucracy. Chiang Kai-shek had to launch a military action, the 
Northern Expedition, In 1928 to try to resolve the problem of military regionalism,
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but the attem pt failed. Warlords, such as Chang Hsueh-liang, Feng Vu-hsiang 
and Yen Hsi-shan, retained great influence. The most important independent 
warlord grouping within the party was the Kwangsi faction led by Pal Chung-hsl 
and U Tsung-jen.
Under the fragmentation of the party's authority, both Sun Yat-sen and 
Chiang Kai-shek's leaderships seemed rather weak. The reality drove both party 
leaders to rely on their personal ties with political and military leaders to 
manage the party. Clientelist approaches were particularly important to 
explain Chiang Kai-shek's party management. After the death of the KMT's 
founder Sun Yat-sen in 1925, there was a bitter struggle between Chiang Kai- 
shek, Hu Han-min, and Wang Jing-wei. In order to strengthen his power base 
and manage the party, Chiang developed his own forces In the military, party, 
and governmental domains to check the power of Hu and Wang. Those 
Chiang-cultlvated forces later developed into several factions within the KMT. 
According to the classification of factions studied in the previous chapter, those 
KMT mainlander factions were personal or clientelist-group factions.
In the military domain, the most important Chiang-cultivated faction was 
the Whampoa faction, which was developed in the time of Chiang Kai-shek's 
heading of the party's military cadre school, the Whampoa Military Academy. 
Later, this force became Chiang Kai-shek's main political and military power 
base in the KMT. Another military-based faction were the fascist Blue Shirts 
(chun tung), led by Tal U. The Blue Shirts' organisation was an Important military 
security apparatus of the KMT regime. They were antl-foreign nationalists and 
proponents of absolute loyalty to the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, using 
violence to achieve their goals.37
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The third faction closely tied to the military was the Youth Corps (Sanmln 
Zhuyi Youth Corps), established by Chiang Kai-shek on the basis of young party 
members being indoctrinated in his philosophy. Chiang hoped to use the Youth 
Corps to replace the old KMT with a more vigorous and disciplined body in the 
light of the depravity and low morale of the party resulting from excessive 
struggle between the CC faction and the Blue Shirts.“  The original director of 
the Youth Corps was Chen Cheng, a leader of the Whampoa faction. Chen 
Cheng later became the number two leader within the KMT after the regime 
retreated to  Taiwan.
In the party sphere, the most important faction was the CC faction. The 
abbreviation '  CC" refers to the nicknames of Its factional leaders, the Chen 
brothers, Kuo-fu and U-fu, who were cultivated by Chiang Kai-shek to manage 
the KMT's organisational affairs. Chen Kuo-fu was the chief standing member of 
the KMT's Central Executive Committee and the head of the Central 
Organisation Department. Chen U-fu was the head of the party's security 
apparatus, i.e. the Investigation Bureau of the Central Organisation Department 
(<chung tung). He was also named Party secretary-general after the KMT's third 
Party Congress. Immense party resources both personnel and material allowed 
the two Chens to establish their influence throughout the party.”
In the governmental arena, major KMT factions Included the Political Study 
faction and the Kung-Sung faction. The former originated from the Association 
of Political Studies established by a group of Nationalist congressmen in 1926 in 
Beijing. After the North government dismissed the Congress in 1918, members of 
the Association moved to the South. They were invited by Chiang Kai-shek to 
administer the KMT government in Nanjing. Members of the Association of 
Political Studies gradually developed their own political force known as the 
Political Study faction."
90
The Kung-Sung faction refers to the faction led by Kung Hsiang-hsi and 
Sung Tzu-wen. Both came from famous business families based in Shanghai. 
They subsequently became the KMT government's Finance Minister and the 
Governor of the Central Bank. Their families also developed a close relationship 
with both Sun Yat-sen and Chlang Kai-shek through marriages and financial 
contributions. Through their long-term dominance over the head offices of the 
Finance Ministry and the Central Bank, they had great influence over the KMT's 
financial and economic polices, and allowed them to develop into a political 
b loc/1
Operating independently was the Chiang Ching-kuo faction. It was 
developed by Chiang Ching-kuo during his terms of office in the Klangsl 
Provincial government as a special administrator (1937-1943), in the temporary 
Capital City Chungching as the director of the Central Cadre School of the 
Sanmin Zhuyi Youth Corps (1943-1946), and as the director o f the Training 
Classes of Political Warfare Officials under the Supervision Headquarters of the 
Youth Troops (1944-1946)/2 However, the Chiang Ching-kuo faction did not play 
an important role during the KMT's time on the mainland. It emerged on the 
main political stage just after the KMT moved to Taiwan. Chiang Kai-shek's 
attempt to cultivate Chiang Ching-kuo as his successor increased the overall 
power of the Chiang Ching-kuo faction.
The campaign to eliminate factionalism was first directed against the 
Kung-Sung faction in the eve of the KMT's retreat to Taiwan. Since Chiang Kai- 
shek believed tha t they were responsible for the collapse of economic order on 
the mainland because of policy mistakes and the excessive exploitation of 
economic privileges, leaders of the Kung-Sung faction Kung Hsiang-hsl and 
Sung Tzu-wen were sent into exile before the KMT moved to Taipei. Besides,
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influential figures in the Kung-Sung faction were prevented from being 
appointed to strategic positions in both the party and government during the 
KMT's political re-establishment years." The Kung-Sung faction consequently 
declined.
In July 1949, few months before the KMT's retreat to Taiwan, Chiang Kai- 
shek established the Political Activities Committee (PAC) in Taipei, the 
forerunner of the Bureau of National Security. It was an organisation set up to 
integrate all security units in the military, party, and government. Chiang Ching- 
kuo was named head of this Committee." Since Tal U, leader of the Blue Shirts, 
had already died before the KMT moved to Taiwan, members of the Blue Shirts 
where integrated into the PAC. At the same time, the CC faction's security 
force, chung tung, was re-organised to become the Bureau of Investigation of 
the Interior Ministry, directly commanded by the PAC. Both the Blue Shirts and 
chung tung were thus effectively dissolved.
The elimination of factionalism continued during the KMT's re-organisation 
in the early 1950s. At the time of party re-organisation, no influential leaders and 
individuals of mainlander factions were appointed to positions in the CRC. The 
leaders of the CC faction, Chen Kuo-fu and Chen Li-fu, were excluded from the 
CRC as well. They were appointed to the newly-created Central Advisory 
Commission (CAC) which was a body made up of honoured party veterans 
with no practical influence over party affairs."
Soon after the party re-organisation, Chen Kuo-fu died In 1954 and Chen 
Li-fu left the country for the United states. Influential members of the CC faction 
only remained In the less Important representative organs. On the one hand, 
the KMT's need for self-legitimation through the preservation of representatives 
in the three branches of the National Congress (the National Assembly, the
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Legislative Yuan, and the Control Yuan) maintained a political space for 
members of those mainlander factions. On the other hand, the remaining CC 
faction members in the national representative organs favoured Chiang Kai- 
shek's strategy for checking the power of Premier Chen Cheng.46
With respect to the Political Study faction, its influence gradually declined 
after factional leader Yang Young-tai was assassinated in 1947 during the KMT's 
time on the mainland. After the KMT moved to  Taiwan, influential individuals of 
the Political Study faction held no strategic positions in the party and central 
government agencies. Although the factions' successor leaders, Wang Shih- 
chieh and Chang Chun, were subsequently named Secretary-Generals of the 
presidential office, this position had no significant meaning under Chiang Kai- 
shek's dictatorship. During the party's re-organisation in 1952, both leaders were 
also excluded from the CRC.47
The only faction, apart from the Chiang Ching-kuo faction, not threatened 
by elimination was the Youth Corps. On the one hand, Chiang Kai-shek's 
incorporation of the Youth Corps into the KMT in 1947 had reduced the Corp's 
overall power. On the other hand, the Youth Corps was necessary to back up 
Chiang Kai-shek's leadership and support his strategy of factionalism 
elimination.48 In 1949, the Youth Corps' leader, Chen Cheng, was named 
Governor o f Taiwan. After the KMT moved to Taiwan, he was further appointed 
as the head of the CRC, the Deputy Director of the KMT, and the ROC Vice- 
President and Premier. However, Chen Cheng's death in March 1965 
contributed to the decline of the Youth Corps. It also prevented an escalation 
of the potential conflict between Chen Cheng and Chiang Ching-kuo.
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In contrast to the above mentioned factions, the overall power of the 
Chlang Ching-kuo faction Increased dramatically as a result of Chiang Kai- 
shek's intention to cultivate Chiang Chlng-kuo as his successor. As a factional 
leader, Chiang Chlng-kuo first controlled all the security forces in the party, the 
military, and the government through the PAC. Then, Chiang Chlng-kuo was 
appointed as director of the newly-established General Political Warfare 
Department of the military (GPWD), an organisation based on the Soviet 
Union's political commissar system, which was founded in March 1950. The 
GPWD helped Chiang Ching-kuo to infiltrate the military where he had had no 
prior power base.'”  A training school, the Fu-hsirt-kang College for the 
development of political commissars was also established. Chiang Chlng-kuo 
was also named head of the College.
Moreover, Chiang Kai-shek named Chiang Ching-kuo as a member of the 
CRC to take part In the party's re-organisation. After the re-organisation, most 
strategic positions in the party and government were occupied by the Chiang 
Ching-kuo faction. At the same time, Chiang Kai-shek appointed Chiang 
Ching-kuo as director of the Revolutionary Practice Institute, the KMT's central 
cadre school.50 These steps were viewed as attempts by Chiang Kai-shek to 
establish Chiang Ching-kuo's power base In the party. Furthermore, Chiang Kai- 
shek established the NSAYC on 31 October 1952 with Chiang Ching-kuo as its 
first director. The NSAYC serves as a political organisation to consolidate Chiang 
Ching-kuo's influence among the young people/ members and academics.51
Finally, Chiang Kai-shek decided to remove the two Washington-backed 
KMT leaders Wu Kuo-chen and Sun U-Jen from their power bases. Both Wu Kuo- 
chen and Sun Li-jen's standing within KMT's ranks was bolstered by support from 
the US government. Due to Washington's attempts to sustain its Influence in 
Taiwan, it forced Chiang Kai-shek to appoint Wu Kuo-chen as Taiwan Governor
94
in 1949 and Sun U-jen as the Army Commander-In-Chief In 1950. The two leaders 
shared similar backgrounds: both received a graduate degree In the USA and 
were trusted by the then-American leadership. Since the KMT was highly 
enthusiastic about gaining support from the US government after It had lost its 
power on the mainland, Chlang Kai-shek did not resist the US pressure.52
However, both Wu and Sun were doubted by Chiang Kai-shek from the 
very beginning. More Importantly, conflict and tension arose from time to time 
between Wu Kuo-chen and Chiang Ching-kuo and between Sun U-jen and 
Chiang Kai-shek. As Washington re-established Its co-operation with the KMT 
regime following the shock of the Korean War. these two US-backed leaders lost 
their support from the USA. Wu Kuo-chen was removed from Taiwan Provincial 
Government In 1952. In the same year, he left for the USA and became a 
political dissident. He was prohibited from returning to Taiwan and died in 
America. Sun U-jen, he was forced to leave his office in 1954. One year later, in 
1955, he was confined to his residence (until 1990) since Chiang Kai-shek 
alleged that Sun had attempted to launch a military coup against him.“
In addition to those efforts mentioned above. Chiang Chlng-kuo himself 
developed personal ties with hundreds of top and secondary party, state, and 
military officials through both formal. I.e. cadre training programmes and 
apprenticeships, and Informal means, I.e. hereditary family lines. This pattern of 
recruitment enabled Chiang Ching-kuo to exercise intimate control and 
command personal allegiance before and after his succession as the KMT's 
supreme leader.54
After several stages of the campaign against factionalism, the removal of 
the two Washington-supported leaders, and the death of Premier Chen Cheng, 
Chiang Kai-shek successfully completed the re-organlsation of the KMT's ruling
society. His leadership was also restored. At the same time, Chiang Ching-kuo's 
succession to the leadership was directly confirmed by these new 
developments. Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo subsequently became 
political strongmen in Taiwan.
3.3 The Re-building of the Local Elite Structure
Taiwan's local political landscape was dominated by gentry and landlords who 
Influenced politics through their resources of wealth and power, i.e. the land, 
during the period of Japanese rule. After the KMT took over Taiwan's 
sovereignty from the Japanese in 1945, a group of Taiwanese-mainlander elites 
(pan san) cultivated by the KMT to help its governance of post-war Taiwan 
came to the island. The pan san soon commanded most political and 
economic privileges. This situation irritated the local Taiwanese elites who 
grouped themselves to compete again the pan san. With a broad realignment, 
the then-Taiwan's local elite society separated into three groups: the Pan-san 
pai. the Taichung pai. and the A-hi pai. As those native political groups were 
either almost totally unorganised or else they were very ephemeral 
organisations, there should be viewed as factional cliques or tendencies.
The Pan-san pai referred to those who had original linkages with Taiwan 
but had served In the KMT government on the mainland. As main political and 
cultural cleavages between the mainlander regime and Taiwanese society 
were evident as a result o f fifty-years of Japanese rule, the KMT selected and 
trained a group of Taiwan-born party cadres to form a bridge between the 
KMT and Taiwanese society before It took over this Island from Japan. These 
KMT Taiwanese-malnlander elites co-operated well with the KMT government 
and occupied the majority of local executives offices in post-war Taiwan. They
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eventually developed their own power base led by several notables. As 
Taiwanese people used to call people from the mainland T'ang-san. Pan-san 
refers to those who have political, economic, or social affiliations, separately or 
In combination, to the mainland but who were born in Taiwan. Thus, they were 
generally termed the Pan-san pai
The Taichung pai refers to the group developed by local Taiwanese 
leaders. It was headed by Lin Hsien-tang. As its political, economic, and social 
bases were mainly In the area of Taichung, this group was named the Taichung 
pai. The overriding characteristic of this group was its engagement in anti- 
colonial movements at the time of Japanese rule. The group's leader, Lin Hsien- 
tang. established the Taiwanese Cultural Association In 1921, calling for a non­
violent liberalisation of Taiwan, i.e. by establishing a Taiwanese Assembly 
independent of the Japanese Taiwan governor office. After the KMT came to 
Taiwan in 1945, this group remained politically active.56
The third group constituted by local Taiwanese elites was the A-hi pai. This 
group comprised two sub-factions led by Chiang Wei-shul and Hsu Ping 
respectively. Similar to the Taichung pai, the Chiang Wei-shul faction was 
characterised by its engagement in anti-Japanese movements. By contrast, the 
Hsu Ping faction consisted of Taiwanese elites who were used by the Japanese 
government to rule over Taiwan. Based on the Taichung pai and especially 
given the Pan-san pai's taking of local political spoils, these two sub-factions co­
operated as a whole political force to pursue political goals.57
With the establishment of their government in Taiwan after World War Two, 
the KMT's mainlander factions moved to the island to compete for the 
abundant resources left by Japanese. Taiwan Governor Chen VI himself was 
one of the leaders of the Political Study group. During Chen Yi's terms of office
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as Minister o f Military Affairs, Fukien Governor, and General-Secretary of the 
Executive Yuan, conflict between Chen Yi and leaders of the CC faction, the 
Blue Shirts, the Youth Corps, and the Kung-Sung faction was passionate.58 Chen 
Yi's occupation of the office of Taiwan Governor also caused great tension 
between him and other factional leaders.
Following Chen Yi's appointment as Taiwan Governor, factionalism 
between the Chen Yi faction and other mainlander factions emerged in post­
war Taiwan. Conflict first arose in relation to the competition for strategic 
positions in the Taiwan provincial government. The Chen Yi faction seized most 
important positions in the government while the CC faction took over the 
party's Taiwan Provincial Branch. In the military and security domains, major 
positions were occupied by the Blue Shirts. The Kung-Sing group grasped most 
executive offices of government-owned organisations and companies. The 
Youth Corps concentrated on its organisational expansion in Taiwan.59
As a result of the intense competition for public offices among the KMT 
mainlander factions, no strategic post in the Taiwan provincial government was 
occupied by local Taiwanese elites. Although within local society there were 
2,508 post-graduates, 55,000 graduates from Japanese universities and 
colleges, and more than 100 people receiving university education in Europe 
and America, the Taiwanese themselves took only one office, the deputy 
director o f the Education Department, in the then-KMT government.“
Moreover, malignant factionalism led to political corruption. All factions 
did their utmost to exploit public resources in order to expand their factional 
interests and Influence. Bureaucratic capitalism severely damaged the KMT's 
ruling credit In post-war Taiwan. Furthermore, the struggle between the Chen Yi 
faction and other mainlander factions was intense. On the one hand, Chen Yi's
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rival factions took every chance to boycott Chen YI's personnel arrangements 
and political programmes. On the other hand, Chen Yi took advantage of his 
office to attack his rival factions. Factionalism between KMT mainlander factions 
was greatly complicated by political involvement o f the three Taiwanese elite 
groups.
In general, Chen Yi kept alliance ties with the Pan-san pai so as to  manage 
local political affairs. He remained very hostile to the A-hi pai since he 
questioned their loyalty to the KMT government. The conflicting relationship 
between Chen Yi and the A-hi pai indirectly Impelled Chen Yi's rival factions, 
the CC and the Blue Shirts, to ally with the A-hi pai against the Chen Yi faction. 
Under such circumstances, the relationships between the Pan-san pai and A-hi 
pal. and between Chen Yi's rival factions and the Pan-san pai were full of 
tension. Meanwhile, the Taichung pai retained a wait-and-see attitude to KMT 
malnlander factions and the other two Taiwanese groups.4'
Political corruption and the chaos of the Chen Yi government's economic 
management and especially the excessive factionalism among the Chen YI 
faction, the KMT mainlander factions, and Taiwanese elite groups (i.e. the Pan- 
san and A-hi) finally led to the chaos of the KMT's rule in then-Taiwan. In order 
to restore governance and social order, the KMT resorted to armed suppression 
which resulted In the mass killings of 1947. This was known as the February 28 
Incident, when more than 20,000 people disappeared or were killed, most of 
them Taiwanese.62
Since excessive factionalism was the major cause of the collapse of Chen 
Yi's government, local elite groups were subject to repression after the KMT 
retreated to Taiwan in 1949. While action to eliminate factionalism was taking 
against KMT mainlander factions, Taiwanese political groups also faced
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repression. Major factional leaders of the Pan-san pai were either forced to 
resign from their offices or sent to jail. Leaders of the A-hi pai and Taichung pai 
were also removed from their influence. They soon declined.63 What is more, the 
KMT's land reform deprived the Taiwanese gentry of their economic resources, 
thus accelerating the break down of the three Taiwanese elite groups.64
However, as an outsider regime, the KMT was unable to control all local 
elites despite the repression of leaders of the Pan-san pai, Tai-chung pai, and A- 
hl pai. In order to rule Taiwan where the KMT lacked a popular base and 
experience in governing, the KMT had to re-establish its relationships with local 
elites. So from 1950, local elections have been held regularly in Taiwan. Elections 
institutionalised the KMT's connections with local leaders through networks of 
patron-client relations. With the passage of time, the political and economic 
interests of the KMT and local elites became intertwined, bolstering the KMT's 
legitimacy. The KMT's election-derived linkages with local elites also enabled 
the KMT to penetrate and exert more effective social control over local 
society.65
The KMT's holding of local elections contributed to the rise of new factions 
in Taiwan's local units. On the one hand, local elites functioned as political 
brokers to channel electoral support from local society to back up KMT 
candidates, so that they were able to exchange privileges (both political and 
economic) with the regime. On the other hand, local elites also joined elections 
to compete for public spoils In their own districts. As more and more social and 
economic resources were mobilised into the electoral process, elections 
became more competitive and Intense, driving local elites to group themselves 
Into a number of political alliances based on local units, l.e. local factions.
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3.4 Conclusion
With the KMT's political re-establishment, the political structure of the KMT's 
ruling society and local political society changed profoundly. The overall power 
of most KMT malnlander factions, i.e. the Whampoa faction, the CC faction, 
the Blue Shirts, the Youth Corps, the Kung-Sung faction, and the Political Study 
faction, was reduced. In contrast, the Chiang Ching-kuo faction emerged on 
the main political stage, dominating most strategic resources and positions in 
the KMT party-state. At the same time, the local political landscape was re­
shaped. Leaders of the three Taiwanese elite groups, i.e. the Pan-san pai. 
Taichung pai and A-hi pai. were subject to repression.
However, the KMT was unable to control all local elites despite the mass 
killing in 1947, known as the February 28 Incident, the KMT's land reforms, and 
the regime's White Terror in the 1950s. Its lack of a popular base in, and linkages 
with, Taiwanese society drove the regime to absorb local elites into its political 
system. Local elites' capability to mobilise electoral support from below was 
necessary for the regime to penetrate local society and to legitimise itself. 
Therefore, the KMT constituted its relationships with newly emergent Taiwanese 
elites who were soon able to fill the political vacuum left by the Pan-san pai. 
Taichung pai, and A-hi pai.
The KMT took two major steps to re-organise Taiwanese elite society. First, 
while using its abundant economic resources inherited from the Japanese 
government and US economic aid, and sustained by natural monopoly and 
governmental procurement to cushion the economic security of a few loyalist 
mainlanders who were politically well-connected with the KMT, it used the 
economic resources of the regime to entice the co-operation of predominant 
Taiwanese families: the Yen family in Keelung, the Un family In Panchiao (Taipei),
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the Lin family in Wufeng (Taichung), the Ku family in Lukong (Changhua), and 
the Chen family in Kaohsiung.66 On the other hand, these predominant 
Taiwanese families also used their island-wide fame and resources to strengthen 
ties with KMT mainlander ruling elites through marriages or clientellst 
relationships. They later became successful capitalists under the patronage of 
the KMT party-state system.67
Secondly, the KMT Impelled local political elites to co-operate with the 
regime on the basis of the KMT's strong political and economic dominance. On 
the one hand, the KMT granted abundant political and economic privileges to 
those who were willing to serve the regime. One the other hand, the KMT put 
strict control over forming new political parties and groups. Political opponents 
were subject to suppression. National politics was closed to Taiwanese. Under a 
carrot-and-stick policy, most Taiwanese elites were Incorporated into the KMT's 
political system. Over excessive election competitions In the 1950s, they soon 
developed into many groups based on local units, i.e. local factions.
Using the patronage system, the KMT successfully institutionalised Its 
connections with local factions. Through employing deliberate manipulation, 
the KMT kept local political leaders divided in two non-ideological camps and 
maintained the role of king-maker in the nomination process. Therefore, the 
KMT could easily play one faction off against another and gain control over all 
factions in each administrative district. Local factions thus became the KMT's 
political clients a t the local level. This allowed the émigré regime to establish its 
rule in Taiwan where it had no previous support.
In other words, as the KMT leader, Chlang Kai-shek deemed the KMT's loss 
of the Chinese mainland was due to excessive factionalism within the party, the 
KMT sought to stamp out factionalism within Its own ranks after it retreated to
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Taiwan. The campaign to eliminate factionalism was directed against the KMT's 
mainlander factions. Meanwhile, however, the KMT actively encouraged a 
depoliticised form of factionalism in society. This was thought to be the 
necessary measure for it to rule the native political leaders so as to widen its 
legitimacy in Taiwan.
With the passage of time, influence of local factions was greatly 
enhanced with political and economic changes. After Chiang Ching-kuo 
succeeded his father as KMT chairman In 1975, the KMT became worried by 
these phenomena and tried to  curb them. Unfortunately resentments from local 
factions against the KMT's attempts to reduce their overall power worked to 
undermine the KMT's own unity. Local factions sought to support the opposition 
candidates in elections so as to challenge KMT central authority. In turn, this 
increased the pressure for further démocratisation.
An analysis of the origins and characteristics of Taiwanese local factions, 
the KMT's establishment and maintenance of ifs clientelist alliances with local 
factions, and underlying problems of the structure of the KMT-local factions 
alliances follows In the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 4
Local Factions in the KM T Authoritarian Regime
With the KMT's political re-establishment in the early 1950s, the three major 
Taiwanese elite groups, the Pan-san pai. Taichung pai and A-hi pal, were 
dissolved. The accomplishment of land reform at the same time further 
accelerated the fading away of old local elites from political stage. However, 
the KMT's lack of a popular base in Taiwan caused problems for its 
governance. In order to establish its rule, the KMT sought the support of 
indigenous elites. Through the regime patronage system and implementation of 
sub-national elections, the KMT institutionalised its relations with the newly 
emerged elites who later grouped into a number of factions in the local units.
As Tsai Ming-hui and Chang Mao-kuei point out, the research on Taiwan's 
local factions is a key component of Taiwan's political studies. On the one 
hand, local factions have been playing significant roles in Taiwan's elections 
and political development. Although Taiwan's party politics is becoming more 
mature, local factions still exert considerate influence over local politics. On the 
other hand, local factions served as the primary political machine bridging the 
KMT party-state and Taiwanese society. The existence and activities of local 
factions are closely related to the characteristics of the KMT's authoritarian 
governance.’
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To express this differently, studies of Taiwan's local factions and their 
relationships with the KMT regime provide a new approach in examining 
Taiwan's political development through the techniques of elite analysis. This 
chapter begins with a study of the origins and characteristics of Taiwan's local 
factions. Then, the focus moves on to how the KMT established its alliance 
relations with local factions through the regime patronage system. Thus, it 
becomes possible to answer the question o f how the clientelist alliance 
structure between the KMT and local factions could maintain the KMT's 
authoritarian rule over Taiwan for the past four decades.
4.1 The Origins of Taiwan's Local Factions
In the literature on Taiwan's local politics, there are two major opinions about 
the causes of Taiwan's local factionalism. The first view emphasises the 
importance of socio-cultural factors in the creation of factions in Taiwan's local 
units. Traditionally, the family has had an important influence on personal 
activities in Chinese society because traditional Chinese Confucianism is an 
intense familialism that took precedence over all other social relations. As Wen 
Tsung-I pointed out, Chinese peasant society is characterised by its strong 
emphasis on the family, paternalism, and regionalism. Relationships built upon 
the primary groups affect not only individual, but also collective behaviour.2 
Similarly, those characteristics are commonly shared by Taiwanese society.
Traditional peasant characteristics contributed to the creation of factions 
in Taiwan's local society because they provided advantageous conditions for 
local elites to call for support from personal networks to engage in political 
activities.3 In other words, traditional socio-cultural roots and relationships 
provided the foundations of Taiwan's local factions. Under electoral
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competition, these roots and relations were easily employed by local elites to 
group themselves, and mobilise support to run election campaigns and 
compete for public offices. Excessive electoral contests Inevitably lead to the 
creation of local factions.'’
Both Jacobs and Gallin also highlighted the Importance of traditional 
soclo-cultural roots In the origins of Taiwan's local factions. They claimed that 
Taiwan's local factions did not exist at the time of Japanese rule, but began to 
emerge after local elections were regularly held by the KMT from 1950 onwards. 
The goal of winning election campaigns drove local elites to  group themselves 
in order to expand their political Influence and strength. Excessive electoral 
competition enlarged traditional social as well as cultural cleavages, and 
concentrated interest relations between local elites, providing fertile ground for 
the development of local factions.5 In general, this perspective deems that 
Taiwanese local factions should be seen as primarily by-products of Its Chinese 
culture.
The second view of the origins of Taiwan's local factions focuses on the 
significance of the KMT regime's political management. As both Chu Yun-han 
and Wu Nai-teh stated, local factions were deliberately cultivated by the KMT. 
Since the KMT was an outsider regime from the start. It had to rely on local elites 
to penetrate the local community. However, the 28 February Incident In 1947 
and the KMT's political re-establishment In the early 1950s had deterred old 
local elites from participating in politics. The implementation of land reforms 
further removed the Influence of the old local elites. Under such circumstances, 
the KMT used Its political control and economic resources to build relations with 
the newly emerged local elites through the patronage system.4
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What is more, the KMT cultivated at least two factions in every county and 
district in order to offset the strength of each, so that the KMT could easily gain 
control over local factions. Also, the KMT used its nomination power to switch 
between factions to occupy city-county and hs/ang-township executive offices 
and thus prevent political dominance by any single local faction. A discussion 
of how the KMT established and controlled its alliance relationships with local 
factions follows in section 4.3. Briefly, both Chu Yun-han and Wu Nai-teh argued 
that the existence of factions in Taiwan's local units is a feature of a political 
system delicately created and managed by the KMT. Through clientellst 
alliances with local factions, the KMT's governance in Taiwan could be 
maintained.7
The first perspective is clearly deficient in explaining the actual 
development of Taiwan's local factions. As Tsai Ming-hui and Chang Mao-kuei 
pointed out, elections had been implemented in some districts in 1935 under 
Japanese rule. Nonetheless, local political factions were unseen in Taiwan at 
that time. Though local elections were held regularly from 1950, factions still did 
not emerge across the whole island. In the early 1950s. some districts had no 
local factions at all. In other words, the emphasis on socio-cultural factors 
ignores the effects of the political system and political change on the 
development of local factions.8
On the other hand, the emphasis on the effect of the KMT's political 
management seems Insufficient to explain why local factions are capable of 
mobilising the support from local society, why the KMT had to establish alliance 
relationships with local factions, and how local factions could help the KMT to 
establish its rule over Taiwan. In all, the political management perspective 
ignores the unique power structure and organisational characteristics of local
no
factions. In addition, it takes no account of the effects of historical, social, and 
economic conditions on the development of factions in the local units.’
In the light of the evident weakness of both the socio-cultural and political 
perspectives, Tsai Ming-hui and Chang Mao-kuei suggested that Taiwanese 
local factions were neither simple outgrowths of Taiwan's traditional socio­
cultural roots, nor the outcome of the KMT's institutional designs. Rather, they 
were institutions developed under the special historical, social, economic, and 
political circumstances of Taiwan's pre- and post-war experiences. Taiwanese 
local factions emerged from a transformation of remaining social cleavages 
through major historical processes, i.e. pre-war colonisation, the transition from 
Japanese colonisation to the Nationalists' political regime, the land reforms in 
the early 1950s, and the implementation of local self-governance (home rule).10 
This view was shared by Joseph Bosco."
According to Lee Hsiao-feng's study, local elites already existed at the time 
of Japanese rule. A number of social leaders were allowed by the Japanese 
government to join assemblies at various levels. These assemblies served as 
honorary institutions without legislative power, enticing the co-operation of 
Taiwanese local leaders. Local elites retained their influence, regardless of the 
transition of political regime, when the KMT took over the sovereignty of Taiwan 
from Japan in 1945. In the 1946 elections for county councillors and provincial 
assemblymen, 292 of 740 county councillors (39.46 per cent) and 22 of 47 
provincial assemblymen (46.81 per cent) had previously held public offices 
under Japan's colonial government.12
However, the 28 February Incident in 1947 and the KMT's political re­
establishment in the early 1950s re-built the landscape of elite structure In the 
local units. The accomplishment of land reforms further changed the socio­
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economic system and power structure of local society. The old local elites 
became passive to participate in politics. Local politics was now dominated by 
new forces which emerged with the implementation of local elections in 1950 
and 1951. These newly emergent elites soon filled the political vacuum and co­
operated with the KMT to pursue political and economic privileges.
In short, Taiwan's local factions consisted of local elites who had already 
established a certain influence over local society based on their economic 
resources and social status. But, they had had no, or only a few, political 
experiences during the period of Japanese rule. They were not totally new 
political recruits who emerged because of the KMT's holding elections or 
deliberate cultivation. After the old local elites who were unwilling to accede to  
party discipline or co-operate with the regime had been eliminated from the 
political stage by the KMT regime, they filled the political vacuum and 
developed a patron-client relationship with the KMT.
Political competition provided Institutionalised means for the new local 
elites to pursue political privileges through public offices. Nevertheless, excessive 
electoral competition inevitably forced them to resort to traditional socio­
cultural roots and primary relationships as a basis for running election 
campaigns. With the implementation of local elections, the new local elites 
soon came to dominate the local political landscape. They grouped into a 
number of factions. The newly emerged political forces in the local units were in 
due time institutionalised Into the KMT's political system after the regime's ruling 
capability was established in Taiwan.
The creation of Taiwan's local factions was assisted by two environmental 
factors. The first o f these was the KMT's political management. As I have 
mentioned earlier, the KMT after 1949 sought to eliminate factionalism within Its
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own ranks, but actively encouraged a depoliticised form o f factionalism in local 
society. Political fostering and manipulation inevitably brought about conflict 
between local political leaders. Besides, the KMT closed national politics to local 
elites in order to maintain the immigrant elites' dominance. Limited resources 
also played a role in intensifying the competition between indigenous elites. 
Intense competition compelled local elites to group themselves in order to 
expand their political strength.
Furthermore, the KMT adopted corporatism to manage the economy and 
civil society in order to prevent an autonomous populist politics. It controlled 
and demobilised all modern social sectors through the pre-emptive 
incorporation of business and professional associations, labour unions, state 
employees, journalists, intellectuals, students, and other targeted groups. 
Therefore, the growth of social fabric in private society was seriously blocked. 
The only remaining weft and warp of the civil society were the lineage groups, 
private enterprises, and some religious groups.’5 It indirectly encouraged the 
locals to pursue their personal interests through patron-client ties, thus providing 
fertile ground for the development of factions in Taiwan's local units.u
Second, Taiwan's inferior socio-economic development in the 1950s and 
1960s promoted the growth of local factions. According to Wakabayashi 
Masatake, the unemployment rate was as high as 10 per cent in the early 
1950s. Illiteracy covered over 30 per cent of the population. Political and 
economic resources were distributed unevenly and were dominated by local 
leaders. These conditions naturally increased the need for patronage between 
Individuals to seek mutual aid.15 However, clientelism contributes to the growth 
of ethnic, linguistic, and religious fragmentation and arbitrariness in the 
distribution of resources, leading to the spread of local factions.
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4.2 The Characteristics of Taiwan's Local Factions
Several characteristics o f Taiwan's local factions can be described. Firstly, local 
factions are a group of local elites who have concerns with local political 
affairs. All factional members share same political interests and are bound by 
the interests of the faction. Members of local factions are positioned 
hierarchically In a rigid pyramid with a simple structure Including three layers. At 
the top of pyramid structure, there are factional leaders. Their influence comes 
from social networks built up through local public offices such as those of 
county magistrates, city mayors or provincial assemblymen, and institutions of 
regional monopolistic business activities, l.e. co-operative banks, credit unions, 
and bus companies. Normally, whoever controls those resources, especially 
public offices, are more capable of becoming factional leaders.
The second layer of factional structure consists of sub-leaders. These are 
normally township chiefs, county/ city legislators, township legislators, senior 
officers In local administrations, party committees and schools, and leaders of 
local civil organisations such as farmers associations. They also possess regional 
monopolistic businesses, but these resources are less compared with those of 
top leaders. The lowest layer comprises factional cells (vote brokers or tlau-a- 
ka); the basic units o f local factions. Cells exist in the basic administrative unit, 
l.e. village or //. They are normally the chiefs of village or //. Their Influence comes 
from face-to-face Interactions with the locals.'6
Factions tend to be personally-oriented and centre around the charisma 
and Influence of powerful individuals. Organisational management mainly relies 
on the Influence of factional leaders. They reflect the specific characteristics of 
the leader-follower structure. The coherence of the faction depends on
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uninstitutional norms agreed among factional members. However, these norms 
have no compulsory effects in terms of law. Thus, members can withdraw 
whenever they feel like. But, the 'de fecto r' may will meet certain obstructions 
from other factional members. For example, the defector may meet a boycott 
during his election campaign. Conflict over interest Issues or leadership within 
factions are handled though voting among factional leaders.”
Secondly, local factions are Informal organisations which have neither a 
fixed system of organisation nor legal status. Unlike party factions, they are not 
part of any formal institution. Factional activities are unspoken. Factional 
leaders usually meet in private places. Also, factional members never meet 
together all at the same time. They have neither designed meeting places nor 
established headquarters. Once decisions are made between factional 
leaders, they serve as the common goal of all factional members and are 
communicated to factional members via factional nodes. Similarly, the 
demands or opinions of factional members at lower layers are passed through 
nodes to factional leaders for discussion if the opinions or issues are significant.
Thirdly, local factions do not make policy for the faction as a whole 
although opinions are communicated between factional leaders. They do not 
offer the same kind of political programme as an organised political party 
would. Elections serve as the primary activities for local factions. They provide 
the means for local factions to pursue political and economic Interests through 
public offices on the one hand, and to support KMT candidates so that they 
could exchange regional monopolistic business on the other hand. Local 
factions participate in every electoral contest since elections serve as both the 
purpose and means for the development of local factions."
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Accordingly, the activities of local factions can be generally separated 
into two different periods: election time and non-election period. At the time of 
election campaigns, local factions co-ordinate their members to compete for 
KMT tickets to  run for public offices, mobilise support from their networks, 
distribute potential votes between their candidates, and channel funds for their 
own factional candidates. Factions are especially active during election 
campaigns time. During non-election periods, local factions use their political 
and economic resources to  expand 1he scope and number of followers to 
strengthen organisational influence, distribute interests and accommodate 
conflict between factional members, and serve the locals in their constituencies 
in order to  prepare for the coming elections."
Factions compete for public offices such as local administration and 
farmers associations, since these offices provide the necessary organisational 
and economic resources for the development of local factions. Only through 
formal organisations can local factions pursue their political and economic 
interests. Local factions often use the authority of local administration to 
distribute public resources to their own factional members who in turn will 
advance the development of their factions by their economic strength and/ or 
social networks. In other words, local factions band together for the electoral 
success o f one of Iheir members, but they do not all actually stand for office 
themselves. To compete tor and hold public office serves as a means for the 
development of local factions, but does not fulfil their overall objectives.
In short, Taiwanese local factions are informal political organisations, 
pursuing political and economic interests through local public offices. They are 
built and maintained through tradition, unspoken bonds, and personal nodes 
rather than formal rules and regulations. Organisationally, local factions reflect 
the specific characteristics of their personal, leader-follower, i.e. patron-client,
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structure. Followers are directly recruited by leaders. They have a simple 
structure in which members are positioned hierarchically in a rigid pyramid. 
However, they have no scheduled meetings, formal votes, designated meeting 
places, or established faction headquarters. According to  the level of 
institutionalisation, local factions are of the personal or client-group factions 
type®
Since not all public demands can be satisfied by formal organisation (I.e. 
government) and locals are usually unable to access authority directly, local 
factions function as political brokers to bridge the gap between the local and 
the government on the basis of their organisational strength. Informal politics 
supplements the practice of formal Institutions, sustaining the movement of 
local politics. In reality, locals (clients) whose demands can not be fulfilled 
effectively by formal institutions (normally because their demands are illegal or 
uninstitutional) may ask help from village chiefs or local councillors (lower 
factional members) who are able to satisfy the clients' demands through using 
their factional networks. For example, a client may ask a local councilor to 
intervene in governmental bodies to arrange employment.
If the client's demand is out of their reach, the councillors or village chiefs 
being asked will ask support from their factional members who are in the higher 
layers of the faction (such as township chief or provincial assemblyman) since 
they have enough influence to fulfill the client's demand. After the client's 
demand is satisfied, the client pays a certain amount o f money to the 
councillors/ village chiefs (In some areas, charges for factional * services" are 
stipulated in each local councilor or village chief's office) or help the 
councillors/ village chiefs to channel voting support during an election 
campaign. The local factions' capability to satisfy locals' demands explains 
why they can survive.
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However, local factions do not serve all the locals in their districts. They 
help only those who are affiliated with one of the members of their factions or 
who are able to advance the development of their factions. This is to say that 
local factions' services to locals are based on the concerns of factional 
interests. Throughout their services and face-to-face interactions with locals, 
factions can expand their social network and organisational strength 
continually. Those organisational resources can be transformed into voting or 
financial support during election campaigns. If one of their members can be 
elected, the faction can control more public resources and become more 
effective In serving their own clients. Thus, factions are able to keep developing 
and expanding.
Most factions have maintained alliance ties with the KMT. Interactions 
between local factions and the party are individual and personal. They move 
mainly between factional leaders and party committee directors. However, as I 
mentioned earlier, decisions made between top factional leaders will serve as 
the common goal of all factional members. Therefore, the Individual/ personal 
interactions between factional leaders and the party form the relationships 
between the faction and the party. Election is the major issue between local 
factions and local party committee. During election campaigns, factional 
leaders represent their factions to compete for party tickets for their member 
candidates. The party also sets a certain amount of votes for the local factions 
to collect In order to support the party. During non-election periods, the local 
party committee mainly acts as a mediator to accommodate conflict between 
factions.
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Taiwan's local factions did not have explicit names before 1950. The KMT's 
implementation of local elections concentrated the traditional political, social 
and cultural roots in local society, and brought these Into the formation of local 
factions. Since then, local factions have been clearly named. Local factions 
are usually named by the surnames of their originators, the colours which they 
used in election campaigns, or other designations which symbolise 
characteristics of the factions.21 For examples, there are Black, White, and Red 
factions in Kaohsiung County. In Chlayl County, the two major factions are 
named Huang and Un.
According to the areas In which factions act, Taiwan's local factions can 
be categorised into two levels: county-city and sub-county, i.e. hsiang- 
township. Sub-county factions are not subordinate organisations of factions at 
the county-city level. Factions a t both levels exist independently of each other, 
but they link up through clientellst ties during elections. Whether factions at the 
sub-country level maintain alliance relations with factions at the county level 
depends on the rewards provided by county-city factions.22 According to Chen 
Mlng-tung, there are 89 local factions at county-city level that have operated 
in Taiwan after the mid-1950s.23 Although there has been no research to show 
the precise number of factions at sub-county level, each of Taiwan's 309 
hsiang-townships has at least tw o factions until now.2'
Research on the background of local factions is scarce. This is due to the 
difficulties involved in such a research operation. To identify the memberships of 
local factions seems extremely difficult because of local factions' organisational 
characteristics. Factional activities are usually unknown to  outsiders. However, 
limited research findings about the background of Taiwan's local factions have 
been published. Basically, the educational level of factional politicians is inferior 
compared with that of non-factional politicians. According to  Wang Cheng-
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huan's investigation of national legislators from 1969 to  1972, 62.58 per cent of 
the non-factional legislators has a university education. By contrast, only 37.42 
per cent of faction-based legislators have first degrees.25
Chao Yung-mao also pointed out that the lower the administrative level, 
the sharper the factional activities. Besides, politicians at the hsiang-township 
level are commonly tied with factions.26 However, his research also shows that 
the educational level of holders of public office at the hs/ang-township level is 
poorer than that at the higher levels. In reality, the educational backgrounds of 
hs/ang-township executives and councillors is Inferior to that of county-city 
executives and councillors, and the educational level of county-city executives 
and councillors is poorer than that of national representatives.22 Both Wang's 
and Chao's researches Indicate that factional politicians are normally poorly 
educated compared with non-factional ones.
The relationship between ethnic components and memberships of local 
factions is also observable. The study by Chao Yung-mao reveals 1hat 
Taiwanese, i.e. Hakka and especially Fukien, are more active in local factions. 
By contrast, mainlander Chinese have less factional concerns and interests. This 
is because the Taiwanese are much more closely tied to local society and the 
traditionally organisational characteristics of Taiwanese society are more 
clientelistic on the other hand. As a result, local factions have more Influence In 
the Taiwanese community, where factionalism is also more active.28
Furthermore, members of local factions place more emphasis on parochial 
loyalty and locality orientation. They are normally less concerned with modem 
democratic values.25 This situation has led to the poor development of a legal 
system In Taiwan's politics especially at the local level. Political corruption 
existed for a long time In local politics. This structural corruption. In the past.
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involved * faction-orchestrated election financing and campaigns, 
institutionalised vote-buying mechanism, and the relentless pursuit of pork barrel 
projects, economic prerogatives and outright bribes for replenishing campaign 
funds. '  “
Local factions emphasise the homogeneity among memberships and 
discriminate against rival factions' members. They compete for interests non- 
ideologically. In a power struggle, local factions follow the principle of elther- 
you-or-me, leading to a zero-sum game. Extensive factionalism can cause 
problems of local political development and construction, enlarge social 
cleavages, obstruct the development of the institutionalisation of local 
administrations, and especially affect the outcomes of election campaigns.3' 
According to Chao Tung-mao's research in 1997, 49.6 per cent of Taiwan's 309 
hsiang-townships have suffered from profound factionalism during electoral 
contests.“
The impact of socio-economic development on the development of local 
factions is also visible. Factionalism is normally more intense in areas whose 
development is inferior and influence of local factions is less evident in urban 
areas. By contrast, local factions are more predominant In rural areas. That is to 
say, the lower the socio-economic development, the greater the strength of 
local factions." Furthermore, local factionalism is stronger in the central and 
southern areas of Taiwan. In the north, east, and Penghus islands, local factions 
have less influence and factionalism is less significant.“  Interestingly, the levels of 
education and the numbers of younger people seem to have no impact on 
local faction Influence.“  Table 4.1 shows a general summary of factions in 
Taiwan's administrative areas at county-city level.
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Table 4.1 A General Summary of Taiwan’s Local Factions
City/ County Names Major Factions Factionalism
Keeluna County Chen pai, Chang pai, Hsieh pai less strong
Taipei City No evident factions unseen
Taipei County No county-wide factions strong
Taoyuan County Fukien, Hakka strong
Hisnchu City Hsi Hsu (West Hsu), Tung Hsu (East Hsu) less strong
Hisnchu County Fukien, Hakka strong
Miaoli County Huang pai, Liu pai very strona
Taichung City Chang pai, Liao pai, Lai pai less strong
Taichung County Red pai. Black pai, and Grey pai very strong
Changhua County Red Chen pai. White Lin pai very strong
Nantou County No county-wide factions weak
Yunlin County Lin pai, Hsu pai, Liao pai, Liu pai strona
Chiayi City Hsu chia pan (non-party) weak
Chiayi County Lin pai, Huang pai very strong
Tainan City No city-wide fdctions weak
Tainan County Pai-men pai, San-hsin pai, Kao pai strong
Kaohsiung City Local (Chen) pai, Tainan pai, Penghus pai, 
Chiavi pai, Wang pai
strong
Kaohsiung County Red pai, White pai. Black pai (DPP) very strong
Pingtung County Chang pai, Lin pai strona
Yllan County Lin (Lo-Hsu) pai, Chen pai weak
Hualien County Fukien, Hakka weak
Taitung County Huang pai, Wu pai, New Turks pai weak
Penghu County South pai. North pai weak
Referring to the map of 
Taiwan
Sources:
1. Chao Yung-mao, T 'a i-w a n  ti- fa n g  p ’a i-h s i  y u  ti-fang  c h e n -s h e  te  k u a n -h s i  [The Relationship between Local 
Factions and Construction in Taiwan] (Kao-hsiung: Te-hsin-shih ch’u-pan-she, 1978), 50-54.
2. Chen Ming-tung, P ’a i-h s i  c h e n g -c h ih  y u  t ’a i-w an  c h e n g -c h ih  p ie n - c h ’ien  [Factional Politics and Political 
Dynamics of Taiwan] (Taipei: Yueh-tan ch’u-pan yu-hsien-kung-szu. 1995), 277-296.
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3. Chang Kun-shan and Huang Cheng-hsiung (eds), T i-fa n g -p 'a i-h x i  y u  t ’a i-w a n  c h e n g -c h ih  [Local Factions and
Taiwanese Politics] (Taipei: The United News Company, 1996).
4.3 The Establishment of the KMT-Local Factions Alliances
A variety of factors have contributed to the establishment of the clientelist 
alliances between the KMT and local factions. For the KMT, its need to govern 
Taiwan played the most important role. Through local factions' mobilisation 
capability, the KMT could penetrate local society and gain local support to 
legitimise its ruling via elections. Moreover, coalition with local factions enabled 
the KMT to  absorb local elites into Its political structure, giving the regime more 
control over local society. Furthermore, the KMT's election-derived linkages with 
local factions enabled the KMT to exert more effective social control and to 
constrain the growth potential of the political opposition.
For local factions, the KMT's abundant political and economic resources 
impelled local factions to co-operate with the regime. In particular, local 
factions were unable to pursue political interests without the KMT's agreement 
because of the KMT's authoritarian control. For these reasons, local factions 
were inclined to build allegiances with the KMT by way of their influence in local 
societies in order to protect their political spaces, and exchange political and 
economic privileges. With the passage of time, the alliance also generated 
political loyalty and intricate interest relations, thus contributing to the 
maintaining of alliance relationships between the two parties.
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In short, tine establishment of political alliances between the KMT and local 
factions was based on mutual needs. The KMT took advantage of Its political 
strength and economic resources to absorb local factions into its political 
structure so th a t It could legitimise Its rule by way of local factions and the 
support gained from local society On this sense, the KMT had transformed local 
factions Into electoral machines). On the other hand, local factions have used 
their mobilisation capability to support the KMT which has in turn rewarded 
local factions with abundant political and economic privileges. Local factions 
have further used those KMT-granted resources to expand their political and 
economic strength. The structure of KMT-local factions alliances can be 
described as a patron-client type.
Elections under authoritarian rule, whether national or local, provide 
political opposition with opportunities to organise and mobile mass support, 
even under restrictions, which could in turn challenge the dominant authority of 
authoritarian regimes. However, the KMT decided to hold local elections after It 
retreated to Taiwan. The KMT's institutionalisation of local elections was based 
on several reasons. First, home rule of local government by way of elections is 
one of the fundamental principles in the KMT founder Sun Yat-sen's teachings 
on 'Rule by the People" or Democracy. Thus, the holding of local elections 
fitted in with Sun Yat-sen's advocacy of democracy. Also, continuing to hold 
local elections could distinguish 'Free China" from 'Communist China" and 
Impress Its influential allies, especially the United States, in order to justify 
Taiwan's membership of the western democratic b lo c“
Moreover, most prominent local Taiwanese elites were either killed or 
frightened after the 28 February Incident In 1947, political opponents were then 
too weak to  pose any significant threat to the KMT. Besides, restrictions on the 
formation o f new political parties further enhanced the ability of the KMT to
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collect, regulate, and distribute political and economic interests according to 
its own concerns. Under such circumstances, elections carried no intrinsic threat 
to its power. Therefore, elections provided the KMT with regular channels for 
alleviating resentment and dissatisfaction among political participants and the 
masses, diluting Taiwanese discontent with the mainlander regime. For these 
reasons, elections served as effective means of social control for the KMT.37
Furthermore, bloody repression might silence political opponents 
temporarily, but it could also undermine the legitimacy of the authoritarian 
regime in terms of political and social stability in the long-run. This is because 
repression could encourage the opposition to use violent strategies to 
challenge the regime for political power. Since the KMT did not admit the 
possibility o f a political alternative or the transfer of power. It ensured that there 
was no serious threat from elections to Its staying in power. Thus, the KMT 
essentially used elections to Increase the legitimacy of its rule. In reality, the 
holding of local elections was a discreet effort by the KMT to restore Its ruling 
legitimacy in Taiwan.33
After Chen Cheng came into office as Taiwan Governor in 1949, he 
established a study group to suggest measures concerning the exercise of local 
autonomy. In April 1950, the ’ Outline of the Exercise of Local Autonomy in 
Taiwan Province' was promulgated and the divisions of electoral 
constituencies were announced. In October of the same year, the first direct 
elections of county and city councils, county magistrates, and city mayors were 
held In 1950. The first provincial assembly election. In which members were 
indirectly elected by county and city legislators, was in 1951 (since 1954, the 
provincial assembly also has been directly elected).35 Afterwards, direct 
elections to both executives and legislators a t the county and sub-county 
levels, and for members of the Taiwan Provincial Assembly were held regularly.
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Based on large and complicated organisational networks and economic 
strength, local factions have abundant influence over local voting behaviour 
and considerable capability in running election campaigns.® According to 
Chen Mlng-tung and Chu Yun-han, the electoral success rate of faction-based 
candidates to provincial assembly elections from 1952 to 1985 was 10.63 times 
of thaf of non-factional candidates.” Besides, an analysis of 5 elections of 
Taiwan provincial assemblymen from 1954 to 1968 by Huang Teh-fu shows that 
the average of factional candidates' share of the popular vote was 57.3 per 
cent, while the percentage of total average of factional members was 60 per 
cent.® Local factions' high capability in infiltration and mobilisation is the 
primary reason that has driven the KMT to institutionalise alliances with them.
The KMT's political alliances with local factions were well reflected in their 
co-operation in elections. This is called electoral clientelism by Wu Nei-teh." On 
the one hand, relying on Its control o f most of the economic and political 
resources, the KMT was able to gain the support of local factions through a 
system of patronage. Local elections were deliberately used by the KMT to 
institutionalise Its connections with local factions. Through the clientelist alliance 
relations with local factions, the KMT was able to penetrate Taiwanese society 
and gain more effective social control, so that the KMT could legitimise Its rule in 
Taiwan.
On the other hand, elections have been important for local factions. Their 
capability in mobilising support from local society as a result of their links with 
the locals is the key point for the KMT In establishing alliance relations with them. 
In elections, local factions channel popular vote to back up KMT candidates to 
run for public offices. In return, the KMT rewards local factions with regional 
monopolistic political and economic spoils. In other words, elections provide the
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institutionalised means for local factions to pursue political spoils and economic 
privileges. Elections serve as indispensable mechanism for the development of 
local factions.
The election-derived linkages between the KMT and local factions are 
clearly observable. According to two research investigations tabled below, the 
percentage share of the vote for KMT candidates who were tied to local 
factions was 63.47 per cent for elections to local executives from 1954 to 1993; 
61.86 per cent for elections of Taiwan Provincial Assemblymen from 1954 to 
1994; 59.3 per cent for elections of National Legislators from 1972 to  1995; and 
40.21 per cent for elections of National Assemblymen from 1980 to 1995 (Table 
4.2).
Table 4.2 The Percentage Vote for KMT Local Factional Candidates 
at Elections (1954-1995)
Year
City and 
County
Chiefs (%)
Year
Provincial
Assemblymen
CM
Year
National
Legislators
CM
Year
National
Assemblymen
CM
1954 85.71 1954 75.00 1972 52.6 1980 29.62
1957 80.95 1957 63.79 1975 55.6 1986 39.47
1960 90.48 1960 64.86 1980 47.4 1991 43.16
1963 80.95 1963 63.33 1983 51.5 1995 48.62
1968 80.00 1972 50.00 1986 47.1
1972 40.00 1977 60.87 1989 52.8
1977 15.00 1981 77.05 1992 78.3
1981 55.55 1985 68.33 1995 53.3
1985 61.11 1989 58.06
1989 65.00 1994 50.91
1993 42.11
Averaae 63.47 61.86 59.3 40.21
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Sources:
1. Chen Ming-tung, P ’a i-h s i  c h e n g -c h ih  y u  t 'a i-w a n  c h e n g -c h ih  p i e n - c h ie n  [Factional Politics and Political 
Dynamics of Taiwan] (Taipei: Yueh-tan ch’u-pan yu-hsien-kung-szu, 1995), 224-227.
2. Huang Teh-fu, “Elections and the Evolution of the Kuomintang," in Tien Hung-mao (ed), T a iw a n 's  E le c to r a l  
P o litic s  a n d  D e m o c ra tic  T ra n s itio n :  R id in g  the  T h ird  W a ve  (New York: M.E. Sharp, Inc., 1996), 133 and 134.
The KMT had long found It convenient to maintain Its governance by cultivating 
and combining relations with local factions. Local factions were ideal vehicles 
for the KMT's infiltration of Taiwanese society since they were not motivated 
strongly by nationalism, but were based on personal values such as family, 
geography and academic ties. Therefore, local factions would not pose 
challenges to the KMT regime. As long as the KMT delivered the special rewards 
which local factions craved, the KMT could gain support from local factions to  
meet Its governing needs"
Despite the KMT's reliance on, and alliances with local factions, It took 
several strategies to manage its patron-client relations with local factions In 
order to  put them under control. First, all factions were geographically bound. 
Local factions were prohibited from engaging in activities or co-ordinating 
campaign efforts across city and county borders. The KMT central authority 
effectively blocked any attempt to form island-wide political alliances among 
local factions and preempted the channels of horizontal liaison in both 
provincial and national representative bodies.45
Second, the KMT suspended elections for representatives to the national 
legislative institutions on the basis of Its claim that it was still the government of 
the whole of China. The elected national legislators continued to consist of the 
representatives chosen throughout China on a province-by-province basis In 
the elections of 1947. Taiwanese representatives were always a small minority in
1 2 8
the national representative bodies, though regular elections were held “  
Besides, direct elections for executive posts were limited to the county level and 
below. The Taiwan Governor was not subject to election, but was appointed by 
1he KMT since an executive with island-wide electoral legitimacy could easily 
threaten the power of the President.47
Under such circumstances, the three branches of the National Congress, 
I.e. the National Assembly, the Legislative Yuan, and the Control Yuan, 
consisted mainly of mainlander Chinese. The Taiwan Governor, Taipei City 
Mayor, and Kaohsiung Major were also mainlanders. Although a few Taiwanese 
were positioned in high party and governmental offices after the KMT's 
Talwanisation policy was implemented in the 1970s, they were discreetly 
selected and cultivated. Strategic posts such as those of Foreign Minister, 
Defence Minister, Finance Minister, and heads of the security apparatus were 
never held by Taiwanese during the time of authoritarian rule.“  The KMT's 
CenlTal Committee (CC) did not recruit any Taiwanese until Its tenth Party 
Congress in 1969.“
Due to these arrangements, the national political landscape continued to 
be dominated by mainlander elites. By contrast, Taiwanese elites filled, but 
were confined to the local political space. This resulted in the creation of a 
unique political structure termed a * bi-ethnic political elite structure" by 
Wakabayashi Masatake
Third, during the authoritarian years, the KMT controlled a substantial 
number potential of swing voters, consisting of loyalist mainlanders. state 
employees, military personnel and their families In each district, which was. In 
most districts, big enough to tip the balance between competing factions In 
elections. The party also controlled substantial financial and media resources
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and Its directive authority over various state agencies. Thus, the KMT had the 
capacity to make or break the political fortune of a faction and Its affiliated 
politicians by throwing Its weight behind rival factions or fostering new 
competition in the district.8'
Based on the KMT's capacity of balance, the KMT nurtured and kept at 
least two competing factions within each administrative district below the 
provincial level, striving for public offices and other electoral offices in many 
quasi-state organisations (such as farmers associations), and more importantly, 
for a share of region-based economic rents In the non-tradable goods sector, 
distributed by the party-directed spoils system.“  Therefore, each of the 23 
administrative districts at county-city level have at least two factions. Likewise, 
there are at least two factions at the same time In each of the 309 hsiang- 
townships.
Under the strategy of bi-factionalism, the KMT could easily play one faction 
off against another and gain control over all factions In each administrative 
district“  Also, the strategy of check-and-balance strengthened the clientelist 
alliances between the KMT and local factions. Since local factions which did 
not support the KMT would become weak because of rival factions' clientelist 
alliances with the KMT, factions would must support the KMT patron In order to 
remain competitive in the political leverage against their counterparts. Thus, the 
KMT's interests became the clients' interests. If the KMT contributed to the local 
faction's power, the local faction would use that power to support the KMT. This 
was particularly true during authoritarian years.“  Fierce electoral competition 
among the factions also helped the KMT to constrain the growth potential of 
the political opposition as they virtually blocked the entrance of the opposition 
candidates in local elections ®
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Fourth, the KMT's control over nomination and election processes served 
as means to constrain the growth potential of local factions. Under the KMT's 
monopolisation of political and economic resources, most factions were 
incorporated into the KMT, whose support guaranteed electoral success in 1he 
early decades. Local party committees used their power over nominations to 
alternate elected posts between factions after every term in sonne cases, and 
dfter every two terms in other cases. Top posts could be divided among 
factions; for example, if the county magistrate belonged to one faction, the 
speaker of the county council would belong to another. The distribution of 
factional influence created the stability of the local political system and 
reduced the uncertainty of the power struggle between factions.“
What is noteworthy is that, all aspects of local elections were tightly 
controlled although local elites were allowed to run for public offices vio 
elections at the sub-national level. For examples, campaign efforts across 
constituencies were prohibited; campaigning was limited to ten days; the 
qualifications for candidacy were constantly revised; election days were 
allowed unexpectedly; and no supra-party supervisory body was permitted5’ In 
addition, the KMT limited electoral offices, such as the country magistrates, city 
mayors and hs/ang-town ships executives, to two terms of office in order to 
prevent a monopolisation of local political and economic privileges by any 
faction through the public offices.58
Fifth, the KMT preserved the institutional power to control local factions. 
Since the KMT controlled the power of institutional creation, the party could 
revise and modify the existing electoral regulations, such as change of electoral 
constituencies and campaign policies, to Its favours. Besides, to some extent, 
local factions' capability to mobilise support from local societies was based on 
their Illegal activities such as vote-buying and gift-giving, especially In rural areas
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where personal affiliations are emphasised and candidates depend on less 
their images or policy issues. Usually, local factions' illegal campaigns were 
accepted by the KMT If they maintained co-operation with the KMT. However, 
the KMT could enforce Its control over local factions through the judiciary once 
local factions infringed the KMT's interests.55
Finally, the KMT arranged Its party-cultivated candidates instead of 
factional members to run election campaigns in order to remove local factions 
from their influence, i.e. their public offices. In reality, the KMT's goals and 
ideology had been in conflict with local factions from the beginning. Local 
factions had little concern with the KMT's aim of retaking the mainland and 
completing national construction, nor the KMT's basic party tenets. Rather, they 
were chiefly interested in only short-term gains in the local units and had no 
ideological centre. Local factions could rise up and undermine the political 
foundation of the KMT party-state once the KMT's authoritarian control 
declines. For these reasons, the KMT attempted to reduce the overall power of 
local factions after Its ruling capability was fully established in Taiwan.
The KMT's establishment of Its control over local factions was built not only 
upon political coercion, but also economic pacification. In order to consolidate 
its clientelist ties with local factions, the KMT offered abundant economic 
privileges to those factions which were willing to co-operate with the regime. As 
Chu Vun-han stated, "ruling elites in authoritarian states often reward their 
political followers with economic privileges In order to gain their loyalty and
maintain the ruling coalition.....The KMT used to take advantage of the party-
state apparatus to generate abundant economic privileges, so that the regime 
could exchange those economic spoils for political allegiance with local 
factions. The regime patronage system served as the fundamental mechanism
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to maintain the KMT's alliances with local factions during the period of 
authoritarian rule." “
The economic privileges granted by the KMT to local factions include: 
local monopolistic businesses such as banks, credit unions, farmers' associations, 
fishermen's associations and public transportation; special loans from provincial 
banks; procurements from provincial and local government agencies, other 
economic benefits bestowed by the government through Its exercise of 
authority as in favourable zoning laws or public construction projects as well as 
public utility for land speculation; and the use o f governmental authority to 
protect certain illegal underground economic activities such as dance clubs 
and casinos.6’ Table shows 4.3 regional monopolistic business granted to local 
factions by the KMT regime
Table 4.3 The Regional Monopolistic Businesses of Local Factions
l^ocal Factions' Monopolistic Business Number of Factions Percentage i 'S 1
Co-operative Banks 60 67.4
Credit Unions 52 584
Non-Credit Unions 42 47.2
Farmers Associations' Credit Departments 50 56.2
Fishermen's Associations' Credit Departments 7 7.8
Bus Companies 18 20.2
Owning at least one of the above 81 91.0
The total number of Investigated local factions is 89
Source:
Chon Ming-rung and Chu Yun-han, “Ohuyu-hsing lien-ho fu -chan chmg-chi, tifang-pai-hsi yu shcn-i yuan hsuan 
chu l hsianp shcn-i yuan hou-hsuan-fcn pci-ching tsu-liao ten hsi " |Regional United and Monopolised Economy,
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Local factions, and Elections to Provincial Assemblymen: The Analysis or the Background Information of Candidates 
to Provincial Assemblymen Elections] J o u r n a l  o f  N a tio n a l S c ie n tific  C o m m itte e :  H u m a n ity  a n d  S o c ia l  S c ie n c e  voi 
2 . ( 1992) :  90
The KMT used a variety of state-allocated benefits at different administrative 
levels to co-opt local factions in county-city and haang-township areas. 
Factions at the hs/dn-township level were allowed to develop a parasitic 
relationship with farmers' associations. Immediately after 1947 land reforms, 
farmers associations were established in eoch of Taiwan's 309 townships to 
provide various services to the local farming community. Following the KMT's 
reforms of farmer associations in 1952. farmers were compelled to join farmers' 
associations in their districts. Allhough the percentage of the Taiwanese 
population working in the agricultural sector had gradually declined (from 52.4 
per cenf in 1952) with Taiwan's industrialisation. “  the farmers' associations still 
remain powerful.
An important aspect of all farmers' associations which helps strengthen the 
relationship between the association and the local community is Its extension 
programmes (one of the designated commissions of farmers' associations). The 
extension programmes help educate farmer-members about up-to-date 
farming techniques, resource preservation, daily living (housing, marketing), 
and agricultural research which are important in the agrarian sector where 
literacy and knowledge of modem cultivation methods tend to be lower than 
in more urbanised areas. The extension work promotes productivity, but also 
strengthens the communication networks between the farmers' associations 
and the farmers, and therefore between local factions and the farmers as 
well.“  Through the organisational network of farmers associations, local factions 
found It convenient to manage iheir relationships with, and to mobilise support 
from, the local community.
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What is more, farmers' associations have a great deal of economic power 
within the agrarian sector. Each farmers' association contains a credit 
department which provides loans and financial assistance to the farmer- 
members. Research by Wang Cheng-huan and Shen Kuo-ping reveals that the 
total savings of the credit departments of 309 farmers' associations was $23 
billions in 1991, and the surplus was $0.24 billions in the same year “  Due to the 
huge savings and business surplus, farmers' associations have considerable 
economic influence. More importantly, certain national regulations concerning 
loans do not apply to the credit departments of the farmers' associations.66 The 
credit departments become private banks for many local factions which take 
advantage of the credit departments to buy support from their followers. For 
example, rewarding their clients, such as vote brokers, by overvaluing 
mortgages.66
Based on its strong organisational strength and economic Influence, 
farmers' associations have a remarkable capability to mobilise support for 
election campaigns and to maintain the development of local factions. They 
have become the most influential civic groups.67 Local factions often compete 
for the support of farmers' associations. Electoral competition for farmers' 
associations is no less Intense than that for the executives of hs/ang-to wnsh ips 
Excessive factionalism for control o f the farmers' associations sometimes causes 
serious economic disorder in hsiang-townships since the opposition faction 
often mobilises their farmer-member supporters to withdraw their savings from 
the credit department In order to damage the political credit of their rival 
faction in power.6*
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Factions at the county-city level were granted with ownership of natural 
monopolistic businesses by the KMT, e g. public transportation systems and 
credit co-operative banks. The KMT also set aside some positions in the local 
administrative system for local factions at city-county level to feed their political 
networks. The most important example is 1he Urban Planning Committee 
established in each county or city government to plan land use and urban 
development policies. These committees are chaired by the executives of 
county or city governments who also have the power to appoint members of 
those committees. On the one hand, the committee has become the key 
machine to enable local factions to accumulate the abundant interests and 
resources necessary to sustain their political networks. On the other hand, the 
committee is a powerful instrument of the KMT in cultivating and controlling 
local factions 6'
Furthermore, the grant system was used by the KMT to nurture its clienteiist 
ties with local factions. In Taiwan, the tax structure was highly centralised. The 
tax revenue received by the national government was much greater than that 
collected by the lower levels of government, i.e. the provincial government and 
especially the county-city and hs/ang-township administrations. This gap in the 
ability of high and lower levels of government to independently finance their 
budgets resulted in the grant system, which facilitates the transfer of money 
from high levels of government to lower levels, for the purpose of fulfilling 
budgetary demands, implementing social welfare improvements, initiating 
construction projects, or providing other services within the local area *
As the lower government levels are highly dependent upon the national 
government to balance their own budgets, the grant system therefore became 
a favourable and important way for the KMT party-state to  maintain Its 
clienteiist ties w!1h local factions. The KMT often took advantages of ruling
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authority to  influence the allocation of greater amounts of grant money to Its 
own client factions in the local administrations. As long as the KMT is able to 
maintain its strong financial base, local factions will continue to support the 
KMT.7'
While examining the KMT's patronage system, the role of the high level of 
party ownership of the Taiwanese economy on KMT factional politics cannot 
be neglected. Taiwan is viewed by the developmental state authors (such as 
Alice H. Amsden, Frederic C. Deyo, Chalmers Johnson and Robert Wade) as a 
successful industrialising country where skilled and relatively insulated economic 
policymakers promoted cdpitalist economic development through market- 
conforming intervention and public-private cooperation. By exercising direct 
and indirect influence on the level of profit ond investment, the state can 
modify, enhance, or create competitiveness.72
The developmental state approach explicitly characterises Taiwan as a 
country 1hat possess a highly elaborate, resourceful, and centralised 
administrative apparatus for effectively implementing national planning 
priorities and administering direct and indirect control over the industrialisation 
process.7’ Taiwan is said to be able to assert an independent national 
development interest * as It acquires the political ability to resist the penetration 
by special interests, to circumscribe the autonomy of economic actors w!1h 
multi-faced mediated control, ond to establish the subordination of labour 
through direct control over organised labour."7*
Taiwan's economy is also characterised by Its unique political economic 
structure, i.e. the KMT party's enterprises own a great many assets in the 
country. Taiwan has been ruled by a party-state that owns outright or directly 
controls huge portions of 1he nation's economic assets. According to research
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by Karl J. Fields, estimates of these state and party holdings range as high as 
50% of all company assets, with annual turnover earnings of up to 30% of 
Taiwan's GNP.75 Yet the remarkable development of the KMT party-owned 
enterprises (kuomintang tangyingshihye') is the product of particular historical 
and ideological factors in Taiwan.
As discussed in Chapter Three, the KMT in many ways remains decidedly 
Leninist in Its democratic centralism within the party and its organisational 
parallelism between the party and state. The KMT adopted an authoritarian 
corporatist approach to dominate society. Private social organisations were 
either restricted or penetrated by party cells. Moreover, the KMT also controlled 
the state through party organs located in administrative units at all levels of 
government and by party commissars positioned in military units, Under such 
circumstances, little distinction was made between party and state interests 
during the KMT authoritarian years. The national treasury was the party's 
treasury, and the existence and development of party-owned enterprises 
coincided with state-owned enterprises.76
Historically, a disastrous relationship with private capital played a 
contributory role in the KMT's loss o f control on the mainland. The regime learnt 
from that lesson after It arrived on Taiwan in 1949. Besides, the KMT's attem pt to 
dominate the subethnic Taiwanese majority also drove It to concentrate 
economic resources in Its own hands. The KMT founder Sun Yat-sen's principle 
of * People s Livelihood' called for limits on the private concentration of capital 
and the equalisation of land tenure, but endorsed neither the ideological 
means (class struggle) nor ends (utopian communism) of Leninist socialism.77 
After the KMT moved to Taiwan, It drew on Sun's vague prescriptions to justify 
both Its restrictions on the scope and scale of private industry, and Its 
maintenance and promotion of substantial state- and party-owned enterprises
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Since 1949, the KMT government has insisted that enterprises directly 
related to national defence secrets, enterprises with monopoly or oligopoly 
power, and large-scale enterprises related to public utilities and risky investment 
beyond the reach of private capital must be run by the government.7* When 
the KMT took over Taiwan from 1he Japanese in 194S, It inherited all the assets 
and enterprises previously owned by both the Japanese colonial government 
and the private Japanese conglomerates. Moreover, the defeated KMT 
brought with It from the mainland several enterprises that It resurrected on 
Taiwan under its own auspices. Furthermore, many new industries, particularly in 
the financial and strategic development sectors were established as state- or 
party-owned enterprises.”
The KMT strongly supports state enterprises with economic policies In the 
1950s and 1960s, 10-20 per cent of the annual financial expenses of the 
government went on funds for state-owned enterprises The percentage 
increased to 20-30 per cent in the 1970s and 1980s The state-owned enterprises 
also received preferential loans from banks based on the government's policy. 
Moreover, the KMT government's policies directly created monopoly positions 
for state enterprises. For example, Taiwan's military industry, transportation, 
postal services, electrical power, oil, copper and aluminium etc. have all been 
operated completely by state enterprises. Furthermore, the KMT raised the 
prices of govemmentally monopolised products (such as cigarettes, alcohol, 
chemical fertilizer and oil), so as to create favorable conditions for state 
enterprises.“
In terms of ownership, organisation and Incentive mechanisms, the KMT 
party enterprises have the same characteristics as state enterprises In fact, the 
party enterprises have enjoyed more government nepotism than the state
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enterprises. Historically. Taiwan's military and governmental offices purchased 
everything from medicine and gunpowder to cement and air conditioners 
exclusively from party-owned enterprises. Many strategic and lucrative sectors 
o f the financial industry, especially the insurance, trust and securities markets 
were also reserved for party-owned enterprises.8' In the ten great construction 
projects in the 1970s and the six-year national construction project in the 1990s, 
the KMT party's enterprises received considerable special privileges during the 
bidding for projects, based on their favourable positions“
Before the 1960s, party-owned enterprises did not capture the attention of 
the public because of their small number and lack of influence. With the KMT's 
purposed development over time since the 1960s, parly-owned enterprises 
expanded dramatically in terms of both scope and scale. Although the 
advance of democratic rules has forced the KMT to separate itself from the 
state, and give up most of the sheltered privileges and rents enjoyed by many 
o f its firms, the party has successfully reorganised the party-owned enterprises as 
private firms beyond the inspection and control of both the public and the 
opposition.
The KMT manages Its interests in Its invested firms through several holding 
companies owned outright by the party and directly controlled by the KMT's 
Central Finance Committee (CFC). The 1991 book value of the party's assets in 
its registered corporations ranged from NTS 112 billion ($ 4.5 billion) to NTS 500 
billion ($ 20 billion) according to different investigation reports.85 Two of the 
seven holding companies, the Central Investment Company and the 
Kuanghua Investment Company are capitalised by huge amounts of re­
invested capital. The re-investments cover a wide range of companies involved 
in finance, investment, oil-chemistry, electronics, electrical machinery, cement, 
steel, construction, medicine, environmental protection, textiles, paper.
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communications etc. The total assets of firms invested in by the party were 
valued in 1993 dt some NTS 900 billion (S 36 billion) although the degree over 
which the KMT exercises control of these firms varies.“  The KMT party's 
enterprises have become Taiwan's largest private business conglomerates in 
terms of assets in annual rankings and the sixth largest in terms of sales in 
present-day Taiwan.
The astonishing economic strength of party enterprises allows the KMT to 
be self-sufficient without depending on 1he national treasury or the business 
community. The KMT is well-capable of funding salaries, pensions and other 
benefits for some 4, (XX) full-time party employees as well as 1,000 retired party 
cadres, which are estimated to cost the KMT about S 200 million each year85 
Also, the KMT is able to fund increasingly costly political campaigns, which are 
highly personal and outrageously expensive. Most importantly, the KMT's party- 
owned enterprises do more than simply perform the role of profit-seeking 
enterprises. They also have performed a variety of functions but providing 
patronage outlets is one of them (the others include: profit sources, 
propaganda organs, developmental agents, market regulators, and 
diplomatic envoys)“
Because the KMT was a transplanted minority regime, It used Its party 
enterprise resources to gain support from mainiander officials and other party 
personnel who remained loyal to the KMT. Those who served well were 
provided with employment opportunities and generous retirement pensions. 
Similarly, the KMT reserved d number of employment opportunities within party- 
owned firms exclusively for retired solders/ military personnel (about over a 
million) who moved to Taiwan in the 1940s with the KMT, so as to constrain 
potential social unrest and entice loyalty from those mainiander veterans, 
whose electoral support is the so-called * iron vote."
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While using the economic strength generated from its party-owned 
enterprises to retain strong relationships with its mainlander clients, the KMT also 
utilized its party enterprises to nurture patron-client relationships with private 
Taiwanese enterprises and local factions. Governmental monopoly licenses 
have been lucrative cash cows that the party has been able to disburse to 
local private enterprises in exchange for political support. The KMT has also 
been using its profitable party-owned construction projects and other types of 
contracts and sinecures within party-owned enterprises to reward local faction 
leaders, whose political support has been playing an important role in helping 
the KMT's continued electoral strength in Taiwan's local units.“7
In general, the KMT's alliance relations with local factions were constituted 
upon both political and economic clientelism and, to some extent, the latter 
strengthens the former. Relying on an abundance of political and economic 
resources, the KMT was able to consolidate its rule by ensuring a coalition with 
local factions through the patronage system. Local party committees have 
played a key role in the relationships between Chiang Kai-shek first, and then 
Chiang Ching-kuo, and their political clients, i.e. local factions. Local factions 
directly served only the supreme leader. No top aides could develop a 
personal clientelist relationship with local elites without the endorsement of the 
supreme leader. Attempts of other KMT ruling elites and mainlander factions to 
connect with local factions were proscribed.“
4.4 Conclusion
Although the KMT had long found it convenienf to maintain its governance by 
cultivating and combining relations with local factions, the KMT's alliance
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relations with local factions was the most fragile sector of the KMT's ruling 
structure.8' Compared with KMT mainlander factions, local factions enjoyed a 
high degree of autonomy. Although the landscape of national politics was 
dominated by the mainlanders. their influence depended on the will and 
decisions of the regime's supreme patrons. They had neither independent 
power base outside the party-state hierarchy nor any monopolistic economic 
resources. Also, they found it difficult to establish their own political base 
through elections as a result of their lack of affiliations to local society.
By contrast, the political positions of local factions were not endorsed by 
the supreme patron. Local factions were not a 'b ra nch ' o f the KMT but 
separate, powerful organisations bound by familial and social ties. They had 
been politically autonomous based on their organisational networks in local 
society. They were very capable of mobilising local support. The influence of 
local factions came from below rather than above. Although the KMT could 
use its political forces and economic resources to control local factions, it was 
unable to remove them all from the political stage. Once the KMT's political 
strength declined or the power of local factions enhanced, local factions could 
easily cease their co-operation with, and become political competitors of, the 
KMT regime.
Furthermore, sub-ethnic cleavages between Taiwanese and mainlanders 
in the post-war Taiwan drove the KMT to ally with local factions for its legitimacy. 
In reality, the KMT's ruling foundation was based on Its alliances with local 
factions through electoral clientelism. Local factions acted as political brokers 
to channel local support to the KMT. Local factions rather than the KMT Itself 
were In daily political contact with local communities. This prevented the KMT 
from merging with local society. Likewise, It indirectly increased local factions' 
strength In their political leverages against the KMT. Under such circumstance.
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local factions were able to bargain with the KMT to gain more political and 
economic privileges based on Its organisational influence in local society If the 
KMT's political dominance was undermined.
With political and economic changes In the 1970s and 1980s. the KMT 
gradually lost its political dominance. On the one hand, the opposition, l.e. 
Tang-wai group, successfully broke though the KMT's blockade and emerged 
on to Taiwan's political stage. On the other hand, the power of local factions 
also increased after they gained momentous capital strength as a result of 
Taiwan's rapid economic growth ond urbanisation. Meanwhile, the KMT's large- 
scale attempts to reduce the overall power of local factions fractured its 
alliance relations with local factions which later turned to the Tang-wai group to 
challenge the KMT. The strategic alliance between local factions and the 
opposition gradually weakened the regime's authoritarian control.
The question of how the change of the alliance relationships between the 
KMT and local factions contributed to Taiwan's democratic transition is 
discussed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 5
The Change in KMT-Local Factions Alliance Relations and 
Taiwan’s Democratic Transition
A patron-client relationship is a vertical alliance based on a voluntary 
agreement between two persons or parties of unequal status, power, or 
resources, with each finding it useful to have as an ally someone inferior or 
superior to himself with whom to exchange favours.' As the maintenance of the 
alliance depends on the willingness of both allies to maintain It, the relationship 
will change if one side finds that the Importance of the other for his interests 
declines. In the view of the client, the alliance relationship Is most likely to 
change when the patron's rewards cannot satisfy the client; when the client 
can find another patron to gain the needs he requires; when the strength of the 
client becomes strong enough to designate services from the patron; and 
when the client finds that the patron's rewards are no longer useful to him.2
As mentioned in the previous chapter, there were two major structural 
problems Involved In the KMT's cllentelist alliances with local factions. Unlike the 
KMT mainlander factions and ruling elites, local factions were able to act 
independently based on their capability to mobilise support in local society 
through traditional networks. The KMT's long-term use of local factions to 
channel electoral support from local factions also prevented the KMT from 
merging with local society, and thus further deepened the KMT's reliance on
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local factions. For these reasons, the alliance relationships between the KMT 
and local factions were most likely to change once the KMT's political 
dominance declined or the potency of local factions increased.
Another problem surrounding the KMT-local factions alliance structure 
concerns the relations between factions. Due to the KMT's strategy of bl- 
factionalism which involves cultivating at least two competing factions In each 
district a t the same time and its use of the nomination power to alternate 
elected posts between factions, competition between KMT factions in the same 
district was intensified. Sometimes, conflict was too Intense to be controlled by 
the KMT. In order to compete for KMT tickets to run for public offices, especially 
under the single-member electoral contests, as with county magistrates, local 
factions tended to be rather non-ideological. The loser often retaliated by 
failing to campaign vigorously for the party's nominees or actually supporting 
the opposition's candidates. Excessive factionalism provided the political 
opposition with an opportunity to increase Its influence via elections.3
With the political and socio-economic political changes of the 1970s, the 
two above-mentioned structural problems were enlarged. On the one hand, 
Taiwan's economic growth in the 1960s boosted the economic strength of local 
factions based on their regional monopolistic businesses granted by the KMT. 
On the other hand, the rise of the political opposition, i.e. the Tang-wai group, 
complicated the clientelist alliance relations between the KMT and local 
factions. The KMT's attempt to remove the Influence of local factions in the 
1970s drove the factions to support the opposition In elections for public offices. 
Afterwards, the growth potential of the opposition steadily increased from the 
late 1970s and finally broke through the KMT's authoritarian rule.
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This chapter examines the process of Taiwan's transition toward political 
democracy by investigating the change of political alliance relations between 
the KMT and local factions. It first addresses Taiwan's political changes in the 
1970s. Next, it discusses the KMT's response to those changes and the 
consequent outcomes. It then analyses the conflict between the KMT and local 
factions and the rise of the political opposition. Finally, it studies the process of 
strategic interaction between the opposition and the KMT and how that 
interaction moved Taiwan toward democracy.
5.1 Taiwan's Political Changes in the 1970s
According to Wang Cheng-huan, support from the United States instead of 
efforts a t home allowed the KMT to  escape liberation by the People's Liberation 
Army (PLA) in the 1950s. First, the United States stationed its Seventh Fleet to 
prevent an invasion from the mainland, concluded a mutual defence treaty 
with Taiwan, and provided Taiwan with more than US$ 2.5 billions of military aid 
between 1950 and 1974. Moreover, the United States helped the KMT to 
implement land and agricultural reforms and develop Taiwan's industrial 
infrastructure. The US government also provided a huge outlet market for 
Taiwan's exports and offered Taiwan more than US$ 1.5 billions of economic aid 
between 1950 and 1965.''
Furthermore, the United States strongly supported Taiwan's representation 
in international organisations, especially the United Nations (UN). American 
political support indirectly confirmed the KMT's alleged claim that it was still the 
government of the whole of China and endorsed the KMT's power based on 
"temporary provisions' entrusted by "national emergency" rather than the 
Constitution. In reality, the United States' strong military, economic, and political
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support In the 1950s and 1960s provided the necessary resources for the KMT's 
legltlmlsation at home. From this viewpoint, the United States' assistance was 
indispensable for the establishment of the KMT's ruling authority over Taiwan.5
Admittedly, US support for the KMT was based on America's own political 
Interests. While the KMT regime gradually lost its dominance and control on the 
Chinese mainland to the communists, Washington kept a distance from the 
KMT. However, the eruption of the 1950 Korean War drove Washington to re­
construct an alliance relationship with the KMT in an attempt to incorporate 
Taiwan into its global defence system to block the expansion of communist 
forces. The Vietnam War in the 1960s further strengthened the ties between 
Taiwan and the USA. However, demands from the Americans to  end the 
Vietnam War and the consistent changes In the International political 
environment finally led to the transformation of Washington's Asian policy.
After Nixon was sworn in as US President In January 1969, realistic concerns 
replaced Idealistic policy. Nixon called for negotiation Instead of confrontation 
in Washington's relations with Beijing.4 This revealed the evidence of the new 
détente between the two governments. Meanwhile, border military tension 
between China and the former Soviet Union In March 1969 impelled China to 
re-instate Its relations with the West especially the USA. The relationship between 
the USA and China began to move forward after Mao Tse-tung Invited Nixon to 
visit Beijing In December 1970. Political harmonisation between the two powers 
seriously degraded Taiwan's strategic Importance for Washington. This was soon 
reflected in Washington relinquishing its political support for the KMT, causing 
Taiwan's loss of its representation in the UN In October 1971. Taiwan's UN 
membership was replaced by Communist China.
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In February 1972, the USA concluded the Shanghai Communiqué with 
China when US President Nixon visited Beijing. In it, the USA acknowledged the 
PRC as the only legitimate government of China and Taiwan as a part of China. 
In the next year, a memorandum was signed between the USA and the PRC for 
the mutual establishment of liaison offices in their capitals. Subsequently, the 
USA withdrew its military consultants group from Taiwan. The Taiwan Resolution 
and US military aid were renounced as well. The international environment had 
rapidly turned hostile to Taiwan, and consequently Taiwan suffered serious 
diplomatic setbacks (Figure 5.1)/ Between 1971 and 1978, thirty-three nations, 
including most major western powers, switched diplomatic ties from Taiwan to 
China. Taiwan's diplomatic crisis reached a climax when Washington 
established official diplomatic relations with Beijing in December 1978.
Figure 5.1 Taiwan's Diplomatic Setbacks (1971-1978)
■  The Number of States 
which had Official 
Diplomatic Ties with 
Taiwan
Sources:
Feng-yun-lun-tan ch’u-pan-she, "t'ou-shih wai-chiao nei-mu," [Look through the Inside Stories or Diplomacy] 
(Taipei: Feng-yun-lun-tan ch'u-pan-she, 1984). 77; quoted in Chang Tsan-he, L ia n g -a n  k u a n -h s i  p ie n -c h 'ie n -s h ih  
[The Dynamics of Taiwan Mainland China Relations) (Taipei: Chou-chih wen-hua yu-hsien-kung-szu, 1996), 176.
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On the other hand, Taiwan's economy began to experience dramatic growth 
from the 1960s. Between 1960 and 1980, Taiwan's grass national product 
increased at an annual rate o f 9 per cent In real terms. Exports expanded at 
around 20 per cent a year and became the economy's leading sector. The 
industrial share of production increased from 25 to  45 per cent. Per capita GNP 
rose from US$50 in 1952 to US$ 6,045 in 1988. Income became more equitably 
distributed. The inflation rate In the 1960s was as low as 2 per cent.'
Rapid economic growth had liberalised social consequences. With the 
economy taking off, Taiwan displayed features common to a modernising 
capitalist society: the literacy rate increased, mass communication intensified, 
per capita income rose, and a differentiated urban sector, including labour, a 
professional middle class and an entrepreneurial business class, came Into 
being. The newly emerged middle class demanded higher levels of political 
participation and democratic reforms and enhanced the opposition's ability to 
mobilise. Such new social forces are generally viewed as propitious for the 
advance of democratic norms.'1 Most importantly, the newly emerged middle 
class intellectuals who came of age during the period of rapid economic 
growth became the main activists, demanding political change in Taiwan.
Uke the leaders of the earlier democratic movement (led by several 
mainlander liberal intellectuals and Taiwanese political elites) who had 
attempted unsuccessfully to  push democratic ideas in the early 1950s, the 
leaders of the new democratic movement were educated elites reacting to 
ideas and institutions in western democratic countries and seeking to apply 
them at home. However, the new democratic elites were predominantly 
Taiwanese from the countryside. They had close ties with local society. The new 
democratic leaders also adopted political techniques, specific democratic 
procedures, institutional designs, and legal frameworks from the West. They
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were better equipped with organisational skills and more likely to take political 
action.'0
Taiwan's loss of Its membership of fhe UN fo Communisf China and its 
severance of formal ties with many Western countries triggered the KMT's 
legitimacy crisis a t home. First, the KMT's alleged claim that it was still the 
government of the whole of China was exposed to challenges. In the light of 
Taiwan's diplomatic setbacks, Taiwanese Christian Presbyterian churches 
published the " Declaration and Suggestions on the State Affairs by the Christian 
Presbyterian Churches" on 29 December 1971. In the declaration, the Church 
claimed that Taiwanese objected to living under the rule of a communist 
regime and also rejected all decisions made by any government without 
consideration of the rights and Interests of the residents of Taiwan. The 
declaration also claimed that all people have the right to decide their fate 
since human rights are bestowed by God."
The emergence of the self-determination concept was the most profound 
effect of the Church's declaration. No radical independent movement had 
ever gained predominant support from the Taiwanese. The self-determination 
concept, which demanded constitutional changes from the government, later 
became the mainstream Idea of Taiwan's nationalist movement.12 Soon, the 
self-determination movement developed vigorously abroad and at home. After 
leaders of the democratic movement entered the debate on Taiwan's future 
and called for self-determination to force the KMT to address the issue of 
démocratisation, the democratic movement gradually merged with the 
nationalist movement.
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Moreover, Taiwan's diplomatic setback triggered another wave of the 
democratic movement, While the initial reaction to the deteriorating external 
environment was patriotic, young intellectuals soon turned their attention to 
domestic society and politics. Leaders of the democratic movement acquired 
new conceptions of the role of politics in their lives and new goals for which 
they might strive.”  They questioned the structural deficiency of the KMT regime, 
especially over the issues of the competence and legitimacy of the "Long 
Parliament," i.e. the three branches of the National Congress (the National 
Assembly, the Legislative Yuan and the Control Yuan) that had not faced re- 
election since 1946 and had not made new room for Taiwanese.’4
5.2 From Hard Authoritarianism to the Soft
The KMT regime responded to the legitimacy crisis and challenge from the new 
democratic movement by implementing further industrialisation and 
Taiwanisation measures after Chiang Ching-kuo was named the Premier In 
1972. The KMT pursued further Industrialisation and economic development in 
order to strengthen the confidence and support of local capitalists In the wake 
of the de-recognition setbacks. As a result, the KMT adopted measures to guide 
Taiwan's transition from light to heavy industrial development and implemented 
"Ten Projects on National Construction" to promote additional economic 
development.’5 Also, agricultural policy was drastically altered and the rural 
sector was increasingly subsidised and protected.’6
Taiwanisation was adopted in the 1950s, but change took place slowly 
and beneath the surface.’7 After Chiang Ching-kuo become the Premier, 
Taiwanisation was vigorously implemented. It included two strategies. On the 
one hand, the KMT tried to integrate itself better with Taiwanese society. This
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was because the issue of whether the KMT could govern Taiwan competently 
became much more important because of the legitimacy crisis of the 1970s. 
The legitimacy of the regime was modified to depend increasingly on its 
effective governance of Taiwan. What is more, the recruitment of more 
Taiwanese into the upper ranks of the KMT party-state could steadily enhance 
the role o f Taiwanese, so as to raise their common stake in the regime's 
fortunes."
First, the KMT actively recruited Taiwanese members, which was visible in 
the changing composition of the party. The percentage of Taiwanese KMT 
members increased from 39.40 per cent in 1969 to 61.03 per cent in 1980 and 
69.16 per cent in 1992 (Table 5.1).
Table 5.1 Taiwanese Membership of the KMT (1969-1992)
Year Taiwanese Percentage (%) Mainlander Percentage (%)
1969 39.4 60.6
1972 46.16 53.84
1975 52.82 47.13
1977 56.57 43.43
1980 61.03 38.94
1983 63.46 36.54
1986 65.87 34.13
1989 67.57 32.43
1992 69.16 30.84
Source: Huang Teh-fii, “Electoral Competition and the Evolution of the Kuomintang,” I s s u e s  a n d  S tu d ie s  (May 1995): 104.
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Second, the KMT significantly added more Taiwanese elites to its Central 
Standing Committee (CSC), the highest decision-making group of the party. 
Before Taiwanlsation, only a few Taiwanese were positioned in the party's CSC. 
With Taiwanlsatlon, the number of Taiwanese In the CSC steadily increased. The 
percentage of Taiwanese in the CSC was 9.52 per cent in 1969 (i.e. 2 out of 21), 
and reached 51.61 per cent in 1988, the year of Chiang Ching-kuo's death, 
and 69.7 per cent in 1997 (Table 5.2).
Table 5.2 Taiwanese Membership of the KMT Central Standing Committee
(1973-1997)
Congress Date Total Numbers Number of 
Taiwanese
Percentage
Taiwanese
8 1957.10.26 16 1 6.25
9 1963.11.23 16 2 12.5
10 1969.04.10 21 2 9.52
11 1976.11.19 22 5 22.73
12 1981.04.06 27 9 33.33
13 1988.07.13 31 16 51.61
14 1993.08.16 31 19 61.29
15 1997.08.24 33 23 69.70
Source: Date were provided by various KMT documents and newspaper sources.
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Finally, the KMT also appointed more Taiwanese politicians to the Executive 
Yuan, the cabinet. Until 1972, only 4 ministerial posts had been occupied by 
Taiwanese. After Chlang Chlng-kuo became the Premier, 8 Taiwanese were 
appointed to the Executive Yuan. The number of Taiwanese in the cabinet 
remained the same during the premiership of Sun Yun-hsuan. In the term of 
office of Premier Yu Kuo-hua, 12 Taiwanese received ministerial posts, or 34.29 
per cent. Since Lee Teng-hui cam e to power in 1988, the percentage of 
Taiwanese in the Executive Yuan has remained steady at over 40 per cent 
(Table 5.3).
Table 5.3 Taiwanese Membership of ROC Cabinet (1950-1997)
Tenure
Premier
Total Number 
of Cabinet 
Members
Number of 
Taiwanese
Percentage
Taiwanese
1950/03-1954/06 Chen Cheng 20 1 5.00
1954/06-1958/07 Yu Hung-chun 19 1 5.26
1958/07-1963/12 Chen Cheng 26 2 7.69
1963/12-1972/06 Yen Chia-kan 36 4 11.11
1972/06-1978/06 Chlang Ching-kuo 26 8 30.77
1978/06-1984/06 Sun Yun-hsuan 29 8 27.59
1984/06-1989/05 Yu Kuo-hua 35 12 34.29
1989/05-1990/05 Lee Huan 20 9 45.00
1990/05- 1993-02 Hao Pai-tsun 21 10 47.62
1993/03-1997/09 Uen Chan 25 11 40.00
1997/09- Hsiao Wan-chang 23 10 43.48
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Source: Huang Teh-fu, “Elections and the Evolution of the Kuomintang,” in Tien Hung-mao (ed.), T a iw a n ’s  E le c to ra l  
P o litic s  a n d  D e m o c ra tic  T ra n s itio n :  R id in g  the  T h ird  W ave  (New York: M.E. Sharp, Inc., 1996), 116. Data for Cabinet 
formed in September 1997 through April 1998 was provided by various newspaper sources.
N ote: All statistics include the Premier
On the other hand, the KMT relied on the legitimising function of electoral 
contests. In addition to holding local elections, the KMT extended limited 
electoral participation to replenish the aged members of the legislative 
branches of the central government. The KMT looked to the institutionalisation 
of supplementary elections for national representatives to moderate the 
criticism of the Long Parliament made by the political opposition. Moreover, the 
KMT anticipated popular elections as an additional important basis for making 
closer ties with local society and Taiwanese elites in order to strengthen the 
legitimacy of the regime.”
A limited opening of national representative bodies was first instituted in 
1972. This elevation of the electoral level marked the beginning of a new era in 
Taiwan's political development. The number of the supplementary members to 
the legislative branches of the central government has steadily increased ever 
since. The electoral opening was expanded In 1980 and again In 1989. 
However, the number of members elected through supplementary elections for 
national representatives did not exceed the number of senior delegates, who 
were elected in 1946, in the National Congress until the complete re-election of 
the three branches of the National Congress In 1991 and 1992.
Unfortunately, the KMT's policies of further Industrialisation and 
Talwanlsation did not diminish Its crisis of legitimacy. The KMT's pursuit of further 
economic development enlarged the politically aware strata of society despite 
closer Integration with major capitalists. More and more people demanded
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accelerated political and economic liberalisation, and even used collective 
protests to express preferences, claim rights and protect Interests. The KMT's 
further industrialisation also eroded the legitimacy of its authoritarian rule.20
More importantly, the extending of only limited participation in national 
elections had profound implications for the process of démocratisation. Under 
authoritarian rule, elections served as a primary mechanism for the KMT to 
enforce its governance In Taiwan. Elections differentiated Taiwan from the 
communist regime on the mainland; they provided avenues for political 
participants, diluting Taiwanese discontent with the mainlander regime; they 
averted radicalisation of the antl-KMT forces; co-opted local elites and 
incorporated existing local patron-client networks into the KMT party-state, 
enabling the KMT to  legitimise itself and exert more effective social control 
through the election-derived linkages; and such political alliances between the 
KMT and local elites constrained the growth potential o f the opposition 
movements.2'
The electoral mechanism was the most fragile segment of the KMT’s 
authoritarian control, however. It became a critical machine moving Taiwan 
toward democracy. The opening of representative bodies to electoral 
competition, though limited, significantly enlarged both the scope and intensity 
of election politics. It provided the political opposition with opportunities to 
organise and mobilise mass support for democratic reforms, even under 
restrictions. The opposition's increasing gains of electoral support eventually 
impelled the KMT to recognise it as a political force. Afterwards, the KMT began 
to take account o f the views of the opposition in policy-making on important 
political issues. Such circumstance accelerated the KMT's weakening 
authoritarianism.22
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At the same time, the KMT's opening of national representative bodies 
from 1972 brought about a change of local politics. Elections in, and of 
themselves helped to shape the power structure at the local level. First, 
elections Increasingly became the only institution that could allocate political 
power legitimately with the softening of the KMT's authoritarian control. Facing 
recurring electoral challenges, local factions successfully transformed 
themselves from traditional clientelist networks, and expanded to Incorporate 
more secondary associations and regional business concerns, especially in the 
rapidly urbanised areas. Such development enabled local factions to deliver 
votes as effectively as they had previously.”  Since electoral success could bring 
with it instant social prestige and great economic gains, more and more 
faction-based candidates were drawn Into elections. The making of new room 
for Taiwanese allowed local factions gradually to move to the national level.
Moreover, the influence of local factions Increased with Taiwan's rapid 
economic growth between the 1960s and the 1980s. Through their regionally 
monopolistic economic privileges granted by the KMT, local factions 
developed Into modern political and economic complexes, existing in the form 
of clientelist structures in the local units that the KMT no longer found easy to 
control. An ever-expanding economy also made both the cost and stake of 
elections ever greater for local factions. As more and more social and 
economic resources were mobilised Into the electoral process, elections 
became more Important for local elites to find their self-identity. Increasingly, 
local factions urged the KMT to create electoral opening at higher levels.24
Furthermore, with the KMT's electoral opening at the national level, the 
election-based KMT elites (most but not all of them were affiliated with local 
factions) quickly found themselves in the same boat with the opposition. Since 
expanded electoral avenues and the elevated political significance of national
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representatives bodies could advance the political Interests of local factions, 
local factions Increasingly tended to favour democratic reforms In the second 
half of 1980s.25 The tacit alliance between the opposition and local factions 
over the issues of democratic reforms significantly contributed to a democratic 
outcome because it forced the KMT's national elite to answer the call for 
democracy from within their own party, especially from those who actually 
could secure continuous electoral success for the party.26
Meanwhile, the Increasing importance of electoral institutions as a means 
of KMT legltimlsation pushed the opposition activists more and more to join 
elections. The limited opening of national bodies for electoral contests provided 
fertile ground for the formation of an islandwide coalition among the 
independent opposition candidates with national alms.27 In particular, rapid 
socio-economic changes helped the opposition, which found more and more 
potential supporters among the electorate of the newly emerged middle 
class.28 The opposition began to expand campaigning and other political 
activities from local election districts to a nationwide network of political 
alliances as it gathered momentum.29 The rise of the opposition led to the 
change of Taiwan's political landscape and complicated the relationships 
between the KMT and local factions.
Although the KMT's Taiwanisation, the recruitment of more Taiwanese Into 
the KMT's ruling society, and the implementation of supplementary elections for 
national representative bodies all temporarily reduced the pressure from the 
political reform movement, there was no intention to  change the basic power 
structure of the KMT party-state. In reality, these reforms were used to expand 
Chiang Ching-kuo's clientelist networks to Taiwanese elites; consolidate his 
power base and leadership; and restore the KMT's ruling legitimacy. Martial Law 
remained In place; the Long Parliament did not face complete re-election; the
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forming of new political parties was still constrained; fully competing In national 
elections was restricted; and strongman politics continued. Taiwan still had far 
to go toward democracy, but Taiwan's politics was moving from hard 
authoritarianism to the soft.30
5.3 The KMT's Faction Replacement Policy
While Taiwanisatlon was being vigorously implemented, political alliance 
relations between the KMT and local factions began to change. The initial 
reasons for the KMT establishing ties with local factions were linked to the KMT's 
needs In governance. Because the KMT was an émigré regime lacking 
grassroots support in Taiwan, It had to  rely on the help of local factions to 
develop support from the bottom up. Through state patronage and party 
favours, and especially the implementation of elections, the KMT 
Institutionalised its connections with local factions. This helped the KMT to win 
the strong majority necessary to rule Taiwan legitimately.
However, the KMT's goal and ideology had been in conflict with local 
factions from the beginning. Local factions had little concern with the KMT's 
retaking the mainland and completing national construction, nor with party 
tenets. Local factions accrued their own political power and had their own 
loyal followers, forming other clientellst ties through their abundant economic 
resources and political influence seized from public offices. Such a situation was 
inauspicious for the KMT's governance since excessive expansion of local 
factions could restrict the parly's control and undermine its ruling base in 
Taiwan if the KMT's political dominance declined.31
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Once local factions penetrated the KMT party-state apparatus, the party's 
Ideology, l.e. all-China emphasis, would have been replaced and the political 
privileges of most KMT mainlander ruling elites would have been damaged.”  For 
these reasons, the KMT began to uproot local factions once it felt able to stand 
on its own In Taiwan. This was faction replacement, a part o f Chiang Ching- 
kuo's Taiwanisation.”  Since local executive offices were the primary Institutions 
for local factions to develop their political and economic influence, the KMT 
decided to cultivate and support its own candidates to run for those offices in 
order to remove the influence of local factions.
After Chiang Ching-kuo came to power in 1972, the KMT's central office 
started increasing Its Involvement in nominating candidates for local public 
offices and supervising election strategy, both tasks being handled previously 
by local party committees. The process of selecting nominees and planning 
election strategy became more centralised.”  The party's centralisation of 
candidate nomination and election strategy planning weakened the position 
of local factions which had little direct leverage over decisions made at the 
centre of the KMT.“  Besides, the KMT began to arrange for its own cultivated 
candidates to receive the party's nomination, rather than being simply 
supported by local factions.
The KMT's attempts to arrange Its own party-cultivated candidates to 
occupy local executive offices was revealed as early as in the end of the 1960s. 
In the 1968 elections for city mayors and county magistrates, the KMT 
nominated for the first time 3 party-cultivated candidates. They were all 
elected, which was quite an encouragement to the KMT. In 1972, the KMT 
nominated 12 party cadres to run for the posts of county magistrates and city 
mayors. The number of factional candidates was reduced from 16 to 8. This 
time, all the KMT-nomlnated candidates gained electoral successes. This led the
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KMT to initiate large-scale attempts to reduce the overall power of local 
factions by nominating 17 party candidates in 20 constituencies to compete for 
local executive offices in 1977.“
The KMT's attempts to do so aroused great resentment from local factions, 
causing the breach of the KMT's political alliances structure with local factions. 
Local factions retaliated by supporting opposition candidates to run In the 
campaigns for city-county executives and Taiwan provincial assemblymen. In 
the two 1977 elections, the KMT lost 4 (out of the 23) seats in the local executive 
offices and 21 (out of the 77) seats in the Taiwan Provincial Assembly to the 
opposition.57 By contrast, the opposition won one-quarter of the posts for city 
and county chiefs, and 30 per cent of the Taiwan Provincial Assembly seats.“  
This contributed to the rise of the political opposition and created a situation of 
strategic interaction between the opposition and the KMT.”
In addition, the opposition candidate Hsu Hsln-liang and his supporters 
demonstrated against alleged vote fraud by the KMT in Chungli, the military 
area of Taoyuan long considered as a KMT stronghold. This was the first large 
anti-government demonstration since 28 February 1947.® As can be seen from 
Figure 5.2, the 1977 election results were the worst ever for the KMT. After the 
election, Lee Huan resigned from his party offices, and as head of the Central 
Organisation Department, director of Revolutionary Practice Institute and 
director o f the National Salvation Anti-Communist Youths Corps (NSAYC), as an 
acceptance of responsibility for the party's electoral losses and the mass rioting.
In the light of these electoral setbacks, the KMT slowed down the pace of 
its fight with local factions. Its attempts to legitimise its repression against the 
rising opposition through electoral successes made it especially necessary for 
the KMT to  restore its alliance relations with local factions.'" In the 1981 and 1985
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city mayor and county magistrate elections, the number of KMT faction-based 
nominees exceeded that of non-factional nominees. The ratio o f factional 
nominees to non-factional nominees was 10:9 In the 1981 election and 11:7 in 
1985." However, the number of the faction-based nominees in the KMT could 
have never been as great as before.
Figure 5.2 The Percentage Vote for KMT Candidates at 
Local Executive Elections (1954-1993)
1954 1957 1960 1963 1968 1972 1977 1981 1985 1989 1993
Sources:
Chen Ming-tung, P ’a i-h s i  c h e n g -c h ih  y u  t ’a i-w a n  c h e n g -c h ih  p ie n -c h  ’ien  [Factional Politics and Political Dynamics 
of Taiwan] (Taipei: Yueh-tan ch’u-pan yu-hsien-kung-szu, 1995), 225.
In June 1984, Chiang Ching-kuo appointed Kung Chung as the Chair of the 
KMT's Provincial Committee. Kung Introduced a system of election primaries to 
reduce the power of local factions. Before the Institution of the primary system, 
three-quarters of the KMT's vote was channelled through the support of local 
factions. The KMT only directly controlled a quarter of the vote. However, the 
implementation of the primary system could encourage local factions to bring
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their members into the party if they wanted to win nominations. Once factional 
members were incorporated into the party structure, the KMT could direct them 
through its control of political and economic privileges. By then, the KMT was 
able to take over the power of local factions."
Under the primary election system, the KMT nominated many non- 
factional candidates in the 1989 elections for national legislators, provincial 
assemblymen, and local executives. Again, Kung Chung's attem pt to eliminate 
the power of local factions through the Institutionalisation of the primary system 
generated hostility from local factions which retaliated by co-operating with 
opposition candidates. Coinciding with a strong backlash from local factions 
and competition from the newly established opposition party, the Democratic 
Progressive Party (DPP), founded in September 1986, the KMT lost 7 local 
executive seats, 21 Legislative Yuan seats, and fifteen Provincial Assembly 
seats."
After these unprecedented setbacks, the primary election system was 
replaced by a nomination system based on opinions of party members and 
evaluation by the party cadres." Kung Chung was also forced to accept 
responsibility by resigning from his posts as the Deputy Secretary-General and 
Chair of the Central Organisation Department. This indicated the weakness of 
the KMT's capacity to reduce the power of local factions. For this reason, the 
KMT further deepened its alliance ties with local factions, especially after 
elections became increasingly important to distribute political power with 
political démocratisation.
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5.4 The Rise of Political Opposition
The 1977 elections were very significant for Taiwan's political development. 
Before the election, the opposition had never obtained enough political 
momentum to challenge the KMT's central authority, so that it was unable to 
bargain for political reforms. At that time, the KMT also showed no willingness to 
initiate democratic reforms because it had received no salient challenges from 
people outside the party. Through the support of local factions, which 
retaliated against the KMT as a result of the party's faction replacement policy, 
the opposition scored their first electoral victory in 1977.
Since the 1977 elections, the opposition has increasingly exercised 
influence on both local and national politics. According to elections for 
national legislators, the opposition/ DPP's total electoral gain rose from a mere 
13 per cent in 1980 to 29.2 per cent In 1989. By contrast, the KMT's superiority in 
electoral contests has steadily decreased. The total popular vote received by 
the KMT candidates steadily declined from 71.7 per cent of total electoral 
turnout in 1980 to 59.22 per cent in 1989. In due course, the KMT was no longer 
able to constrain the opposition from participating and competing In local 
elections and, with limitations. In national elections." Figure 5.3 shows the 
changing KMT and opposition electoral support in elections at various levels 
between 1954 and 1993.
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Figure 5.3 The Percentage Change of the Popular Vote for the KMT and 
the Opposition/ DPP at Elections (1972-1997)
1977  1981 1985  1989  1994
National Legislators
1 9 7 2  1 9 7 5  1 9 8 0  1 9 8 3  1 9 8 6  1 9 8 9  1 9 9 2  1 9 9 5
National Assemblymen
1 9 7 2  1 9 8 0  1 9 8 6  1 9 9 1  1 9 9 6
Provincial Assemblymen
■ the K M T
■ the Opposition
■ the K M T
■ the Opposition
■  the KMT
■  the Opposition
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Magistrates/Mayors
1977  1981 1985  1989  1993  1997
■  the KMT
■  the Opposition
Sources:
1. Central Election Commission, the Executive Yuan, ROC.
2. Data for 1997 Local Executives Election are provided by various newspapers sources.
The opposition's victory in the 1977 elections stimulated an expansion of the 
democratic movement. On the eve of the aborted 1978 election for 
supplementary national representatives, the opposition formed the Taiwan 
Tang-wal Campaign Group, taking collective action to support opposition 
candidates. They demanded political démocratisation, called for a complete 
re-election of national representative bodies of the central government, and 
supported Taiwanese self-determination. This was the first time that the self- 
determination concept had appeared in the opposition's manifestos."'
In the view of opposition leaders, the KMT's one-China principle had 
provided the ideological justification for the political monopoly of mainlanders 
for many years. Therefore, the opposition explicitly linked the goal of 
démocratisation to the Issue of Taiwanese identity and the principle of self- 
determination. The KMT's long-cherished one-China principle became the 
target of direct attacks by the opposition."' As Hu Fu and Chu Yun-han state, 
this was an effective counterstrategy to the KMT's all-class appeal since this 
latent sub-ethnic cleavage cuts across the socio-economic cleavage. 
Furthermore, this was also an issue capable of uniting the Tang-wal members of
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different interests and ideals under a common cause.4’
With Washington's withdrawal of official recognition from Taipei in late 
1978, the KMT announced the indefinite suspension of the planned national 
elections. This decision spurred the opposition to escalate its efforts to mobilise 
mass support. The opposition intensified its campaigns for democracy and 
human rights. Mass rallies and political agitation in 1979 continued to generate 
tension between the opposition and the KMT (when it was dominated by the 
hard-liners of the party). In December of the same year, the escalation of the 
conflict o f street demonstrations culminated in the Kaohsiung Incident where 
most of the leaders of the radical faction within the opposition were jailed.50
After the Kaohsiung Incident, the KMT expanded Its opening of elections 
for national representative bodies in response to the Unites States' recognition 
of China. In addition, the KMT began to normalise the political process by 
enacting electoral laws to equip the independence of the election committee, 
and initiating dialogue with the opposition although the KMT maintained 
various constraints on the activities of the opposition. The KMT's efforts to 
achieve political normalisation helped the opposition to enter the existing 
political arenas.5’ Meanwhile, the strength of the opposition was increased by its 
discovery of overseas resources. In 1982, four opposition leaders were invited by 
the US State Department as a team to visit the US Congress. This trip * enhanced 
the opposition's visibility, cemented ties with overseas Taiwanese organisations, 
and highlighted the issues of démocratisation in Taiwan-US relations."52
In 1983, the opposition established the Association for Public Policy (APP), 
aimed at functioning as an electoral machinery and policy research body. It 
also formed islandwide local branches, which were seen as an infrastructure for 
a political opposition party In the future. This was proposed as an alternate to a
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new political party, which the KMT explicitly forbade. The APP allowed 
discussion and also had certain organisational authority to bind opposition 
members' actions. In addition, it equipped the opposition with a better 
capability to accumulate knowledge in substantive policy areas, thus 
contributing greatly to the opposition's negotiations with the performance- 
oriented KMT.53
The formation and expansion of the APP became the major focus of 
conflict between the opposition and the KMT. In order to avoid possible 
crackdown by the KMT, the opposition accepted the KMT's invitation to 
negotiate over the procedures and restrictions to be imposed on the APP. 
However, the KMT permitted the APP to have only two local branches. This 
decision resulted in the collapse of negotiations.“  Afterwards, the opposition 
announced its specific demands for democracy and ifs determination to 
establish a party despite the stern warning from the government of its resolve to 
enforce the legal ban on forming new political parties. While threatening a 
crackdown, the KMT did not actually take any punitive action.
Meanwhile, the KMT was internally befuddled by various speculations 
about political succession to the ailing Chiang Ching-kuo and by a financial 
scandal involving the Tenth Credit Company that forced the resignations of the 
minister of economical affairs, minister of finance, and the KMT's secretary- 
general. In addition, the KMT's Involvement in the killing of several Chinese- 
Americans by Taiwan's security apparatus weakened its support in the 
American overseas community and Invited unwanted publicity and pressures 
from the US Congress after several American congressmen such as Solarz and 
Leach held various congressional hearings to drive Taipei toward democracy.55 
These events led to the increased public criticism of the government and drove 
the regime to Initiate political system change to respond to public demands.
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Social movements and collective protests also hastened the collapse of 
the KMT authoritarianism. Under authoritarian rule, the autonomy o f "civil 
society" had been curbed by the dominance o f the KMT regime. From the mid- 
1980s, “ civil society" began to free itself from the KMT's grasp, as shown in the 
rise of a variety of social movements, pressing for civil rights and social justice. 
Political demonstrations and rallies, the labour movement, the student 
movement, and women's movement were important examples. The number of 
protests rose from 175 in 1983 to 335 in 1986, and to 1,172 in 1988.“  This revealed 
that the KMT rule was no longer unchallengable by the general public.
Furthermore, during the 1980s further developments in East Asia and on the 
mainland helped to make Taiwan's démocratisation politically acceptable. The 
peaceful victory of Mrs. Aquino over President Ferdinand Marcos in the 
Philippines In February 1986 had made an impressive demonstration of “ people 
power' for Taiwanese people and also had a major influence on the thinking 
of KMT leaders at that time. Besides, China's turning from Maoist extremism to 
Deng Xiao-ping's pragmatic economic reforms, which reduced the apparent 
threats o f invasion and allowed a relaxation of KMT control on the opposition, 
also played a role in facilitating the KMT's political opening-up in the late 
1980s.57
In June 1986 Chiang Ching-kuo appointed a study group of twelve CSC 
members after the KMT's Twelfth Central Committee to suggest reform 
measures. That task force proposed the following reforms: (1) holding large- 
scale supplementary elections for national representative bodies, (2) legalising 
the formation of civic associations, (3) simplifying national security laws, (4) 
strengthening public order, (5) institutionalising local government, and (6) 
Instituting other party reforms.55 During the KMT's serious study of
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démocratisation, leaders of the political opposition announced the 
establishment of a new political party, the DPP, on 28 September 1986. Instead 
of suppression, the KMT reacted by lifting martial law on 15 July 1987 and 
announcing its decision to remove the ban on political association, including 
parties.”
As Huang points out, the establishment of fhe DPP signified the certain 
decline of the KMT's dominance over Taiwan. The lifting of martial law and 
other political bans indicated the end of authoritarian rule.“  In the 1986 
December elections for national representatives to the National Assembly and 
the Legislative Yuan, the KMT and the DPP competed as the two principal 
parties, and the KMT acted as an ordinary party in an emerging two-party 
system.61 The KMT subsequently accelerated other aspects of démocratisation 
despite the death of Chiang Ching-kuo in January 1988.
Between 1988 and 1990, the Meeting and Parade and Civic Association 
Laws were passed; the Public Officials Election and Recall Law was revised; and 
the Law on the Voluntary Retirement of Senior Parliamentarians was 
approved." Subsequently, the Temporary Provisions were abolished In May 
1991 and complete re-elections for national representative bodies of the 
central government were implemented In late 1991 and 1992. Furthermore, the 
executives of Taiwan Province, Taipei City, and Kaohsiung City were subject to 
direct popular elections in late 1994. Démocratisation reached a climax when 
the first direct popular election for the President was held in March 1996, which 
put a conclusive end to the process of democrafic transition.63
In addition to the breach of the clientelist alliance relations between the 
KMT and local factions, internal debates over the scope and speed of political 
liberalisation between the KMT's hard-liners and soft-liners were another crucial
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factor that contributed to the rise of the opposition.“  The former group 
included party cadres in the military and internal security apparatus who were 
concerned about the potential social disorder accompanying political 
change. This group was led by Wang Shen, the head of the Department of 
Political Warfare. The latter comprised younger cadres centred on the KMT 
Department of Organisation and new Taiwanese recruits to the party. It was led 
by Lee Huan, the head of the Central Organisation Department. The soft-liners 
were more responsive to demands from the opposition and the public for 
political changes.“
Research by Cheng Tun-jen and Stephan Haggard shows that the affinity 
between the opposition and soft-liners within the KMT has been a key to 
Taiwan's dem ocratic transition, although substantial tensions between the 
opposition and the KMT had surfaced during the transition period.“  After the 
December 1979 Kaohsiung Incident, KMT soft-liners who lost their influence 
temporarily after the 1977 elections, re-gained their power. Wang Shen and his 
hard-line viewpoint were removed from the inner circle of the KMT with Chiang 
Ching-kuo's decision to send Wang into exile in 1984 in the face of Wang's 
political ambitions to succeed him as leader and the growing power of his 
political warfare system. Chiang Ching-kuo's doings further strengthened the 
power of the KMT soft-liners group.
The decline o f the hard-liners within the KMT shifted the dominant mode of 
interaction between the KMT and the opposition toward implicit negotiation. 
Subsequently, informal negotiation between the KMT and the opposition 
resumed.47 By co-ordinating mass movements on the streets, opposition in the 
Legislative Yuan, political dialogue, and overseas support (notably from the US 
Congress), the opposition gradually compelled the KMT to open up national 
politics.48 At the same time, the opposition's subtle setting of the negotiation
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agenda by entering the debate on Taiwan's future and calling for self- 
determination further forced the KMT to address issues of démocratisation.6’ The 
continuous process of strategic Interaction and bargaining between the KMT 
and the opposition finally moved Taiwan's politics toward democracy.70
5.5 Conclusion
In retrospect, the political opposition's electoral success in the 1977 elections 
was considerably noteworthy for Taiwan's democratic development. Before 
1977, the opposition had not accumulated enough strength and resources to 
challenge the KMT. On the other hand, the KMT's stable clientelist alliances with 
local factions prevented the KMT from receiving strong pressure from below, so 
that it had made no attempt to Initiate democratic reforms. Although the KMT 
took several political as well as economic projects to respond to Taiwan's 
diplomatic setbacks in the 1970s, the regime was still based on "temporary 
provisions" justified by the " national emergency' rather than the Constitution; 
the Long Parliament was not subject to  complete re-election; and the 
numerous restraints on opposition activity were not lifted. The KMT's 
authoritarian power structure thus remained unchanged.
Elections served as the most significant mechanism that contributed to  
Taiwan's democratic transition. However, it is important to remember that, in 
addition to the legal ban on forming new political parties and the restrictive 
campaign and electoral laws that prohibit candidates from forming 
coordinated campaign efforts across different electoral districts, there were 
some institutional barriers set by the KMT in order to constrain the emergence of 
an opposition party through elections.
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First, the election system was structured to discourage co-operation 
among candidates. Under a system of multi-seat districts and the non- 
transferable vote rule for members to legislatures at various levels, candidates of 
the same party have to divide up popular votes among themselves. Because 
the opposition had only little material resources and organisational capability, it 
was difficult for the opposition to create a coordinating mechanism and 
authority to distribute votes among its candidates. Most opposition candidates 
pursued a vote-maximising strategy without due consideration for maximising 
the seats for the party as a whole."
In contrast, the KMT could effectively play the balancing and co­
ordinating role among party-nominated candidates with its enormous resources 
and organisational endowment. Three factors contributed to the KMT's superior 
vote-equalising capacity: strong central authority in coordinating the vote 
mobilisation strategy among party nominees, the practice of vote-buying by 
local factions, and the existence of a large number of strong partisan identifiers 
(so-called iron votes, accounted for on average close to 10 per cent o f the 
popular vote) Including loyal mainlander party members, state employees, 
veterans and military personnel, and their family members.72
In other words, the KMT enjoyed considerable organisational advantage in 
maximising the seat/ vote ratio under the system of multi-seat districts and the 
non-transferable vote rule. For KMT candidates, the party coordinated the 
distribution of electoral gains to make sure that each party-endorsed 
candidate received roughly the same amount of electoral votes. Flowever, the 
opposition's weakness in balancing and coordinating among Its candidates 
degraded its achievement in the taking of elected seats. The discrepancy 
between the popular vote and the seats of the opposition in elections was 
evident.73
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Moreover, the opposition's ability to mobilise discontented electorate was 
confined as a result of local political structures. In election campaigns, 
opposition candidates faced challenges from KMT-nominated local politicians 
rather than the national KMT leadership. Normally, these KMT local politicians 
had amassed abundant financial resources, extensive patron-client networks in 
the local community, and well-run vote-getting machines.'4 A national political 
label In itself carries very limited additional votes for opposition candidates in 
the campaign process of local orientation. Under such circumstances, the 
opposition could hardly emerge through elections especially local elections. On 
the contrary, it amplified competitive advantages for most KMT candidates.
Despite all the aforementioned obstacles, the opposition had gradually 
made inroads in the electoral competition since their meager start in the 1977 
elections. This created a situation of strategic interaction between the 
opposition and the regime. However, the opposition's electoral victory in 1977 
owed more to the support of local factions than its own efforts. The KMT's 
attempts to reduce the power of local factions indirectly drove those factions 
to retaliate against KMT central authority by supporting opposition candidates. 
Subsequently, the opposition's voting support steadily increased. This 
development generated a certain pressure for the KMT whose dominance In 
Taiwan was gradually declining at that time.
Meanwhile, the rise of the opposition highlighted the inherent problems of 
KMT-local factions clientelist alliances structure. With political and socio­
economic changes, local factions successfully transformed themselves from 
traditional clientellst networks to new organisational structures incorporating 
more secondary associations and regional business groups that the KMT could 
no longer control effectively. The newly emerged opposition became an
alternative coalition partner for local factions in competing political privileges. 
The opposition also sought strategic alliances with local factions to gain 
Influence in national and local politics. Furthermore, the rise of the opposition 
deepened the KMT's reliance on local factions, which became the common 
agents with which both the KMT and the opposition attempted to ally.
In addition to the fracture of the KMT's alliance relations with local factions, 
internal political debates between hard-liners and soft-liners within the KMT also 
contributed to the emergence of the opposition. By subtly setting the agenda, 
using extralegal methods, shifting bargaining arenas, and strategically affiliating 
with KMT soft-liners, the opposition eventually pushed the ruling KMT to address 
issues of democratic reforms. The establishment of the DPP was another 
milestone of Taiwan's democratic development. In late 1986, Chiang Ching-kuo 
named a study group to suggest reform measures, signalling the beginning of 
Taiwan's démocratisation.
With democratic transition, the KMT's political dominance gradually 
declined. The weakening of its dominance accelerated after the death of 
Chiang Ching-kuo in early 1988. Political changes and the power transition 
resulted In the disorder of the KMT's leadership. With a broad power 
realignment, the KMT divided into the mainstream and non-mainstream 
factions. Intra-KMT factionalism caused several problems of political 
management In the party and central government. Factional contentions 
focused especially on the party's mainland policy due to the high political 
sensitivity of the policy.
In addition, the KMT strengthened its patron-client relations with local 
factions in order to  maintain Its traditional dominance. The KMT also promoted 
the Six-Year National Development Plan to restore its dominant role in
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economic development and rebuild its close links with Taiwanese capitalists.”  
However, the increased dependence on local factions and capitalists, that 
soon moved to national politics and expanded dramatically following the 
collapse of authoritarian rule, directly contributed to money politics in Taiwan. 
Studies of the KMT's factionalism and the development of local factions in the 
post-Chiang Ching-kuo era follow in the next two chapters.
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CH APTER  6
The K M T ’s Factionalism in the Post-Chiang Ching-kuo Era
In spring 1988, the KMT's paramount leader Chiang Ching-kuo died. This event 
had several far-reaching effects on Taiwan's political development. The power 
transition was embroiled in the process of political démocratisation initiated 
from the mid-1980s. What is more, ideological differences and conflicting views 
about Taiwan's identity between KMT mainlander conservatives and Taiwanese 
ruling elites, and the newly established democratic value system all intensified 
the conflict between KMT leaders in the post-Chiang Ching-kuo period. A 
broad realignment o f various groups within the KMT separated into the 
mainstream and non-mainstream factions.
Both the mainstream and non-mainstream factions can be classified as 
factional cliques or tendencies according to the level of their institutionalisation. 
Although they were not totally unorganised, they were very ephemeral 
organisations. To identify the two factions by way of ideological difference 
alone is neither easy nor useful since ideological differences only partially 
explain the emergence of the two factions, which primarily represent a division 
between mainlanders and Taiwanese. Other important factors include age and 
area differences.1 In general, the creation of the two factions was caused by 
conflict between KMT mainlander and Taiwanese ruling elites, between new 
and old party elites, and between the party elites in urban and rural areas. In
terms of the motives for faction formation, which I outlined in Chapter Two, both 
the mainstream and non-mainstredm factions are motivated by a combination 
of political ideology and spoils.
The mainstream faction consisted mainly of Taiwanese politicians in the 
representative bodies, the pdrty's central committee and the government, and 
a number of mainlanders who co-operated with Lee Teng-hui to secure their 
political interests. By contrast, the non-mainstream faction comprised both 
Taiwanese and mainlander politicians in the party, government, and 
representative bodies whose political interests and influence were jeopardised 
by the rise of the mainstream and Lee Teng-hui's political programmes.2
This chapter begins with a discussion of the causes of the KMT's 
factionalism in the post-Chiang Ching-kuo era. Then, attention turns to the 
development of the factionolism between the mainstream and non- 
mainstream factions. The development of intra-KMT factionalism in relation to  
the party's mainland policy is also analysed in order to highlight the 
characteristics of the intra-KMT power struggle.
6.1 The Causes of Post-Chiang Ching-kuo Factionalism
The origins of KMT mainstream and non-mainstream factions can be traced to 
two major factors: the Taiwanese-mainlander rift and the closely related 
national identity issues, and political changes, i.e. the liberalisation of the party 
and the KMT's power transition.
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The Taiwanese-mainlander Rift and National Identity Issues. For most o f the 
imperial era. Taiwanese culture and language were viewed as barbarous by 
those who lived on the North-Central Chinese mainland. The central 
government on the mainland began to pay attention to Taiwan only after 1885 
when the Manchu government became aware of Taiwan's strategic 
importance. The government then established Taiwan as a province. On the 
other hand, the early migrants to Taiwan had few interests in associating 
themselves with the political regime on the mainland. The new settlers also 
developed their own island culture, life style, and especially a distinct regional 
consciousness. In fact, relations between the migrants and mainland authorities 
were often hostile.3
Cultural and consciousness differences between Taiwanese and 
mainlander Chinese grew over fifty years of Japanese rule. The colonial 
government's Japanisation policy blurred the Taiwanese people's 
consciousness toward the mainland and strengthened the cultural differences 
between people on the two sides of the Taiwan Straits. Moreover, a 
modernisation consciousness developed in the minds of Taiwanese people 
after a half century of Japanese rule. Both were auspicious to the development 
of Taiwanese consciousness. The burgeoning Taiwanese nationalism erupted 
after the 28 February Incident in 1947 when thousands of Taiwanese were killed 
by the KMT government.'
The Taiwanese-mainlander rift was enlarged further after the KMT moved 
to Taiwan in 1949. The new regime then established political control over the 
domestic politics of a subject people largely excluded from political 
representation. Major political and economic resources were monopolised by 
the KMT. State violence, i.e. the security apparatus, was strengthened to repress 
political opponents. The Taiwanese dialect was banned as an official
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language. Local culture and socio-economic styles were discriminated against. 
In many ways, the KMT regime resembled a colonial system.5
The regime's bans on mainlander elites' connections with local Taiwanese 
elites was another factor leading to an enlargement of the ethnic rift between 
the Taiwanese and mainlanders. A notable case was the Free China Event. In 
1960, a few mainlander liberal intellectuals (led by KMT national assemblyman 
Lei Cheng) were relentlessly repressed when they decided to coalesce with 
indigenous elites to form a  new political party, the Chinese Democratic Party 
(CDP). The KMT's decision to imprison only mainlander members of the Free 
China opposition movement created a mental barrier between the Taiwanese 
and mainlanders.6 In particular, political separation was further enlarged 
because of the implementation of local elections since mainlanders had no or 
little base on which to participate.
Socio-economic factors also played a role in the increase of sub-ethnic 
cleavages. Around 1.5 million mainlanders Immigrated to Taiwan in 1950 
together with the émigré KMT regime.7 This move was a selected political 
Immigration, consisting of KMT military, security personnel, bureaucrats, 
technocrats, teachers, representatives, and businessmen as well as industrial 
capitalists. However, mainlander Chinese did not merge into Taiwanese society 
after they moved to the island. Unfavourable perceptions, cultural differences, 
and occupational varieties between the Taiwanese and mainlanders divided 
the two ethnic groups into separate communities.8
As national politics was primarily reserved for mainlanders, the indigenous 
Taiwanese pursued economic advancement for upward social mobility.' The 
potential for conflict between the two ethnic groups grew with increasing 
Taiwanese economic power after Taiwan experienced spectacular growth in
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the 1960s and 1970s. The Taiwanese argued that mainlanders had never been 
interested in Taiwan until the late nineteenth century. In addition, they argued 
that a new political culture had grown up in Taiwan which included both 
ethnic Taiwanese and the last two generations of mainlanders born on the 
island. They also contended that Taiwan was an inseparable part of China.'0
Taiwan's identify question indirectly provided the Taiwanese with a 
theoretical justification to distinguish themselves from mainlander Chinese and 
fo highlight the deficiency of the KMT's ruling legitimacy. The political opposition 
strategically employed the issue of Taiwan's identity to push the KMT to accept 
its terms for democratic reforms. With time, the notion of Taiwan as a separate 
nation-state became rooted in Taiwanese minds. However, the emotional 
exaggeration of Taiwan's identity questions inevitably intensified the 
controversy over the whole identity debate and increased the Taiwanese- 
mainlander tension, which erupted after Taiwan's political opening in the late 
1980s.
Political Liberalisation and the Power Transition. In addition to cultural-historic 
factors, political development was another significant factor in the rise of the 
KMT's factionalism in the post-Chiang Ching-kuo period. With political 
liberalisation in the late 1980s, long-suppressed views were expressed with 
greater frequency and greater passion. Political liberalisation also released 
abundant political resources. The end of strongman politics further undermined 
party control. A number of contending influences based on ethnic, age, and 
area differences competed with one another, leading to intra-KMT 
factionalism.
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At the same time, the too extreme Taiwanese-mainlander conflict was
fuelled by political liberalisation. More and more Taiwanese within the KMT lost 
their fear and asked questions that began to  drain the KMT of its monopoly of 
power and domination by mainlanders." The Taiwan-first policy was also voiced 
by the rank-and-file. As the indigenous Taiwanese account for 85 per cent of 
the whole population in Taiwan, the needs of the KMT to maintain its ruling 
power led to the emergence of the Taiwan-first policy on the party's policy 
agenda, replacing its traditional all-China emphasis.12
Under the Taiwan-first emphasis, Taiwan's independent status as a political 
entity In the international system began to be stressed by the KMT, as reflected 
in Its mainland and foreign policies. On the one hand, the KMT maintained 
Taiwan's political status as a part of China, but rejected any radical unification 
and cautiously enhanced Taiwan's relationship with the mainland. On the other 
hand, the KMT vigorously pursued Taiwan's official recognition by the nations of 
the world and international organisations through the rhetoric of pragmatic 
diplomacy.
However, Lee Teng-hui's modest actions on cross-Straits relations and his 
passionate search for diplomatic interests have aroused the wrath of many 
mainlander KMT members who believe he is a traitor to the KMT cause. What is 
more, the upsurge of Taiwanese nationalist movements following political 
liberalisation became subject to intense conflict between KMT elites. In short, 
the rise of the Taiwan-first policy has infringed KMT mainlander elites' interests. 
Ideological and Interest conflicts became inextricable, but the former were 
advanced by the latter. Through the power struggle, the KMT's mainland policy 
became a direct cause which fuelled the KMT's Intra-party factionalism after 
Chiang Ching-kuo died.
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6.2 The Development of Post-Chiang Ching-kuo Factionalism
The study of the KMT's factionalism can be separated into three periods 
according to the development of intra-KMT conflict in the post-Chiang Ching- 
kuo period. The first refers to the time after Lee Teng-hui succeeded as ROC 
President in January 1988 and before he was elected as the eighth-term 
President in May 1990. The second begins with Lee Teng-hui's becoming the 
eighth-term President but ends after Hao Pai-tsun, the most influential factional 
leader of the non-mainstream faction, stepped down from his premiership in 
February 1993. The third period refers to the time after Lee Teng-hui's political 
follower. Lien Chan, entered the Executive Yuan in spring 1993 and before Lee 
Teng-hui received the KMT ticket to run for the ninth-term presidential election 
at the party's Second Plenum of the fourteenth Central Committee (CC) in 
August 1995.
In the first period, conflict between KMT ruling elites was intense. Several 
forces competed with one another for the abundant political privileges left by 
the old power centre. Conflict developed not only between Lee Teng-hui and 
old party leaders, but also among mainlander conservative leaders. In the 
second period, the KMT separated into the mainstream and non-mainstTeam 
factions following a broad realignment of various forces. Conflict between the 
two factions had many effects on 1he KMT's party management. In 1he third 
period, Lee Teng-hui's power base was consolidated after the non-mainstTeam 
leader Hao Pai-tsun was removed from his power base. Lee Teng-hui then 
became the supreme leader of the party.
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Under authoritarian rule, the KMT's elite structure was founded on a
centralisation of power in the hands of the paramount leader, who almost 
became an institution by himself. Many decision rules and institutional 
arrangements were custom-made for the paramount leader. The co-ordination 
mechanism would cease to function and the coherence of the ruling elite 
would deteriorate once political vacuum at the centre set in.'3 It was feared 
that intra-party as well as intra-state strife might erupt with the passing away of 
the paramount leader, but there was no well-established mechanism and 
procedures in place to resolve It. The complex web of the clientelist network 
would take time to regroup Itself into various competing power blocs.14
Conflict between KMT ruling elites erupted as soon as Chiang Ching-kuo 
died. Although Lee Teng-hui smoothly succeeded as ROC President, his 
elevation was challenged by the party's mainlander conservatives and 
Taiwanese politicians. As the Leninist conception of party leadership places 
great emphasis on charismatic legitimacy based on revolutionary 
accomplishment with legal-rational legitimacy, and strict organisation and 
disciplinary procedures,“  Lee Teng-hui's lack of a long training period to gain 
both the experience and political base needed for an eventual succession 
generated many questions about his succession from other party leaders.
In order to boycott Lee Teng-hui's succession as KMT chair, the party's 
mainlander conservatives around the old power centre, i.e. the Palace faction 
(kung-ting pa!), which generally refers to the mainlander clique centred on the 
Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo families, called for a collective 
leadership instead of a single party leader.14 On the other hand, they claimed 
that the nomination to the party's chair should not be in place before the 
party's thirteenth Congress in July 1988.”  They attempted to push Premier Yu 
Kuo-hua, an active member of the Palace faction who had abundant
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influence over Taiwan and the KMT's financial and economic sectors, to the
party chairmanship.
However, support for Lee Teng-hui arose from the media and the national 
representative institutions. On 16 January, United Press International (UPI) issued 
a news report to create public support for Lee Teng-hui." On the next day, 
thirty-eight KMT young Turks in the Legislative Yuan led by national legislator 
Chao Shao-kang announced their backing for Lee Teng-hui's succession to the 
party's chairmanship. On 18 January, similar appeals arose from the National 
Assembly. What is more, editorials in the China Times, Independent Morning 
Post and Freedom Times also publicly echoed the pro-Lee tendency.'0 
Regardless of opposition from malnlander conservatives, Lee Teng-hui was 
named KMT acting chair on 27 January 1988.
After Lee Teng-hui became party leader, conflict between KMT ruling elites 
moved to the party's thirteenth Congress. Before the Congress, the Chief of 
Staff, Hao Pai-tsun, a paramount mainlander military leader, tried to ally with 
KMT Secretary-General Lee Huan, an influential mainlander party leader who 
had followed Chiang Ching-kuo In the party domain for decades, to set up a 
deputy chair in the party in order to provide himself with the avenues of sharing 
the party's power.20 However, Hao Pai-tsun's proposal was rejected by Lee 
Huan since whoever occupied the office of deputy chair would obstruct his 
own march to high offices. In return, Lee Huan's call for a secret ballot for the 
party chair, thus giving him a chance to head the party, received no support 
from Hao Pai-tsun.2’
Meanwhile, conflict between the two mainlander leaders. Premier Yu Kuo- 
hua and Secretary-General Lee Huan, became more apparent. With the 
transition at the power centre, Premier Yu was considered to have been
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replaced in the premier's office due to his public unpopularity. In contrast, Lee 
Huan was the favourite candidate for 1he new Premiership according to public 
opinion surveys.22 Lee Huan also had the ambition to enter the Executive Yuan. 
Under such circumstances, conflict between Lee Huan and Yu Kuo-hua 
became inevitable.
The two leaders' conflict began to grow when Lee Huan's followers In the 
Legislative Yuan initiated attacks against Premier Yu Kuo-hua before the Party 
Congress.23 What is more, Lee Huan took advantage of 1he party secretary- 
general's office to strike at Yu Kuo-hua's prestige during the re-election of 
members to the KMT's Central Committee (CC) at the thirteenth Party 
Congress. Yu Kuo-hua came only 35"\ In contrast, Lee Huan's name came first.23 
At the same time, the relationship between Hao Pai-tsun and Lee Huan was 
tense because of Hao's disaffection over Lee Huan's redistribution of the quota 
of the military's seats in the new CC.
Lee Huan's aggressive actions gave rise to counteractions by his political 
competitors. A pro-Premier Yu alliance led by Hao Pai-tsun, Yu Kuo-hua, Chiang 
Wei-kuo, and Secretary-General of the presidential office Shen Chang-huan, 
an influential leader of the Palace faction, was created. After the Congress, Yu 
Kuo-hua remained In office, but his unpopularity and damaged power base 
provided Lee Teng-hui with a favourable opportunity to Intrude into the 
Executive Yuan's affairs. Appointments to the new cabinet's re-shuffle after the 
Party Congress were mostly decided by Lee Teng-hui.28 Yu Kuo-hua's Influence 
over the financial and economic sectors was also taken over after Lee Teng-hui 
arranged for his followers to head strategic positions of the central 
government's financial and economic institutions.28
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On the other hand, Yu Kuo-hua's weak premiership still provided Lee Huan 
with an opportunity to enter the Executive Yuan. As some mainlander leaders, 
such as Chiang Wei-kuo and Shen Chang-huan, later considered that Yu Kuo- 
hua's weak power indirectly contributed to the rise of Lee Teng-hui, they 
decided to back Lee Huan to compete for the premiership.27 Moreover, Lee 
Teng-hui's attem pt to remove Lee Huan from KMT central office in order to take 
over the party apparatus became anolher conducive factor in promoting Lee 
Huan.28 Most importantly, Lee Teng-hui's weak leadership contrasted with Lee 
Huan's abundant political influence at that time.
Co-operation between Lee Huan and Lee Teng-hui was delicate. A 
political scandal involving the Justice Minister, Hsiao Tien-tsan, a follower of Lee 
Teng-hui, and the private involvement of Lee Chin-hua, Lee Huan's son, in the 
government's mainland policy and high office affairs enlarged the breach 
between the two Lees.25 Lee Teng-hui's sacking of Lee Huan's trustee, Kuan 
Chung who was the KMT Deputy Secretary-General and Chair of the Central 
Organisation Department, after the 1989 year-end election generated serious 
tension between the two KMT top leaders.
Conflict between President Lee Teng-hui and Premier Lee Huan was 
embroiled by several subgroups in the Legislative Yuan with the upsurge of local 
factions to national politics. The most important cases were the Wisdom Club 
(ch/h-sh/h hul) and the New KMT Alliance (hs/n kuomintang lien-hsieri). The 
former developed a parasitic relationship with the mainstream faction. By 
contrast, the New KMT Alliance was closely tied to the non-mainstTeam faction. 
Excessive confrontation between the Wisdom Club and the New KMT Alliance 
caused intense conflict between Lee Teng-hui and Lee Huan, and also 
between Lee Teng-hui and Hao Pai-tsun after Hao entered the Executive Yuan. 
Discussions of the development of KMT subgroups In the representative
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institutions follow in the next chapter.
When relations between Lee Teng-hui and Lee Huan turned worse, conflict 
between Lee Teng-hui and Hao Pai-tsun was also highlighted. Lee Teng-hui's 
attem pt to replace Hao as Chief of Staff created tension between the two 
party leaders for the first time since Lee Teng-hui had come to power. Hao 
revealed his interest in being Lee Teng-hui's running mate for the eighth-term 
presidential election, but was rejected by Lee Teng-hui.50 Conflict between Hao 
and Lee Teng-hui temporarily ceased after Hao Pai-tsun was named Defense 
Minister, a post which enabled him to  keep his influence within the military. 
However, this event undermined the relationship between Lee Teng-hui and 
Hao Pai-tsun.
Conflict between KMT ruling elites reached a climax after Lee Teng-hui 
announced he would choose the then-Secretary-General of the presidential 
office, Lee Yuan-tzu. as his running-mate for the eighth-term presidential 
election in January 1990. Lee Teng-hui's decision was met by antagonism from 
his political rivals. Through Hao Pai-tsun s grouping, an anti-Lee group headed 
by Hao Pai-tsun, Lee Huna, Chiang Wei-kuo, and Lin Yang-kang, a KMT 
Taiwanese ruling elite member who was the most influential political competitor 
of Lee Teng-hui, was created.5’ They called for support from the CC to prevent 
Lee Teng-hui receiving the KMT ticket to run in the presidential election 
campaign. However, Lee Teng-hui and his running mate were named the 
party's official candidates after a poll in the CC.
Despite this setback, the non-mainstream faction decided to call for 
support from the National Assembly whose members were predominantly 
mainlanders who supported the old power centre. This event generated critical 
pressures on Lee Teng-hui. In order to solve the crisis, he called upon senior
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party leaders and local factional leaders to conciliate the political contention 
between him and his political rivals. The crisis ceased after Lin Yang-kung 
announced his withdrawal from the presidential campaign. The most crucial 
factor was the disunion of political goals between the non-mainstream leaders; 
there were no political principles holding the whole of the faction together.”
After the party crisis, Lee Teng-hui became the eighth-term ROC President. 
He removed Lee Huan from his power base through a cabinet reshuffle after 
the election. Hao Pal-tsun was named Premier. It was Lee Teng-hui's tactic to 
repress counteractions form Lee Huan and to disunite the non-mainstream 
camp. Besides, Hao Pai-tsun's departure for the Executive Yuan might provide 
Lee Teng-hui with an opportunity to take over Hao's influence in the military. A 
more Important factor that contributed to Hao Pai-tsun's entry to  the Executive 
Yuan was Hao Pai-tsun's abundant political and military influence.”  After Hao 
Pai-tsun became premier, the KMT's post-Chiang Ching-kuo factionalism 
entered Its second period.
Co-operation between Lee Teng-hui and Hao Pal-tsun was short-lived. The 
détente between the two KMT leaders collapsed after the DPP national 
legislator Yeh Chu-lan exposed Hao's call for military conferences a year after 
Hao Pal-tsun was sworn in as Premier.'“ This event fuelled the flame of conflict for 
the control over the military between Lee Teng-hui and Hao Pal-tsun. The 
breach between the two leaders enlarged after Lee Teng-hui decided to 
promote his trustee, the Chief Military Aide of President Chiang Chung-lin, to 
become a four-star general. This decision invited serious criticism from Hao Pai- 
tsun and Hao's supporters in the military. Serious counteraction forced Lee 
Teng-hui to reverse his decision.”
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Conflict between the mainland and non-mainstream factions expanded 
to the party's Third Plenum of the thirteenth CC In the spring of 1992. This Plenum 
was assembled to decide a method for the forthcoming presidential elections. 
Before the assembly, the KMT's Study Group on Constitutional Revision, headed 
by Lee Teng-hui's own trustee, Vice-President Lee Yuan-tzu, had decided on an 
indirect election method (we/-jen chih-hsuari). i.e. electoral college system or 
proxy vote, as the party's proposal. This proposal became part of the electoral 
manifesto of the party in the 1991 year-end National Assembly elections when 
the KMT achieved a majority of seats
In the view of the mainstream faction, the method of direct popular 
election embraced by the DPP accorded with the demand for a directly 
elected president made by the majority of Taiwanese. In contrast, the non- 
mainstream faction rejected the idea of direct popular election since a 
president elected by the people of the Taiwan Province would be less 
convincing as a symbol of the unity of China, accentuate Taiwan's sovereign 
status in the International community, and foster the growth of a Talwan- 
centred national identity.“  Besides, a direct popular election might drive the 
government toward a presidential system that would become a pretext for 
further expansion of presidential power (and also increase Lee Teng-hui's 
power), which was unlikely to be accepted by the non-malnstieam leaders.57
At the same time, all public polls Indicated that those supporting direct 
popular election outnumbered those favouring Indirect election by proxies 
(Table 6.1).
Table 6.1 Public Opinion Poll on Presidential Election Formula
S u n n  Conductor Direct Popular Election ( % ) Indirect Election
(%)
POC Public Opinion Poll Association 
(8 March 1992)
37.1 16.5
Lien-ho-pao (United Dally News) 
(8 March 1992)
35.0 17.0
Lien-ho-pao (United Daily News) 
(13 March 1992)
38.0 18.0
Public Opinion Research 
Foundation (23 March 1992)
47.8 21.0
Sources: Shao-chuari Leap and C henpvi Lin. “Political Change on Taiwan Transition to Democracy?” The Chino 
Quarterly vol 136 (December 1993): 814
The mainstream faction accepted the indirect election method temporarily in 
order to distinguish the KMT from the DPP m the National Assembly elections. 
After the elections. Lee Teng-hui dramatically replaced the party's proposal for 
indirect election method by direct popular election. His reversal of policy once 
again became subject to  intense conflict between him and his political rivals in 
the party. In the Plenum, the KMT separated Into two groups: the indirect 
election group (wei-hsuan pal) and the direct popular election group (ch/b- 
hsuan pal). The former consisfed mainly of members of the non-mainstream 
faction, except for Lin Yang-kang. The latter comprised most of the molnstream 
members. The conflict was resolved after a compromise was reached between 
leaders of the two groups. The Plenum sent bo1h groups' proposals for 
subsequent discussion.
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The struggle between Lee Teng-hui and Hao Pai-tsun continued after the 
Plenum. The 1992 Legislative Yuan elections provided Lee Teng-hui with a 
favourable opportunity to replace Premier Hao in office due to the strong 
public demand for resignation, supported the opposition DPP. Because Lee 
Teng-hui was unwilling to name Hao Pai-tsun the Premier again, Hao was in 
danger of losing support from KMT representatives in the Legislative Yuan. 
Pressure on Hao Pai-tsun to resign was especially strong after the DPP gained 50 
out of 161 elected seats, or 31 per cent in the Legislative Yuan after the 
election.“
In order to defend Hdo Pai-tsun's premiership, the non-mainstream 
national legislators led by its faction leader Kuan Chung called alliance with 
anolher influential KMT Taiwanese politician. Kao Yu-jen, the former Speaker of 
the Taiwan Provincial Assembly, to join in the competition for the party ticket to 
run for the chair of the Legislative Yuan. Once the non-mainstream group won 
the nomination, they were able to push Lee Teng-hui to appoint Hao Pai-tsun 
as the Premier again.
However, the non-mainstream's setback In the nomination contributed to 
the downfall of Hao Pai-tsun. Lee Teng-hui announced that his follower. Lien 
Chan, would head the Executive Yuan. Hao Pai-tsun's political influence was 
thus removed following his departure. On the one hand, the inauguration of 
Lien Chan as the first native premier symbolised the end of KMT governance 
centred on the older generation of malnlanders* On the other hand. It moved 
the intra-KMT factionalism Into a new stage.
After Hao Pai-tsun was removed from the Executive Yuan, some 
mainlander conservatives, centred on Hao Pai-tsun, founded the Chinese 
Democratic Reforms Alliance (Hsln Tung-meng Hu/or CDRA) on 12 March 1993.
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The CDRA was composed of scholars, senior party leaders, military leaders and 
overseas Chinese, all united in a common effort to  restore the KMT to Its focus 
on the party founder Sun Yat-sen's three principles (San Min Chu I) and to re- 
capture the mainland.® CDRA leaders claimed that Lee Teng-hui had been 
corrupted by the temptations of power and money. Besides, they accused Lee 
Teng-hui of abandoning the party's responsibility to restore the mainland and of 
tacitly fighting for Taiwan's independence/1
Meanwhile, members of the New KMT Alliance began to form a political 
group in 1he light of the declining political strength of the non-mainstream 
factional leaders.® This move was regarded as a competition between the 
party mainlander elites of 1he first and second generations When the KMT 
convened Its fourteenth Party Congress In August 1993, the KMT New Alliance 
members held a concurrent congress and announced the creation of the New 
Party (NP). The NP tried to ottract support from malnlanders who had grown 
disenchanted with the KMT mainstream. Its popularity was largely based on Its 
appeal for honesty in politics. "
After the KMT's fourteenth Party Congress, Lee Teng-hui's leadership was 
unchallenged. Three influential non-mainstream leaders, Kuan Chung, Chiu 
Chuang-huan and Home Minister Wu Po-hslung, were subsequently pacified by 
Lee Teng-hui. Although a group of party mainlander members of the second 
generation formed an organisation, the Salvation and Reform Committee, In 
April 1995 to accuse Lee Teng-hui of dictatorial leadership and call for party 
reforms, this move did not have any significant effect. The organisation 
dissolved soon after Its initiators were disciplined by party central office
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The victories of Song Chu-yu and Wu Tun-yi, Lee Teng-hui's followers, In the 
elections for the Taiwan Provincial Governor and the Mayor of Kaohsiung City In 
late 1994, and Lee Teng-hui's success in being nominated as KMT official 
candidate for the ninth-term presidential election In the Second Plenum of the 
party's fourteenth CC In August 1995 further strengthened Lee Teng-hui's power 
base in the KMT. After Un Yang-kang and Hao Pai-tsun broke off from the KMT 
to join the ninth-term presidential election as independents, Lee Teng-hui 
became the supreme leader in the KMT. Finally, the post-Chiang Ching-kuo 
factionalism within the KMT came to an end.
6.3 Factional Disputes over the KMT's Mainland Policy
During the authoritarian years, the KMT's mainland policy indirectly justified the 
KMT regime's poltticdl monopoly. Ordinary democratic activities endorsed In 
the Constitution were suspended becduse of the KMT's claims to retake the 
mainland and complete national construction. Due to Its highly political 
sensitivity, the KMT's mainland policy had close links with Taiwan's democratic 
development. What is more, the struggle over the democratic reform and the 
ensuring redistribution of political power between the KMT Taiwanese and 
mainlander elites inevitably clashed over the KMT's One-China policy after the 
death of paramount leader Chiang Chlng-kuo.
In retrospect, the KMT's mainland policy played a significant role In the 
Intra-KMT factionalism between the mainstream and non-malnstredm factions 
In the post-Chiang Chlng-kuo era. Policy disputes first occurred In the summer of 
1989 when ihe Executive Yuan gave Its official approval to a business group for 
business tour In the former Soviet Union. This group was organised by business 
circles, but was composed of officials from the Ministry of Economic Affairs and
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the Foreign Trading Association, a quasi-govemmental body.
As the Soviet Union had long been considered by the KMT as a foreign 
enemy which had contributed to Its defeat on the mainland, anti-Soviet policy 
was ideologically embraced by the KMT in the times of Chiang Kai-shek and 
Chiang Ching-kuo. With Taiwan's political opening and the change in Taiwan- 
mainland China relations, the political significance of anti-Soviet ideology also 
declined. The Executive Yuan's approval for the business group was supported 
by public opinion. However, the government's decision was questioned by the 
party's senior leader, Shen Chang-huan. Shen resigned from his office as the 
Secretary-General o f the presidential office to protest against the party's new 
leadership led by Lee Teng-hui.
Controversy over the KMT's mainland policy began to go far as a result of 
the Lee administration's pragmatic diplomacy. To re-establish the ROC on the 
international stage was one of the major political programmes of the Lee 
administration after Lee Teng-hui came to power. On 3 June 1989. Lee Teng-hui 
addressed to the Second Plenum of the KMT's thirteenth CC, calling for 
pragmatic management of the ROC's diplom acy" The Lee administration's 
pragmatic diplomacy aimed at increasing official diplomatic relations, 
strengthening non-official diplomatic nations, and breaking the barriers of the 
ROC's participation in international organisations.45
On 6 March 1989, Lee Teng-hui launched his pragmatic diplomacy by 
visiting Singapore. Singapore had been playing an important part in bridging 
Taipei and Beijing because of her leader Lee Kuarvyew's private friendships 
with leaders on the both sides of 1he Taiwan Straits. However, Singapore 
announced a switch of formal recognition to Beijing before Lee Teng-hui's visit. 
However, this did not stop Lee Teng-hui. Besides, the Singaporean media's
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naming of Lee Teng-hui as 'th e  President from Taiwan' was also accepted by 
President Lee at his press conference. Lee Teng-hui's actions invited questions 
from KMT conservatives who condemned Lee Teng-hui for abandoning the 
party's One China policy.
Following Lee Teng-hui's visit to Singapore, the Executive Yuan announced 
the decision to send a delegdtion led by Finance Minister Kuo Wan-jung to 
attend the Asian Development Bank's (ADB) 22"° annual conference hosted in 
Beijing on 1 May 1989. Minister Kuo's visit to the mainland was the first official 
contact between Taipei and Beijing since the 1949 separation. As a result, the 
Lee administration's decision to attend the 22"° annual conference of the ADB 
was viewed as a big breakthrough in Taiwan-mainland China relations, 
However, this decision involved neither consultation with other party leaders nor 
a request to the CSC for confirmation. The decision was made by Lee Teng-hui 
and his staff“
Another crucial development was the delegation's performances in the 
opening ceremony of 1he ADB annual conference, where members separated 
into two groups: one called for absence and another suggested all-round 
engagement. Minister Kuo stood on the side of the latter. Kuo's decision to 
stand and listen to the PRC's national anthem gave rise to many questions and 
provoked criticism from Taiwan's academic circles, the government, and the 
party.
In the view of KMT conservatives, Lee Teng-hui's pragmatic diplomacy had 
caused the KMT's legitimacy crisis since the regime had long based Its control 
over Taiwan upon Its all-China emphasis.*’ Besides, pragmatic diplomacy would 
eventually lead to the recognition of the Chinese communist regime, a 
complete election of national representative bodies of the central government,
207
and constitutional revisions, all of which would inevitably infringe the vested 
interests of old power holders, i.e. senior national delegations, security forces, 
and the military." Because of ideological and Interest conflicts, the ADB event 
embittered factional disputes between Lee Teng-hui and his political rivals over 
the party's mainland and foreign policies.
The Lee Teng-hui administration's pursuit of diplomatic goods became 
especially passionate after Hao Pai-tsun stepped down from his premiership in 
1993. Lee Teng-hui and Premier Lien Chan subsequently visited several countries 
in South East Asia, Central Asia, Central America, South Africa, and Eastern 
Europe. Furthermore, the ROC positively sought to join international 
organisations such as the APEC, the WTO. and especially the UN. Pragmatic 
diplomacy reached a climax after Lee Teng-hui visited his alm a mater, Cornell 
University in the USA in June 1995. This event caused serious tension between 
Taipei and Beijing, and between Lee Teng-hui and KMT conservative leaders."
In addition to pragmatic diplomacy, the upsurge o f the Taiwanese 
nationalist movement became another subject of infense controversy among 
KMT leaders in relation to the party's mainland policy. With démocratisation, 
long-repressed views were expressed with greater passion and frequency. 
Political dissidents were also allowed to return to Taiwan after the abolition of 
the blacklist system. In the summer of 1990, a number of Taiwanese nationalists 
were invited to attend 1he National Affairs Conference. In August 1994, Lee 
Teng-hui received staff of the World United Formosans for Independence 
(WUFI). Lee Teng-hui's benevolent attitudes to Taiwanese nationalists inevitably 
irritated KMT conservative leaders.50
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Likewise, Lee Teng-hui's confession that the KMT was an outsider regime in 
his interview with Japanese writer Shima Ryutaro in May 1994 and the Minister of 
Economic Affairs Chiang Ping-kun's outspoken address saying that Taiwan's 
mainland policy was 'a  staged two Chinas policy toward one China* at the 
Asian Pacific Economic Co-operation Forum (APEC) in the summer of 1993 all 
generated further conflict between Lee Teng-hui and his political rivals.
Furthermore, Lee Teng-hui's connection with the Wisdom Club also blurred 
the image of his mainland policy. The Wisdom Club was a KMT Taiwanese- 
based subgroup In the Legislative Yuan. The overriding character of 1his group 
was its advocacy of 'O ne China One Taiwan* policy which apparently 
contradicted the KMT's One China policy. In addition, the Club's hostility 
towards Premier Hao Pai-tsun and the non-mainstream New KMT Alliance was 
evident. This made the Club's political role controversial on the one hand, and 
strengthened Lee Teng-hui's political rivals' prejudices about Lee Teng-hui's 
mainland policy on the other hand.
Regardless of the serious disputes over the KMT's mainland policy between 
the parly's ruling elites, their views about the policy were not far different. Table
6.2 compares both the mainstream and non-mainstream factions' policy views 
with regard to the KMT's mainland policy.
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Table 6.2 A Comparison of Views on KMT Mainland Policy 
between the Mainstream and Mainstream Factions
Mainstream non-Mains tream
Political Positions 
on the Issue of 
Unification vs. 
Independence
One China; 
Taiwan first;
rejection of any form of 
Taiwan independence
One China; Taiwan first; 
rejection of Taiwan 
independence; two Chinas, and 
one China one Taiwan
Viewpoints on the 
Unification Process
Security first;
stage-by-stage advance of 
bilateral relations; 
objection to party-to-party talks
Security first;
stage-by-stage advance of 
bilateral relations; 
calling for sea. air, and trading 
links with the mainland; 
objection to party-to-party talks
Proposals on 
Unification Models
A Chinese community Federation, confederation or 
a Chinese community
Attitudes toward 
Foreign Policy
Vigorously pursue international 
participation In the name of 
pragmatic diplomacy
Domestic development first, 
anti-money diplomacy; essential 
diplomacy;
Political Positions 
on Taiwan- 
Mainland China 
Relations
One China, two political entities; 
pro-intemational relations; 
call for a treaty ruling out any 
invasion of each other's territories
One China, two areas; 
domestic relations; 
call for a cease-fire treaty
Sources:
1. Lee Teng-hui. C h in g -y in g  ta  t 'a i -w a n , h s in -k  art-pen  [The Management of Taiwan. New Edition] Taipei: Yuan- 
liu ch'u-pan-kung-szu, 1995.
2. Lee Teng-hui. C h in g -y in g  ta  t ’a i -n u n  [The Management of Taiwan] Taipei: Yuan-liu ch'u-pan-kung-szu, 1995.
3. Lin Yang-kang. H x m -U a n g -ta o : l in -y a n g -k a n g  te  c h ih -k u o  la n - t 'u  (New Leader: Lin Yang kang s Blueprint for
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Nan ana] Management] Taipei: Wan-hsiang Book Co., Ltd., 1996.
4. Kuan Chung, Kuo-hui pi-chi [Congressional Notes] Taipei: Democracy Foundation. 1995.
5. Kuang Li-chia, Cheng-hsin: Lin Yang-kang hui-i-lu [The Memoir of Lin Yang-kang] Taipei: T'ien-hsia wen- 
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According to the above analysis, differences of viewpoints on the KMT's 
mainland policy between the mainstream and non-mainstream factions were 
not evident. They reached a consensus in several respects. Neither the 
mainstream nor non-mainstream factions denied the importance of the party 's 
long-lasting One China policy. The policy ruled out an invasion from China and 
retained the vintage KMT ideology for 1he time being. Therefore. 1he 
establishment of an independent Taiwan state was rejected by both factions 
although Lee Teng-hui had acknowledged publicly that Taiwan is presently 
independent o f China.
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Moreover, the Taiwan-first policy was emphasised by leaders of both the 
mainstream and non-mainstream factions. They all confirmed the significance 
of Taiwan's security in the unification process and rejected any political talk 
with Beijing unless China renounces its hostility toward Taiwan. Also, both the 
mainstream and non-mainstream factional leaders underlined the fact that 
China's unification should not damage the welfare of Taiwanese people. The 
timing and manner of unification should respect the rights and interests of the 
people in the Taiwan area.
For these reasons, both the mainstream and non-mainstream factions 
stressed the importance of the principle of circumspection in the government's 
management of Taiwan-mainland China relations. They called for a stage-by- 
stage approach to move the process of Taiwan-mainland China relations. They 
also agreed that direct trade, transport, and postal links (san-tung) with the 
mainland will not open until China renounces the use of force against Taiwan, 
recognises Taiwan as a political entity on equal footing, and allows Taiwan to 
have reasonable space for international participation. That is because an 
excessive increase of Taiwan's dependence on the mainland market will 
weaken Taiwan's political countermeasures in leverage against China. By then, 
China will be able to force Taiwan to accept Its terms a t 1he negotiation table.
Furthermore, neither the mainstream nor non-mainstream factional leaders 
disclaimed Taiwan's independent status in the international community 
because they both stressed the Taiwan-first policy. They all confirmed that both 
the mainland and Taiwan are parts of Chinese territory, coexisting in 
international societies with common responsibilities for China's unification. This 
suggested that neither Taiwan nor China is eligible to represent the whole of 
China. Taiwan's rights to  take part in the international society should be 
respected by the PRC under the principle of equivalent sovereignty.
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Remarkable differences of policy views about the KMT's mainland policy 
between the mainstream and non-mainstream factional leaders emerged from 
their different orientations toward Taiwan's relationship with China based on 
divergent conceptualisations of Taiwan's identity. The mainstream faction 
claimed that the Taiwan-mainland China relationship is in the sphere of 
international politics based on the reality of political development across the 
Taiwan Straits. In contrast, the non-mainstream faction declared that the 
existing separation across the Taiwan Straits is an outcome of the Chinese civil 
war, differing from the cases of Germany and Korea which were caused by 
international sources. Therefore, they considered that the relationship between 
Taiwan and China pertains to domestic politics.
Conflict of views about the orientation of Taiwan's relations with China 
resulted in different opinions on the details of the KMT's mainland policy. For 
example, the mainstream faction calls for a peaceful treaty to deal with the 
two-sides relationship. By contrast, the non-mainstream faction refuted the idea 
of a peaceful treaty, but proposed a cease fire treaty between the two 
domestic war groups. In short, policy differences about the KMT's mainland 
policy between the mainstream and non-mainstream factions exist only in terms 
of the details of policy contents. However, the policy differences were 
exaggerated by intra-KMT factionalism.
6.4 Conclusion
At the beginning of Lee Teng-hui's succession to Chiang Ching-kuo's 
leadership, he did not gain any support from the other KMT leaders. His power 
base was rather weak. In contrast, Lee Huan exercised abundant influence
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based on the party apparatus; Hao Pai-tsun had great power in the military; Yu 
Kuo-hua remained in control of Taiwan's financial and economic sectors; Lin 
Yang-kang enjoyed considerable popularity in Taiwanese society and had links 
with local elites. Based on the mainlander leaders' political and military strength 
a t that time, history would not undoubtedly move in the direction of Lee Teng- 
hui.
Excessive competition between the KMT mainlander leaders undoubtedly 
contributed to  the rise of Lee Teng-hui. According to Wang Cheng-huan, 
relationships between Chiang Ching-kuo and his political followers tended to 
go down vertically and remained individually in the form of clientelism. 
Horizontal connections between the party ruling elites were proscribed.61 After 
the end of strongman politics, various forces led by different personalities 
began to compete with one another for spoils left by the old regime. At that 
time, the position of Lee Teng-hui was overlooked by those old party leaders 
due to the weakness of his power base.
KMT mainlander leaders' control o f the old power centre drove Lee Teng- 
hui to seek support from forces outside the KMT through his institutional positions, 
i.e. ROC President and KMT Chair.“  He developed explicit and/ or implicit 
coalition relationships with the following groups: the KMT elected members of 
representative institutions and technocrats who demanded more democratic 
reforms, the opposition DPP whose major Ideology, Taiwanese nationalism, had 
long been repressed by KMT mainlander conservatives, Taiwanese capitalists 
who pursued a more liberal market that contradicted the old regime's state- 
planned economy, and local factions that had been advantaged by Lee 
Teng-hui's political reforms.63
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Relying on the support o f these forces. Lee Teng-hui finally took control of 
the party and central government apparatuses. The advent of a new regime 
led to the KMT's pursuit o f Taiwan's political re-establishment on the 
International stage, the replacement of the KMT's traditional all-China principle 
which was reflected in the holding of complete elections for the three branches 
of the National Congress and a direct popular presidential election, and the 
emphasis on Indigenous culture and the establishment of a new community 
based on the whole population of Taiwan.54
In reality, the KMT's Indigenisation was an inevitable outcome of Taiwan's 
political transition. With the rise of the Taiwan-first emphasis and the increased 
importance of the electoral mechanism, the KMT could not maintain its ruling 
power over Taiwan without Indlgenisation. Similarly, Lee Teng-hui's pragmatic 
diplomacy was a result of political liberalisation. The emergence of a Taiwan- 
first emphasis drove the government to pursue a more reasonable and equal 
position In international society. This demand became especially strong with 
Taiwan's high economic growth and successful démocratisation.
Lee Teng-hui's political programmes, however, became subject to intense 
conflict between himself and his political rivals. Factional disputes were 
particularly passionate over the party's mainland policy and foreign policy. 
Also, the Taiwanese-mainlander rift was employed by both the mainstream and 
non-mainstream factions to attack each other, thus leading to  political 
retribalisatlon.“  Ideological conflict became enmeshed with power conflicts. 
The KMT's mainland policy became a major cause which fuelled the flame of 
intra-party conflict between Lee Teng-hui and his political rivals. Within this 
power struggle, both KMT factions shared a broad consensus on the party's 
mainland policy, but exaggerated the small differences.
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Most important was political corruption. The rise of capitalists and local 
factions in national politics following political transformation and Lee Teng-hui's 
strategic alliances had led to the deterioration of political morale and the 
emergence of money politics, which turned to undermine Taiwan's infant 
democracy. In the next chapter we will consider the development of local 
factions and the closely related issue, the state-business relationship, following 
Taiwan's political transformation.
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CHAPTER  7
Local Factions after the Collapse of Authoritarian Rule
The KMT's coalition relationships with local factions can be analysed in terms of 
three different periods. In the 1950s and 1960s, the KMT used its control of most 
economic and political resources to gain the support o f local factions through 
the system of patronage. Elections served as the mechanism through which the 
KMT fostered institutionalised connections with local factions. In time, the 
political and economic interests of local factions becam e intertwined with 
those of the KMT, bolstering the regime's rule over Taiwan. However, the 
influence of local factions was constrained by the KMT through several 
institutional devices such as bi-factionalism and barriers to the formation of 
inter-county/ inter-city coalitions between factions.
In the 1970s and 1980s, the KMT's Taiwanisation policy tended to cultivate 
and recruit more Taiwanese into the high ranks of KMT party-state. The 
Taiwanisation policy also included attempts to reduce the overall power of 
local factions. Unfortunately, the KMT's failure to achieve this impelled it to 
restore its alliance relations with local factions. In particular, the KMT's legitimacy 
crisis caused by Taiwan's serious diplomatic setbacks and the rise of the political 
opposition in the 1970s increased the importance of local factions in the KMT's 
ruling structure. However, local factions were still effectively constrained from 
expanding across the boundaries traditionally set by the KMT.
2 2 1
In the 1990s the KMT's authoritarian rule collapsed, strongman politics 
ceased, and Taiwan's political landscape profoundly changed. Local factions 
were no longer constrained in their local areas. They expanded islandwide and 
emerged In the national political arena, reflecting in the emergence of a 
number of sub-groups in legislatures a t all levels. The political alliance relations 
between the KMT and local factions turned from vertical clientelism to the 
horizontal. Meanwhile, local factions converged with business groups and 
became political-business blocs In the local areas, thus helping to restructure 
Taiwan's political development.
This chapter aims to analyse the development of local factions after the 
collapse of authoritarian rule. It first studies the change of the alliances structure 
between the KMT and local factions. Then it examines the rise of local factions 
In Taiwan's national politics. Next, it Investigates the upsurge of business groups 
in politics and the convergence between local factions and business groups. 
Finally, it discusses the Issue of gangsters in Taiwan's politics. The chapter 
concludes by highlighting the key problems in Taiwan's local politics today.
7.1 The Change of the KMT-Local Factions Clientelist Structure
As Taiwan's political system become more democratic, elections Increasingly 
became the only institution that could distribute political Interests legitimately.’ 
Moreover, elections have become very significant in helping the KMT to 
strengthen and demonstrate its legitimacy over Taiwan to the outside world.2 
The role of elections became particularly predominant after Taiwan developed 
a competitive party system in the late 1980s. when the DPP was established. The 
Increasing importance of elections directly contributed to the growth of local
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factions in the political leverage system based on their effective capability to 
mobilise support from electorate and their involvement In electoral competition.
In retrospect, elections were a very significant factor In the development 
of Taiwanese local factions. The KMT's implementation of local elections from 
1950 built up the foundation for Taiwan's local self-government and democratic 
political participation. Also, it stimulated the growth of a number of factions in 
the local units. In the early 1970s and 1980s, the KMT furthermore held 
supplementary elections for representative bodies of the central government In 
order to respond to demands for political reforms from the newly emerged 
middle class and the political opposition due to Taiwan's political setbacks 
abroad. The opening of supplementary competitions for national elections, 
though limited, provided local factions with institutionalised avenues to move 
up to national politics from the local.3
After the collapse of authoritarian rule, the KMT was forced by the 
opposition DPP and the public to improve the competence and legitimacy of 
the three representative bodies of the central government. The KMT held 
complete elections to replenish senior delegates of the Legislative Yuan and 
National Assembly elected in 1947 between 1991 and 1992. Members of the 
Control Yuan were also replaced by new recruits appointed by the President. 
Subsequently, local factions found more agencies through which they could 
move into national politics. The holding of direct popular elections for 
executives of Taiwan Province, the two metropolitan cities, Taipei City and 
Kaohsiung City, and especially for the President further boosted the influence of 
local factions.4
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Moreover. intra-KMT factionalism between those party elites who were 
situated near the old power centre and who were closed to the new 
leadership, l.e. Lee Teng-hui, In the post-Chlang Chlng-kuo era played a role 
that expanded the overall power of local factions and also business groups. As 
a result of Lee Teng-hui's weak leadership position within the KMT, he 
developed coalition relationships with local factions, business groups, and the 
opposition in order to strengthen his power base for political leverage over 
political rivals.5 Local factions and business groups also quickly turned their 
allegiance to the new party leadership whose political reforms advanced their 
interests.6
Power sharing between the Lee Teng-hui group (the KMT mainstream 
faction) and local factions became manifest a t the KMT's thirteenth Party 
Congress In the summer of 1988 when Lee Teng-hui counted on the support of 
local factions and rank-and-file for his election as party chair.7 Furthermore, Lee 
Teng-hui sought to bolster support for his leadership of the party through local 
factions by campaigning on behalf of KMT mainstream candidates in the 1993 
elections for the executives of local governments, and the 1994 Taipei and 
Kaohslung mayoral and Taiwan provincial races.8
Taiwan's rapid economic growth also contributed to the growth of the 
power of local factions. With Taiwan's economic boom between 1965 and 
1985, local factions gained considerable economic strength based on their 
dominance of regional monopolistic businesses granted by the KMT. The rapid 
rise of commercial land capital in suburban areas and then later In urban areas 
in the 1970s gave local factions huge profits through their control of land 
politics. Local factions were largely benefited by rural industrialisation and the 
expansion of large-scale public construction projects.'
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With the decline of the KMT's political dominance and the increase of 
political and economic strength of local factions, the KMT was no longer 
capable of controlling local factions effectively. After the collapse of the KMT's 
authoritarian rule and the end of strongman politics, the old clientellst structure 
of the political alliances between the KMT and local factions changed. The 
weakening of KMT control coupled with the growing strength of local factions 
thus began to change the nature of the traditional patron-client relationship. 
Local factions became the KMT's political companions of equal status, differing 
from their conventional roles as political subordinates.
Local factions became greatly Influential over local politics although the 
KMT had attempted to remove them from the main political stage in the 1970s, 
and again the 1980s. Members of local factions consistently occupied more 
than 55 per cent of the seats in the Provincial Assembly from 1954 to 1989, and 
the KMT's faction-based representation never fell below 50 per cent.’0 With the 
increased importance of elections, the rise of the opposition/ DPP, and its 
inability to remove the Influence of local factions, the KMT had strengthened its 
political alliance relations with local factions in order to maintain the party's 
political dominance. Local factions once again became the KMT's crucial allies 
after the KMT's failure to reduce their power and especially Taiwan's 
démocratisation.
The KMT's increased reliance on local factions was revealed in Its 
nomination of party candidates for elections after the political opening. The 
1991 National Assembly elections were a good example. At the elections the 
national representative body would be subject to complete election for the first 
time since the 1947 elections on the mainland. This served as an indication to 
see whether the ruling KMT could maintain its power to direct the coming
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constitutional amendments and to control the démocratisation agenda during 
the later stages of regime transition."
At the same time, the 1991 elections were also important for the KMT party 
leader, Lee Teng-hui. It was the first national electoral competition after the split 
of the KMT into the mainstream and non-mainstream factions as a result of 
uncontrolled conflict between Lee Teng-hui and his political rivals on the matter 
of the party's nomination of official candidates for the presidential election in 
early 1990. The 1991 electoral outcomes would decide If Lee Teng-hui was able 
to solidify his leadership, justify his democratic and foreign policy agendas, and 
overcome the threats from the opposition.’2
Hence, pressure on the party machinery to concentrate on winning 
elections became considerable. Facing these challenges, the KMT under Lee 
Teng-hui's direction nominated 79 candidates who were closely tied with local 
factions to run for the campaigns for the National Assembly elections. KMT 
factional candidates took 43.16 per cent of the total number of KMT nominees. 
This was the highest ever percentage share of factional candidates in national 
representatives elections than ever before. After the elections, 77 factional 
candidates were elected. The success rate was as high as 97.47 per cent. This 
was quite an encouragement for the KMT.13
Following the success of the 1991 elections, the KMT deepened its reliance 
on local factions to Join electoral contests in the 1992 Legislative Yuan elections. 
The constitutional power of the Legislative Yuan is much greater than that of 
the National Assembly. In order to maintain Its electoral success, the KMT 
nominated 58 factional candidates to run for the campaigns. The percentage 
share of factional candidates of the total KMT nominees was 59.18 per cent, 
which was the first time that the percentage of factional candidates exceeded
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that of the non-factional candidates in party nominations for national 
elections.u
Strong criticism against the KMT's money politics from opposition parties, 
however, caused the KMT to suffer unexpected losses in the 1992 elections. Of 
the 58 KMT factional candidates, only 38, or 65.5 percent of all factional 
candidates were elected. The KMT gained only 62 seats, or 63.23 per cent of 
the total elected seats.15 This drove the KMT to reduce the number of faction- 
based candidates in the 1993 county and city chiefs elections. Of 19 KMT 
candidates these were only 8 candidates with factional backgrounds.
Despite this, candidates affiliated with local factions were more likely to be 
nominated by the KMT, and KMT members who had affiliations with local 
factions were more likely to be elected.'5 Table 7.1 indicates the KMT's close 
reliance on local factions in elections between 1988-95. A slight reduction in 
KMT faction-affiliated candidates In the 1993 and 1995 elections was caused by 
criticism of anti-money politics from the opposition.
227
Table 7.1 The Number of, and Percentage Vote for KMT Factional Candidates 
at Elections (1988-1995)
Year Elections
Total Number of 
KMT
Candidates
Number of KMT 
Factional 
Candidates
Elected
Factional
Candidates
1989 Legislative Yuan 58 29; (50%) 26; (89.66%)
1989 Regional District Councils 
Elections
53 28; (52.8%) 24; (58.5%)
1989 County and City Chiefs 20 13; (65%) 9; (69.23%)
1989 Provincial Assembly 62 36; (58.06%) 32; (88.89%)
1991 National Assembly 183 79; (43.16%) 77; (97.47%)
1992 Legislative Yuan 98 58; (59.18%) 38; (65.52%)
1992 Regional District Councils 
Elections
83 65; (78.3%) 41; (82.0%)
1993 County and City Chiefs 19 8; (42.11%) 4; (50%)
1993 Provincial Assembly 55 28; (50.91%) 26; (92.86%)
1995 Legislative Yuan 75 43; (53.3%) 27; (62.79%)
Sources:
1. Chen Ming-tang, “Local Factions and Elections in Taiwan’s Démocratisation,” in Tien Hung-mao (ed.), Taiwan's 
Electoral Politics and Democratic Transition: Riding the Third Wave (New York: M.E. Sharp, Inc., 1996), 178, 179, 
187, and 189.
2. Huang Teh-fu, “Elections and the Evolution o f the Kuomintang,” in Tien Hung-mao (ed.), Taiwan’s Electoral 
Politics and Democratic Transition: Riding the Third Wave (New York: M.E. Sharp, Inc., 1996), 133 and 134.
7.2 The Rise of Local Factions in the National Political Arena
During the authoritarian years, local factions were kept out of national politics 
through a series of institutionalised devices. As independent political actors, 
local factions were unwilling to subordinate their own interests to the KMT
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central authority forever. Despite their patron-client ties with the KMT regime, 
local factions were Institutionally autonomous. After the collapse of the KMT's 
authoritarian rule and Taiwan's political democratic transition, old constraints 
and barriers for local factions to form alliances across the boundaries of cities 
and counties disappeared. Local factions were no longer constrained at the 
local level. They could ally with one another both horizontally and vertically. 
They also expanded nationwide to compete for public offices at all levels, 
undermining the KMT's dominance over central government agencies.1'
Local factions' nationwide coalition moves began as soon as KMT 
Chairman Chlang Ching-kuo died in the spring of 1988. Before the KMT's 
thirteenth Party Congress In July 1988, KMT speakers and deputy speakers of the 
councils from 21 cities and counties held the Yllan Conference, which 
demanded a greater share of seats in the forthcoming party Central 
Committee (CC).18 Another important case of inland alliance moves between 
local factions was the Wisdom Club (chi-shih hut), established on 22 April 1988, 
which was the first Island-wide subgroup in the Legislative Yuan after the 
change of Taiwan's political environment.
The Wisdom Club consisted of mainly Taiwanese KMT representatives. Its 
primary Interest was the national legislature. The establishment of the Wisdom 
Club broke the KMT's restriction on forming subgroups in the representative 
Institutions. Before the announcement of the establishment of the Wisdom Club, 
counter pressure from the KMT central authority was considerable. However, 
support from the party's former Secretary-General Ma Shu-li contributed to the 
establishment of the Club.1’ The founding of the Wisdom Club triggered the 
establishment of several subgroups, consisting mainly o f local factional 
representatives in the Legislative Yuan (Table 7.2). According to the level of 
Institutionalisation, they could be categorised as Institutionalised factions.
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However, the organisational strength and the level of institutionalisation of those 
subgroups were far behind those of factions in the Japanese LDP. 12
Table 7.2 Subgroups in the Legislative Yuan (1988-1993)
Names Formation Date
Number of 
Members Partnerships
Wisdom Club 22 Aril 1988 21 KMT
Construction Club 16 June 1989 45 KMT
Hairlock Club 19 December 1989 8 KMT (female)
New KMT Alliance 9 February 1990 14 KMT
Heritage Club 22 February 1990 18 KMT
Concord Club 5 March 1990 39 KMT
Welfare Club 1 March 1990 13 Non-partisan
Creation Club 1 May 1990 27 KMT
Congressional Function 
Reform Club
15 November 1991 51 KMT
Breakfast Club (Wisdom 
Club)
17 January 1992 45 KMT
Yu-san Club 1 February 1993 14 KMT
Public Policy Roundtable 11 February 1993 7 Non-partisan
Public Opinion Club 18 February 1993 20 KMT
New Era Club 9 December 1993 18 KMT
Policy Study Club 18 December 1993 16 KMT
Sources:
1. Chen Ming-tung, P ’ai-hsi cheng-chih yu t ’ai-wan cheng-chih pien-ch'ien [Factional Politics and Political 
Dynamics o f Taiwan] (Taipei: Yueh-tan ch’u-pan yu-hsien-kung-szu, 1995), 230-232.
2. Huang Teh-fu, "Elections and the Evolution of the Kuomintang,” in Tien Hung-mao (ed.), Taiwan's Electoral 
Politics a nd  Democratic Transition: Riding the Third Wave (New York: M.E. Sharp, Inc., 1996), 128.
Notes:
Concerning the formation dates and number of members of the subgroups, the authors do not entirely agree. I 
therefore mainly adopt Chen Ming-tung’s research data for those groups formed before the 1992 Legislative Yuan
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election as Chen undertook a detailed study of each group’s membership, but only for those groups formed before the 
1992 election. Information for those groups formed after 1992 comes from Huang’s study. Unclear data from both 
studies were added and supplemented by the present author’s research.
After Its establishment, the Wisdom Club developed an Intimate tie with the KMT 
mainstream. The Club members' close relationship with Lee Teng-hui, and their 
harsh confrontation with Premier Hao Pai-tsun and the non-mainstream New 
KMT Alliance In the Legislative Yuan generated several questions about the 
Club's political role. Another factor which made the Wisdom Club's character 
controversial was its ” Taiwan-First" agenda and its advocacy o f an 
independent Taiwan, which contradicted the KMT's traditional One China 
principle. The Wisdom Club's anti-One China policy position became a subject 
of Intense conflict between the KMT mainstream and non-mainstream factions 
over the party's mainland policy.
However, the Club did not have strong influence. First, its advocacy of 
"One China, One Taiwan" was still proscribed by the KMT central authority 
although Lee Teng-hui did acknowledge publicly that Taiwan is independent of 
China. Moreover, the Wisdom Club was a pragmatic group and had neither a 
direct approach to address the most immediate concerns of the electorate, 
nor other notable policy positions apart from attempting to focus the political 
agenda on Taiwan. Such circumstances caused of development problems for 
the Club. Furthermore, no Wisdom Club leaders were capable of grouping 
local factions as a whole since they were not the leaders of the local factions to 
which they belonged. Therefore, the Club could not easily expand its Influence 
outside the Legislative Yuan.20
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In the 1992 Legislative Yuan elections, the Wisdom Club did badly. Several 
influential incumbent members were defeated in the face of allegations of 
campaign corruption. Afterwards, the Wisdom Club fell into chaos in early 1993. 
Although its leaders attempted to  re-organise the Wisdom Club Into a non­
partisan Public Interest Alliance in June of the same year, it did not succeed. By 
1994, the Wisdom Club and Its successor organisation had effectively been 
dissolved.21
Another noteworthy subgroup in the Legislative Yuan was the New KMT 
Alliance, founded on 9 February 1990. In contrast to the Wisdom Club, most 
members of the Alliance were young mainlander representatives of the second 
generation. Moreover, the New KMT Alliance was closely associated with the 
KMT non-mainstream faction leaders. In the party contention in early 1990, 
members of the New KMT Alliance acted against Lee Teng-hui and the 
mainstream Wisdom Club. Furthermore, the Alliance stuck to the KMT's claim to 
rule all of China and repudiated the idea of "Taiwan Independence" or an 
"Independent Taiwan." Its popularity was largely based on its appeal for 
honesty in politics, and its criticism of political corruption and money politics.
On 10 August 1993, some members of the New KMT Alliance split away 
from the KMT and founded the New Party (Hs/n Tang or NP) before the KMT's 
fourteenth Party Congress. The NP continued to attract support from 
mainlanders who were tired of the political dominance of the KMT party 
mainstream and the public who had grown disenchanted with political 
corruption. However, the NP's policy development was weak. Many policy 
statements were difficult to distinguish from KMT policies. What is more, a widely 
shared image of the NP as a mainlander-only party indirectly contributed to the 
Ineffectiveness of the party's organisational development.22
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Inter-county and inter-city coalitions between local factions emerged not 
only in the Legislative Yuan, but also in the Taiwan Provincial Assembly. To take 
the ninth Taiwan Provincial Assembly In 1989 as an example, there were four 
subgroups in the Assembly: the Grassroots Club, the Dally Renewal Club, the 
Practice Club, and the Political Study Club.23 In reality, the emergence of 
subgroups in the Legislative Yuan and Taiwan Provincial Assembly revealed the 
growing overall power of local factions. However, it also brought to the surface 
tensions between the elected elites and party cadres."
The examples above Illustrate political alliances among local factions. 
However, nationwide coalition moves also developed vertically between KMT 
factions and local factions. In early 1990, the KMT split into the mainstream and 
non-mainstream factions. In order to strengthen their power bases, both the 
KMT mainstream and non-mainstream factions abandoned the KMT party- 
state's old constraints and barriers, and associated with local factions. They co­
opted new allies from outside the KMT, Including local political forces and the 
business groups; a kind of repetition of what the KMT did In the 1950s.25
One remarkable case was the establishment o f the Foundation for 
Democracy (FD), organised by Kuan Chung, a young leader of the KMT non­
mainstream faction in November 1990. Kuan Chung was the Deputy Secretary- 
General and Chair of the Central Organisation Department o f the KMT 
between 1988 and 1989. Following the KMT's setbacks in the 1989 elections for 
national legislators, Taiwan provincial assemblymen, and local executives, Kuan 
Chung was forced to  leave the KMT central office. His offices and influence In 
the party were taken over by Lee Teng-hui and his trustee. Sung Chu-yu. 
Afterwards, Kuan Chung joined the non-mainstream faction before the 1990 
political disputes.
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Through his abundant influence built up as head of the KMT Taiwan 
Provincial Committee, Taipei Metropolitan Committee, and the Central 
Organisation Department, Kuan Chung organised the FD in late 1990. The FD 
consisted of 1,381 members, including 53 national legislators, 290 
representatives at provincial and local levels, 450 scholars, 365 business people, 
and 265 from various sectors of society. The FD sought to act as a quasi-party 
body to promote its particular candidates to political offices through elections. 
Among 1,381 members, 80 were first-ranked leaders of local factions.26
Another noteworthy case was the Association for National Development 
Promotion (ANDP) established in April 1991 by Chiu Chuang-huan, a Chiang 
Ching-kuo cultivated Taiwanese politician. During the KMT's party crisis in the 
early 1990s, Lee Teng-hui promised to appoint Chiu Chuang-huan as Premier or 
KMT Secretary-General in order to  gain his support. At that time, Chiu Chuang- 
huan had a closer relationship with the mainstream factions. However, Lee 
Teng-hui did not fulfil his promises after the party crisis. What Is more, Chiu 
Chuang-huan was replaced by Lee Teng-hui's trustee. Lien Chan, as chair of 
the Taiwan Provincial Government. Later, Chiu reacted against Lee Teng-hui by 
moving to the non-mainstream faction.27
Subsequently, Chiu Chuang-huan announced his intention to run for the 
forthcoming presidential election in 1996. Following the founding of the FD, he 
established the ANDP in April 1991 through his own large personal networks. Like 
the FD, the ANDP was designed to promote their particular candidates to 
public offices through elections. The ANDP consisted of more than 1,500 
members from the party, political circles, local factions, business community, 
and academic circles, including many local factional leaders. What is more, 
the ANDP established 9 local branches in Taipei, Taoyuan, Taichung, Nantou,
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Changhua. Kaohsiung, Taltung, Hualien and Keelung. and 9 overseas branches 
to publicise its organisational policies.28
Undoubtedly, both Kuan Chung and Chiu Chuang-huan's alliances with 
local political forces indirectly promoted the political position and influence of 
local factions in the KMT. Meanwhile, they drove Lee Teng-hui and the 
mainstream leaders to  strengthen their political alliance relations with local 
factions. Through abundant political and economic resources, the mainstream 
faction used superior and more political rewards to restore their links with local 
factions. By contrast, the relatively inferior political and economic power of the 
FD and ANDP prevented the two organisations from developing further. Their 
political networks were soon abolished by the mainstream-controlled KMT 
central authority.w
As a result, neither the FD nor the ANDP played important roles. Apart from 
their originally designed functions, the two organisations never recommended 
or supported particular candidates to  run for election campaigns. Instead, they 
only focused on academic affairs such as conferences and publications. What 
is more, both Kuan Chung and Chiu Chuang-huan were pacified by Lee Teng- 
hui before the KMT's fourteenth Party Congress In August 1994. It was arranged 
that Chiu should become the Chair o f the Examination Yuan in April 1993. Kuan 
became the Minister of Personnel before the 1994 year-end Taiwan Governor 
election and again the Deputy Chair of the Examination Yuan in 1996.”
The growing influence of local factions in the post-Chiang Chlng-kuo 
period was also observable during the KMT's 1990 party crisis. Although Lee 
Teng-hui called upon eight senior party leaders to reconcile political conflict 
between himself and the non-mainstream faction leaders, this did not make 
any significant contribution. A major breakthrough was made by local factional
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leaders invited by Lee Teng-hui to act as mediators at the same time. The efforts 
of the former Speaker of the Taiwan Provincial Assembly Tsai Hung-wen, a 
factional leader of the Taichung Red pai, played a decisive role in solving the 
crisis after Lin Yang-kang accepted his advice and withdrew from the National 
Assembly's campaigns for the 1990 presidential election.31
After Lee Teng-hui became the eighth-term President, several local 
factional leaders were named as Presidential Senior Advisors or Consultants for 
national policies. Several strategic positions In the central government and KMT 
central office were also occupied by local factional leaders. For example, Liu 
Sung-fan, an influential member of the Taichung County Red pa i became the 
Chair of the Legislative Yuan while Wang Chin-ping, a significant factional 
member of the Kaohsiung County White pai. became the Deputy Chair of the 
Legislative Yuan. Likewise, the secretary-generals of the KMT Central Policy 
Committee and its party branch in the Legislative Yuan were taken over by 
local factional members.32
Moreover, the increasing influence of local factions was visible through 
analyses o f the composition of the KMT CC. Under authoritarian rule, party 
members who were tied to local factions were seldom positioned in the CC. 
Although a few factional members were appointed in the eleventh and twelfth 
CCs, they were carefully selected by party central authority and accounted for 
less than 10 per cent share of the total CC members. After the ending o f 
strongman politics, local factions began to expand In the KMT CC. By the fifth 
CC in 1997, local factions had gained 51 of 230 CC members or a 22.2 per cent 
share Gable 7.3).
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Table 7.3 The Increasing Number of Seats o f Local Factions 
on the KMT Central Committee (1952-1997)
Party
Congress
Date Total CC 
Members
Members of 
Local 
Factions
Percentage of Local 
Factions’ Seats
7 10 October 1952 32 0 0
8 10 October 1957 50 0 0
9 12 November 1963 74 0 0
10 29 March 1969 99 1 1
11 12 November 1976 130 8 6.2
12 29 March 1981 150 8 5.3
13 7 July 1988 180 24 13.3
14 16 August 1993 210 46 21.9
15 24 August 1997 230 51 22.2
Sources:
1. Chen Ming-tang, “Local Factions and Elections in Taiwan’s Démocratisation,” in Tien Hung-mao (ed.), Taiwan’s 
Electoral Politics and Democratic Transition: Riding the Third Wave (New York: M.E. Sharp, Inc., 1996), 172.
2. “Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang chien-tang i-pai-nien da-shih-chi,” [The Chronology of the One Hundred Anniversary of 
the Establishment of the KMT] Chung-yang Jih-pao [Central Daily News] (Taipei), 24u* November 1994.
3. Data for 14th and 15th Party Congress were provided by various newspaper sources.
Furthermore, investigations into the personal details of representatives in the 
Legislative Yuan provide further evidence of the increasing influence of local 
factions in the early 1990s. The percentage share of factional representatives in 
the Legislative Yuan rose from 13.89 per cent In 1972 to 49.32 per cent in 1986 
and 50.98 per cent in 1989. The DPP's striking gains in the 1992 and 1995 
Legislative Yuan elections reduced the percentage share of factional 
representatives In the Legislative Yuan. However, faction-based legislators still 
accounted for over 40 per cent of the total (Figure 7.1).
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Figure 7.1 Factional Representatives in the Legislative Yuan 
(1972-1995)
I percentge
1972 1975 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995
Sources:
Wang Cheng-huan, Shei t ’ung-chih t ’ai-wan: ch ’uan-hsing-chung te  kuo-chia chi-ch’i yu chuan-li-chieh-kou 
[Who Governs Taiwan? National Apparatus and Power Structure in Transition] (Taipei: Chu-liu Book Co., Ltd., 
1996), 153.
Note:
Date for 1995 were provided by various newspaper sources
7.3 The Political Expansion of Business Groups
As already mentioned, the KMT used a variety o f state-allocated benefits at 
different levels of administration to incorporate local factions as political allies In 
order to legitimise Its rule over Taiwan. According to  Chu Yuan-hen and Chen 
Mlng-tung, these KMT-granted monopolistic economic businesses Include co­
operative banks, credit unions, credit departments of farmers' associations and 
fishermen's associations, and public transportation. Over 90 per cent o f local 
factions had at least one of those businesses.33 However, the scope of those
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regional monopolistic businesses was confined to the city-county or hslang- 
township areas In order to limit the expansion of local factions both politically 
and economically.
With Taiwan's economic liberalisation in the 1980s and especially the 
collapse of the KMT's authoritarian control, the economic scope and structure 
of local factions changed profoundly. On the one hand, local factions no 
longer limited their regional monopolistic businesses to the traditional 
boundaries. Local factions expanded their businesses nationwide and even 
abroad. On the other hand, local factions positively invested in capital-intensive 
businesses based on their regional monopolistic businesses. A large number of 
local factions shared In the establishment of stock exchange companies, 
construction companies, and private banks.
Research by Chen Ming-tung reveals that local factions shared in 6 o f 16 
new established private banks given authority by the KMT to open in 1990. Also, 
36, or 52.9 per cent of the existing 68 local factions at city-county level have 
shares in stock exchange companies; 47, or 69.1 per cent, have businesses 
pertaining to land speculation such as construction companies and housing 
mortgages.34 The structural change of economic activities has allowed local 
factions to expand their economic, and also political, Influence. The dramatic 
expansion of local factions in business, however, has melted down the 
distinctive lines that separated locdl factional leaders and business people, thus 
causing the state-business relationship to deteriorate.
Meanwhile, business groups broke through and began to engage In 
politics actively. Under authoritarian rule, the business community served as the 
primary coalition partner of the KMT to accelerate economic development. 
Business people generally were not permitted to  play an active role In politics.
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The business community's involvement in politics was limited to a passive 
partnership with the party and the administrative system of the party-state.35 It 
did not assert itself as an autonomous and organised political actor in the 
policy-making process nor were its Interests well represented in the KMT's power 
structure. Three unique characteristics of Taiwan's political economy during the 
authoritarian years confined the growth potential of business groups.
First, the KMT's requirement of full-fledged legitimacy of the business sector 
was reduced to a minimum because it has based Its legitimacy on international 
recognition and because of its effectiveness in bringing about economic 
prosperity. The differentiation of state elites and business elites along the sub­
ethnic line also erected institutional cleavages between the KMT's national 
leadership and the business community as a whole.35 The existence of state- 
owned enterprises which had a monopoly or near-monopoly in a large number 
of manufacturing sectors further buttressed the existence of an economic base 
independent of the private sector. Throughout the 1970s total investment in the 
state-enterprise sector accounted for more than a third of gross domestic fixed 
capital formation in most years.37 Under such circumstances, the political 
support of the business community was not a weighty factor in sustaining the 
political legitimacy of the KMT regime.
Second, in the time of authoritarian rule, the formal channel between the 
government officials and business leaders was through the state-sponsored 
industrial associations which were created through the economy hierarchically 
along corporatist lines. However, the KMT regime's pre-emptive incorporation of 
industrial and business associations and political manipulation changed the 
way in which these associations functioned. Rather, these associations were 
designed by the KMT to  penetrate, organise, and mobilise various sectors of the 
civil society. The elections of association leadership were conducted under the
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guidance of the KMT Social Affairs Department which exercised effective power 
over the appointment of officers of the secretariats of these associations. Most 
of the officers were retired state officials, military officers, and party bureaucrats 
recruited through a complex clientelisi network.38
Third, some inherent structural characteristics of the private sector 
prevented attempts at group-based coalition politics from business community. 
Most of the export-oriented sector consisted of small and medium sized firms 
which lacked the necessary resources and skills for organising group-based 
actions. As both the entry barriers and exit costs were quite low in these sectors, 
firms moved in and out of a given sector every now and then. These conditions 
encouraged private adjustment instead of collective bargaining.39 With respect 
to large diversified business groups, they tended to avoid organising 
autonomous collective actions among private business interests, so that they 
could enjoy better access to economic officials who administered an array o f 
powerful policy instruments (such as bank credits, protectionist measures, fiscal 
incentives, and market-order regulations) in order to gain essential economic 
resources from the regime.40
In general, as Chu Yun-han mentioned, 'private business was relatively 
weak vis-à-vis the KMT party-state during the authoritarian years because the 
regime was endowed with a centralised political authority, an oversized military 
and administrative apparatus, and a huge array of state-owned enterprises. 
The party-state could shape the patterns of segmentation and association 
within the business community because its control of the organisational bases of 
resources distribution and its power of Institutional innovation, which Is the most 
effective weapon for the ruler to manipulate the ruled.'4'
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From the early 1970s, business groups began to participate in politics. They 
began to develop ties with local factions and participate in local elections after 
Taiwan's economic take-off and subsequent urbanisation in the 1960s. Through 
collusion with local factions, business groups were able to receive large profits 
from land speculation, favourable loans, governmental procurement, and 
public construction projects.42 As Taiwan entered the 1980s, mounting external 
and internal pressures for economic liberalisation and increasing political 
démocratisation rapidly resulted in the changes of Taiwan's political and 
economic environments. Business groups became more Involved in political 
activities In order to expand or defend their economic Interests.
With the rise of neo-protectionism in the developed countries especially 
the United States in the 1980s, the external economic environment for 
Taiwanese business groups started changing. It was particularly so after 
economic and trade fiction was generated between Taiwan and the United 
States due to the United States' annoyance with Taiwan's long-term 
maintaining of a favourable trade balance and her large foreign exchange 
reserves. In 1987, the US trade deficit with Taiwan reached 19 billion dollars.43 This 
was an enormous figure, second only to the US deficit with Japan, and at a 
time when a great deal of USA congressional attention was being focused on 
the US trade deficit. It led to great pressure on the government In Taiwan to 
take measures to lower the deficit.
Under pressure from Washington, the Taiwanese government called for 
market diversification by developing alternate markets in Southeast Asia, 
Eastern Europe and many other parts of the world, even In mainland China, 
and to promote Industrial upgrade.44 More significantly, the Taiwanese 
government opened up Its domestic market by removing non-tariff barriers to 
trade. Many long-running policy measures, such as mandatory export-ration
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requirements, domestic content requirements and export subsidies, were forced 
out. The New Taiwan dollar was re-valued upwards by more than 48 per cent 
against US currency between 1986 and 1988.“  The government was also forced 
to take measures to improve working conditions. Those measures of economic 
liberalisation all have reduced the productivity of business groups.46
Moreover, political as well socio-economic changes at home worsened 
the production conditions of business groups. Due to the KMT's neo-mercantilist 
policies in the past few decades, the concerns of consumers, farmers and 
labours were ignored, and the importance of the environment was 
downplayed in order to protect the interests of large diversified business groups. 
However, this In turn led to the rise of organised new social movements in the 
1980s. These social movements converged with the growth of opposition 
movements to push the KMT to transform the authoritarian regime and its 
policies. They also targeted the business community, thus directly and indirectly 
increasing business production costs.47
Faced with these challenges, business groups turned to  the state to 
deregulate economic controls. They called for deregulation of a number of 
state-dominated sectors, especially the financial sector in which private 
participation was prohibited, privatisation of certain state enterprises which 
lacked clearly-defined policy missions, liberalisation o f banking regulation, and 
development of a full-fledged capital market.48 The decline of the KMT's 
authoritarian power also became an incentive for business groups to exert 
greater efforts toward maintaining or turning the state's policy-making In their 
favours.46
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Under pressure from business groups and the decline of Taiwan's 
international economic competitiveness, the KMT, between 1986 and 1987, 
deregulated foreign exchange and overseas investment, allowed trade with 
some socialist countries, and permitted travel for the purpose of visiting family 
members and indirect investment to mainland China.60 Also, the channel of 
participation of the business groups in the government's formulation of 
economic policies was broadened, showing in Premier Yu Kuo-hua's decision to 
establish a blue-ribbon Economic Reform Advisory Council to suggest measures 
for the direction of development strategy in early 1985.61
Meanwhile, economic liberalisation compelled business groups to play a 
more positive role in political activities. A large quantity of economic resources 
were released by economic liberalisation from the late 1980s. Between 1988 
and 1991, the government took the entry restrictions off a series of state 
enterprises or parastatal-dominated sectors, such as commercial banking, 
investment banking, construction, mass transportation, airlines, and the mid­
stream petrochemical sector. A number of state-harboured oligopolies, such as 
security brokerage, newspapers and insurance, were also opened for new 
entrants. Some state-owned enterprises are earmarked for privatisation.62 In the 
process of the redistribution of economic resources, business groups became 
more enthusiastic about participating in political activities in order to achieve 
larger economic spoils.
Furthermore, political démocratisation since the late 1980s became 
another incentive for business groups to participate in politics. With 
démocratisation, an expanded electoral avenue and an descending 
parliament (more rooms were made to representatives of the island of Taiwan 
as more mainlander senior delegates died) provided the business elites with 
new opportunities to initiate new forms of political investment and pursue
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Influence buying at strategic Junctures In the policy-making process.“  Business 
groups got involved in politics in various ways: providing financial aid to 
particular parties or candidates to run election campaigns; offering material 
resources to support governmental activities; establishing thlnktanks to affect 
the government's policy-making; lobbying political parties or legislators; joining 
local factions; and directly engaging in electoral contests to compete for 
public offices.“
From the early 1970s, electoral contests became increasingly money­
consuming as more and more new land capitalists participated In elections for 
high stakes. Election campaigns became particularly expensive after the 
money game began in the late 1980s, requiring huge amounts of money for 
advertising, lavish banquets, other campaign activities, and vote-buying. 
According to Shiau Chyuan-Jeng, a candidate in the 1989 Legislative Yuan 
elections might spend as much as $1.2 to $3.2 million on a single campaign. In 
contrast, average campaign expenditures in 1988 for candidates to the US 
House of Representatives averaged only $274,000 and for the Senate, $2.8 
million.“  Current political market assessments suggest that a t least $5 to $6 
million Is required to run for county magistrate and $3 to $4 million to secure a 
seat in the Legislative Yuan.“
As business groups were very capable of providing abundant financial aid 
for expensive campaigns and held sway over the thousands of employees who 
are registered voters, the business community increasingly became the most- 
sought partner for political parties, local factions, individual politicians, and 
other forces that sought to increase their influence through the electoral 
process.57 The implementation of direct popular election for the President in 
which election campaigns required huge spending further increased the 
significance of business groups.“  In other words, the influence of business
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groups has been boosted dramatically with Taiwan's economic growth and 
political démocratisation.
With increasing political influence, business groups have come to play a 
significant role in Taiwan's politics. As already stated, the post-Chiang Ching- 
kuo power struggle over political succession, which was entwined with the 
division over the scope of political reform and the shape of new institutional 
arrangements, compelled both KMT mainstream and non-mainstream factions 
to bring in new allies from the outside. The mainstream faction reached out to 
the business community much more vigorously as It at first had a weaker power 
base within the KMT.W Lee Teng-hui received essential support from large 
Taiwanese-based private enterprises to reform the KMT party-state and to 
neutralise resistance from mainlander-oriented members within the KMT.“
Based on their abundant influence, both political and economic, business 
groups became an important political coalition partner for the KMT. The 
importance of business groups in the KMT's efforts to maintain legitimacy has 
been gradually superseding that of local factions.61 Support from business 
groups were crucial to the KMT's maintaining its dominant role in economic 
development and gaining the support of the middle class. In order to restore its 
dominant role in economic development and strengthen its relations with 
business groups, the KMT enthusiastically promoted the Six-Year National 
Development Plan in the early 1990s.62 Business groups gradually became 
significant in reconstructing the KMT regime.
The increasing political influence of business groups is well revealed in their 
growing involvement in Legislative Yuan elections. In the 1989 elections, 54 of 
289, or 19 per cent of candidates were affiliated with business groups. 40 of 
these 54 candidates were elected. The success rate was 76.2 per cent. The
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business-related candidates accounted for 39 per cent of the 101 newly 
elected legislators.“  In the 1992 year-end Legislative Yuan elections, the first time 
there was a complete election of the whole national legislature, the number of 
elected business-related candidates remained high, accounting for 78 of a 
tota l of 101 newly elected legislators, or 66.7 per cent.“
Research by Wang Cheng-huan shows that business-related 
representatives in the Legislative Yuan accounted for 50 per cent o f the total of 
294 elected legislators between 1969 and 1992. Within those business-related 
legislators, 26.87 per cent are in business pertaining to the industrial sector, e.g. 
construction companies and petrochemical Industries; 19.05 per cent are linked 
to  banking and financial business; 15.31 per cent to trades; 13.27 per cent to 
service Industries (especially lawyers and medical doctors); and 3.06 per cent to 
agriculture, fisheries, and minerals.“
After being elected, business-related legislators are normally keen to 
compete for assignments In the committees for the budget, finance and 
economics, the three most lucrative committees. Through their control over the 
Institutional power of the three committees, business groups are better 
equipped to turn the state's policy-making to their favour; for example, to 
expand or defend the privileges of their elective offices and pay off their 
political debts. Among the total of 294 elected legislators between 1969 and 
1992, 70.6 per cent of members on the committees of budget, finance and 
economics had close links with business groups. Furthermore, 75 of the 294 
elected legislators, or 25.52 per cent, were tied to both business groups and 
local factions.“
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However, a large number of factional and business-based legislators 
skipped most of the legislative sessions and concentrated on the legislative 
proposals and budgets which involved the interests of their factions or financial 
backers.67 They also vigorously opposed any revised policy or new proposed 
policy which might weaken their entrenched business interests. For example, 
two important financial measures (the legal ceiling on the percentage of real 
estate assets which an insurance company can hold and the case of fhe 
securities transaction tax) designed to cool down the overheated stock and 
real estate markets in 1990 met strong resistance from the spokesmen of the 
giant insurance companies and the brokerage houses in the legislative 
process.6*
In the 1950s and 1960s, the KMT was capable of maintaining its control 
over local factions and kept a clear distance between business groups and 
local factions. However, Taiwan's political and economic changes since 1970s 
and especially in the late 1980s have profoundly reduced the KMT's dominance 
In Taiwan and changed the country's political landscape. On the one hand, 
local factions were freed of the KMT's old constraints and could expand 
throughout the Island. On the other hand, business groups deepened their 
Involvement in political activities to pursue economic interests through politics. 
The emergence of local factions and business groups in the national political 
arena inevitably Intertwined the whole relationship between the two.
Money politics and structural corruption which had long been fermenting 
in the local politics was transmitted into the national politics as a result of the 
convergence of local factions with business groups. The Legislative Yuan 
became an arena of bargaining among state officials, party officials, and law­
makers who acted as surrogates of special business Interests.66 Although Lucian 
W. Pye, who has recently studied the scandals of money politics In Japan,
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Taiwan, South Korea, China, and Singapore, suggested that money politics can 
also operate in a manner that actually advances democracy,70 Taiwan's 
money politics not only badly damages the moral integrity and political 
leadership of the KMT but also gravely endangers the smooth transformation of 
the entire political system.
What is more, the KMT officials who still wielded considerable power over 
the party nomination process and the elective fate of individual candidates 
actually encouraged the growth of money politics and the cycle of structural 
corruption, l.e. institutional voting-buying mechanism. Based on the Increasing 
influence of local factions and business groups, and the party's attempts to 
contain the electoral growth of the opposition candidates, the middle-level 
KMT officials who were directly responsible for the election outcomes in a given 
district tended to recommend the nomination of candidates, who have strong 
support from a business group or local faction.7’
The excessive expansion of local factions and business groups invited 
strong criticism from the political opposition and the public. Several social 
movements in the early 1990s targeted the KMT central authority as result of 
money politics.77 What is more, money politics became a cause that fuelled 
political contention between the KMT mainstream and non-mainstream 
factions.77 Anti-money politics and antl-vote-buylng movements precipitated an 
island-wide popularity during the 1992 elections. During the elections, the KMT 
suffered an unexpected setback. This signalled the decline of the electoral 
value of factions. Vote-buying no longer guaranteed electoral success. Also, 
the KMT's alliance strategy with local factions cannot enjoy continued success 
within the current corrupt structure.74
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In order to diminish the pressure caused by criticism of the KMT's money 
politics, the KMT nominated more candidates with 'c le a n ' backgrounds, good 
images, and no factional ties for elections in 1993 for local executives. Factional 
candidates took 8 out of 19 KMT nominations, or 42.11 per cent (Table 7.1). As 
Figure 5.2 shows, this percentage was the lowest ever for the KMT's factional 
candidates at elections for local executives except for the 1977 local 
executives elections when the KMT made large-scale efforts to reduce the 
overall power of local factions. Even so, local factions still played an important 
role in elections, but they were assigned to a behind-the-scenes role to support 
good-image candidates.75
In addition, the KMT Initiated a series of investigations Into vote-buying 
crimes in the election of the speakers and deputy speakers of local councils in 
early 1994. 257 local councillors including 190 KMT members (74 per cent), 60 
non-party members (23 per cent), and 7 DPP members (3 per cent) were 
prosecuted.75 Despite the decline In the electoral value of local factions, 
factional candidates are still more likely than non-factional candidates to be 
elected (Figure 7.2). As a result, the KMT needs to maintain its alliances with 
local factions at the present time because of its necessity to retain the support 
of local populations.77
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Figure 7.2 The Percentage of the KMT's Nomination and Outcomes 
at Elections for the Legislative Yuan (1980-1992)
■  Elected Factional 
Candidates
■  Elected Non-factional 
Candidates
1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995
Source:
3. Chen Ming-tang, “Local Factions and Elections in Taiwan’s Démocratisation,” in Tien Hung-mao (ed.), 
Taiwan’s Electoral Politics and Democratic Transition: Riding the Third Wave (New York: M.E. Sharp, Inc., 
1996), 189.
4 . Date for 1995 are added from various newspaper resources.
Taiwan's politics has suffered increasingly from violent campaigns and Mafia- 
style politics as more and more gangsters have participated in politics. After 
elections became particularly expensive from the 1970s, gangsters were 
attracted by the huge flow of campaign expenditures and sought to gain 
material resources from candidates through violence. Moreover, the over­
heated electoral contests Impelled local factions to associate with gangsters. In 
elections, gangsters are now in charge of the safety of local politicians, helping 
factional candidates to run their campaigns, and bribing voters In exchange for 
rewards, normally huge cash or political favours from local factions.78
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As gangsters became more familiar with election campaigns and retained 
greater economic power generated by illegal business activities (that had 
benefited from Taiwan's rapid urbanisation between the 1970s and the 1980s), 
they began to get involved in elections for public offices. Through public 
offices, gangsters are able to compete for opportunities in public construction 
projects and economic privileges. Moreover, gangsters can use the 
administrative authorities to solicit their infraction of regulation and laws, and to 
protect their illegal businesses. Gangsters can basically 'd o c to ra te ' their 
underground status once they occupy public offices.7’
The phenomenon of Mafia-style politics is serious in rural areas where socio­
economic development are poor. According to Chao Yung-mao. gangsters In 
Changhua County, Yunlin County, Chiayi County, Tainan County, and 
Kaohsiung County are more vigorously involved in politics. In 1989, 25 per cent 
on an average of county and sub-county councillors in these areas had close 
affiliations with gangsters. In Yunlin. the percentage was especially high at 40 
per cent In the same year."0 In urbanised cities and counties, the superior socio­
economic conditions cause problems for the political activities of gangsters, 
and therefore such groups have less electoral influence.
Furthermore, gangsters are more active in elections at local level than 
those at national level. Underground group-based candidates are commonly 
seen in local elections, especially a t the hs/ang-township level. During the 
judicial investigation moves of the Ministry of Justice in 1994, 300 of the total of 
858 newly elected local councillors, or 35 per cent, had records of criminal 
conviction and/ or association with illegal gang organisations." The excessive 
expansion of gangster activity can sometimes take control over, or even annex, 
local factions with which they are affiliated.
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The growing of gangster influence in election politics may drive Taiwan 
toward a Mafia-type politics. It Is now quite commonplace to see the forces of 
gangsters take control over local election campaigns and political affairs. One 
of the shocking cases of political violence made by gangster politicians was 
revealed by government prosecutors in December 1994. involved the Speaker 
o f the Pingtung County Council, who accompanied by his gangster brothers 
personally shot and killed his business rival at the victim's own home.12
7.4 Conclusion
In general, this chapter expands upon what I mentioned in Chapter Two about 
the relationship between the performance of the KMT's clientelist alliances with 
local factions and the strengthening of its political control. Since the late 1970s, 
the KMT's clientelist alliances have undergone an essential change. The KMT's 
attempts to curb the enhanced influence of local factions cracked the alliance 
relationships between local factions and the KMT. Then, as a consequence, 
undermine the KMT's own unity and increased the pressure for further 
démocratisation. After the collapse of authoritarian rule, the alliance 
relationships between local factions and the KMT became much more 
unstable. The KMT continued to lose its political dominance.
Indeed, Taiwan's rapid economic growth and socio-economic changes 
during the past few decades have contributed to the political transition from 
authoritarian rule to democracy. Unfortunately, the development of 
democratic norms does not match the level of socio-economic modernisation 
in general. Neither local politicians nor the local population are equipped with 
democratic Ideas and respect for the rule of law. This situation is particularly 
worrisome in rural areas where the level of modernisation and democratic
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development has not advanced at the same rate as in the urban centres. 
Despite high levels of urbanisation. Industrialisation, per capita income, literacy 
and mass communication, kleptocracy, i.e. bribery, corruption, political 
discrimination, and money politics are still prevalent in Taiwan's local politics.
In addition, the popularity of local factions in elections continues to prevail. 
According to Figure 7.2, factional candidates are still more likely to be elected 
than the non-factional candidates. The influence of local factions has not 
faded with socio-economic modernisation. Their capability to achieve electoral 
mobilisation in local politics has not declined yet. This negates Chao Yung- 
mao's proposition that socio-economic development will result in the decline of 
local factions.“  To put it differently, Taiwan's political culture is truncated, which 
means that it has not developed in accordance with socio-economic 
modernisation." This is the major cause of anti-democratic behaviour, such as 
bribery, vote-buying and violence, in elections and political management in 
present-day Taiwan.
As Michael Ying-mao Kau mentioned, the pernicious assaults on the 
weakened KMT party machine by local factions, business groups, and gangster 
elements are creating trouble of crisis proportions for Taiwan's orderly process 
of démocratisation.85 “ It is clear that the KMT leadership is now confronted with 
a critical dilemma: should it choose to gather up all its courage for the sake of 
its long-term survival to cut off ties with the pernicious factional and money 
politics a t the risk of alienating support from the powerful and rich in society, or 
should it continue to indulge in the short-term benefit and expediency of 
symbiotic cooperation with resource-rich local factions and the business groups 
to help It hang on to  power and security."86
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CHAPTER 8
Conclusion and Reflections
8.1 Research Summary and Findings
This research adopted the factionalism approach, which assumes a situation 
where political elites and political institutions rely exclusively upon clientelist ties 
to structure political action, to investigate the relationships among the KMT's 
mainlander ruling elites, among Taiwan’s indigenous elites and between the 
KMT regime and local factions. Through the analysis of changes in the 
clientelist relationships between the KMT and local factions, I attempted to offer 
a new as well as fresh theoretical contribution so as to supplement the 
inadequacies of existing theories in the study of Taiwan's démocratisation
This study presumed that the key to Taiwan s democratic transition was 
the conflict and disunity within the KMT's ruling structure. The fracturing of the 
clientelist alliance relations between the KMT and local factions in the late 
1970s, when the central authorities of the KMT adopted a faction replacement 
policy to reduce the overall power of local factions, provided fertile ground for 
the rise of political opposition whose strategic interaction with the regime finally 
drove Taiwan toward democracy The study dealt with two spheres of 
clientelism in Taiwan patron-client relationships between the KMT and local 
factions and clientelism within local factions (between factional leaders and their 
clients, i.e. their factional members)
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The first two chapters of this thesis focused on both démocratisation and 
factionalism theories. A  literature review was provided Through analyses of the 
literature of Taiwan's démocratisation in Chapter One, I highlighted the value 
and significance of my adoption of the factionalism approach to the study of the 
origins and process of Taiwan’s démocratisation. The research approach and 
methods were also discussed In Chapter Two, in addition to reviews of 
factionalism theories, I presented a figure to explain the relationship between 
the change of the KMT's clientelist alliances with local factions and the strength 
of the KMT’s authoritarian control. It was my research framework fo r this study
Chapter Three dealt with the KMT’s policies to establish authoritarian rule 
after it moved to Taiwan in 1949 This chapter began with a discussion of the 
KMT’s political establishment in the early 1950s Under strong political, 
economic, and military support from the USA, the KMT took several steps to 
restore its ruling capacity and to legitimise its governance These included the 
suspension of the Constitution by temporary provisions which put the state 
under emergency rule; the suspension of elections at national level which 
maintained the basis of the immigrant elites’ dominance of national politics; the 
re-organisation of the KMT which re-established the KMT as a Leninist party, 
and the establishment of despotic control over civil society
Since Chiang Kai-shek believed excessive factionalism had led to the 
KMT’s loss of the Chinese mainland, eliminating factionalism became one of the 
aims of the KMT’s political establishment after the KMT moved to  Taiwan The 
KMT initiated campaigns against factionalism within its own ranks Major KMT 
mainlander factions were removed from the political stage The KM Ts 
elimination of its own factionalism was the main theme of the second part of this 
chapter The final section of this chapter investigated the KMT’s establishment 
of control over local Taiwanese elites Indigenous political leaders who opposed
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political forces were suppressed However, the KMT's lack of governing 
experience and o f a popular base in Taiwan drove the KMT to encourage a 
depoliticised form of factionalism in society more generally, so as to widen its 
legitimacy
Chapter Four focused on the KMT’s establishment of its clientelist alliances 
with local political elites. It began with a discussion of the origins of Taiwanese 
local factions Then, this chapter explained the organisational characteristics 
and operation of local factions Next, it examined the KMT's institutionalisation 
of its relationships with local factions through patronage systems The chapter 
argued that Taiwanese local factions were neither simple outgrowths of 
Taiwan’s traditional socio-cultural roots, nor the outcome of the KMT’s 
institutional designs. Rather, they were institutions developed under the special 
historical, social, economic, and political circumstances of Taiwan’s pre- and 
post-war experiences
The second major finding of this chapter was that Taiwanese local factions 
are a kind of informal organisation They are not part of any formal institution 
They do not offer the same kind of political programme as a party would. They 
are groups who band together for the electoral success of one of their 
members, but they do not all actually stand for office themselves. To compete 
for public office is only one of the means for the development of local factions, 
but not their ultimate purpose Local factions tend to use the authority provided 
by public office to expand their organisational and economic strength so that 
they are able to continuously expand
Based on their tremendous organisational strength to mobilise voting 
support in elections, the KMT deliberately fostered and manipulated local 
factionalism so that the immigrant KMT was able to rule the native population
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Using its opportunities for patronage, the KMT constituted clientelist alliances 
with local factions. This chapter concluded that the KMT-local faction clientelist 
alliance structure had two underlying problems: the Taiwanese-mainlander rift 
and the institutional autonomy of local factions, which together undermined the 
clientelist structure and, launched Taiwan's political liberalisation and 
démocratisation in due time.
Chapter Five was the main focus of this thesis First, this chapter reviewed 
the KMT’s political as well as econom ic counter policies in the early 1970s after 
the regime was plunged into a legitimacy crisis as a result of Taiwan's 
diplomatic setbacks. Then, it examined how the KMT’s hard authoritarianism 
was transformed to a soft form in th e  context of the implementation effects of its 
counter policies Next, it discussed how the KMT’s attempts to reduce the 
overall power of local factions fractured the regime's clientelist alliance relations 
with local factions Finally, this chapter investigated how the rise and growth of 
a prospective opposition strategically interacted with the KMT and how the 
democratic opposition movement finally drove the KMT to open up its politics
This chapter concluded that the  breach in the KMT’s alliance relations with 
local factions was the key factor th a t initiated Taiwan s political liberalisation and 
démocratisation. Before 1977, the opposition had never gained enough strength 
to push the KMT to take measures for political opening However, the KMT’s 
attempts to remove local factions generated resentment among local factions 
which reacted against the KMT central authority by supporting the opposition 
candidates in elections. The opposition’s increasing electoral support and the 
KMT’s loss of its electoral popularity from the late 1970s drove the KMT to 
recognise the opposition as a political force Strategic interactions between the 
opposition and the KMT finally forced the KMT to address the issue of 
démocratisation.
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Chapters Six dealt with the development of factional politics within the KMT 
after the death of KMT strongman Chiang Ching-kuo in 1988 It firstly 
investigated the causes of the KMT’s factionalism in the post-Chiang Ching-kuo 
era. It found that ethnic cleavages between Taiwanese and mainlanders. and 
Taiwan’s political changes, i.e. liberalisation and démocratisation, were the two 
major causes of the KMT’s factionalism between 1988 and 1993. The transition 
of power fuelled these underlying problems which created political conflict 
between the KMT mainstream and non-mainstream factions
During the years of intra-KMT factionalism in the post-Chiang Ching-kuo 
era, the party’s mainland policy played a significant role Factional disputes 
between the two KMT factions in general developed around the issue of the 
KMT’s mainland policy and foreign policy under the leadership of Lee Teng-hui. 
However, the mainstream and non-mainstream faction's views on the party's 
mainland policy were not far apart, according to analyses in the third part of this 
chapter. Differences existed only in the details of the policy, but were 
exaggerated under factionalism. Chapter Six concluded that ideological conflict 
only played a small role in the KMT’s factionalism in the post Chiang Ching-kuo 
era. The struggle for power was the primary reason
Chapter Seven focused on the development of local factions after the 
collapse of authoritarian rule During the authoritarian years, local factions were 
kept out of national politics by a series of institutionalised devices Old 
constraints and barriers to prevent local factions from expanding out of their 
districts, however, were no longer effective after the collapse of the KMT s 
authoritarian rule The KMT’s factionalism under leadership of Lee Teng-hui 
further boosted the expansion of local factions as both KMT factions attempted 
to ally with local factions so as to increase their influence in political leverage 
Local factions soon emerged in the national political area, shown by the
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numerous factional members In the state and party representative bodies
This chapter also examined the issue of the state-business relationship 
Under authoritarian rule the KMT was able to keep a clear distance between 
local factions and business groups However, with Taiwan s political and 
economic changes in the 1970s and 1980s, local factions transformed 
themselves into local political-business blocks while business groups became 
more enthusiastic about pursuing their economic interests through politics The 
emergence of local factions and business groups in the national political arena 
inevitably became involved in the whole relationship between the two 
Unfortunately, the convergence of local factions and business groups resulted 
in money politics and structural corruption which are the two major problems for 
Taiwan’s future political development
In conclusion, the basic logic of this study of the origins and process of 
Taiwan’s démocratisation is the following After 1949, the KMT sought to stamp 
out factionalism within its own ranks, but actively encouraged a depoliticised 
form  of factionalism in society more generally so as to widen its legitimacy 
However underlying problems, i.e the Taiwanese-mainlander rift and the 
institutional autonomy of local factions, caused changes in the K M Ts clientelist 
alliances with local factions With political and economic changes overtim e, the 
growth potential o f local factions was enhanced Later the KMT became 
worried by the enhanced influence of local factions and tried to curb them 
Reactions from local factions against the KMT s faction replacement policy in 
the late 1970s undermined the KMT s own unity and provided a fertile ground 
fo r the rise of the political opposition In turn, this increased the pressure for 
démocratisation
265
Table 8.1 The Changing Relationships between the KMT, 
Local Factions, and the Opposition/ DPP
1949-1972 1972-1986 1986-1996
KMT
Authoritarian
Control
Strong
Strong, but gradually 
declining since the 
early 1980s
Weak
KMT Ruling
Society
Unified
Unified despite 
internal debate 
between hard-liners 
and soft-liners
Separated into 
mainstream and 
non-mainstream 
factions
The KMT-Local 
Factions Alliances
The KMT was the 
supreme patron of 
local factions while 
the latter were 
followers
The KMT retained 
its dominance over 
local factions but 
this gradually 
declined
Local factions 
became the KMT’s 
political partners 
with equalised 
political status
Influence o f  the 
Opposition
Weak
Weak, but gradually 
influencing both 
national and local 
politics since the 
1980s
Became an able 
political competitor 
against the KMT 
with opportunity to 
hold the ruling power
The Opposition vs. 
Local factions
Potential strategic 
alliances
Open political 
alliances
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8.2 Research Assessment and Contributions
A variety of theories have been considered to study the origins and process of Taiwan s 
démocratisation Modernisation theory posits that Taiwan's democratic transition was a 
consequence of rapid economic growth and social change, the transition approach 
focuses on the institutional efforts of the political opposition; one form of démocratisation 
theory emphasises the key role of an individual leader in this case Chiang Chmg-kuo; 
and the structural approach calls for attention to the analysis of external influence
However modernisation theories are insufficient to explain the origins of Taiwan s 
démocratisation since modernisation can create certain pressures for authontarian 
regimes but it does not necessarily result in political démocratisation The transition 
approach provides an effective perspective to the study of the Taiwan s democratic 
transition, but it overlooks the role of the KMT in the process of political change 
Analyses which focus on Chiang Ching-kuo's individual contribution to Taiwan s 
démocratisation, however, ignore the efforts from below As for the view of 
démocratisation from the outside, it exaggerates external influence on Taiwan s 
democratic reforms External factors can determine the process of démocratisation only 
if there is a direct Intervention by foreign factors or cataclysmic external events
In light of the insufficiencies of the above-mentioned theories in the study of 
Taiwan’s démocratisation, this thesis focuses on the effects of conflict and disunity within 
the KMT s own ruling structure as the origins and process of Taiwan s démocratisation 
Through analysis of the development and change of the coalition relationships between 
the KMT and local factions, this study agrees with Chen Ming-tung that change of state 
apparatus is normally caused by conflict and disunity between ruling elites ' It concludes 
that conflict and disunion between the KMT regime and its institutional clients, i.e local 
factions, is the key factor in explaining Taiwan’s democratic transition
In retrospect, the political opposition unquestionably played an indispensable role in 
the process of Taiwan's democratic transition The KMTs agreement to expand political 
participation and initiate democratic reforms would not have been possible without the 
efforts of the political opposition However the rise and growth of the political opposition 
was actually advanced by the KMT itself First, the breaching of the KMTs clientelist 
alliances with local factions undermined the KMTs own unity Support from these local 
factions, which reacted to KMT central authority as a result of the KMT’s attempts to 
remove their influence in the late 1970s indirectly contributed to the opposition s electoral 
victory in the 1977 electoral contests After the elections, the opposition’s influence in 
both national and local politics began to expand
Moreover debates within the KMT's own ranks (between KMT hard-liners and soft- 
liners) over the speed and scope of democratic reforms in the 1980s helped the 
opposition to adjust its strategies to engage with the KMT regime By skilful co-ordination 
of a mass movement on the streets and opposition in the Legislative Yuan the delicate 
setting of a negotiation agenda and the taking advantage of internal political debates 
within the KMT the opposition effectively created pressure against the authoritarian 
regime Under strong pressure the KMT agreed to an expansion of political participation 
and then to address issues of démocratisation
Furthermore, the KMT s intra-party factionalism in the post Chiang Ching-kuo era 
further moved Taiwan’s political démocratisation forward Facing challenges from KMT 
conservative leaders, Lee Teng-hui enticed co-operation from local factions, business 
groups the opposition DPP and the social movement to accelerate democratic reforms 
especially in the direction that would effectively undermine the power of his rivals 
Accordingly democratic reforms became a means for Lee Teng-hui to struggle against 
and marginalise his political rivals Political contention between the KMT mainstream and 
the non-mainstream factions accelerated the process of démocratisation
This study was based on Chen Ming-tung s correlative study of the KMTs patron- 
client relationships and its political development But it have also gone beyond his 
research As I mentioned in Chapter One, my study is similar to Chen Ming-tung s work 
as both our studies look into the political dynamics of Taiwan through analyses of 
changes within the KMT s factional politics But his study does not clarify how the conflict 
within the KMT's ruling structure, i.e between the KMT and local factions, caused 
Taiwan’s democratic transition, though he pinpoints the importance of the relationship 
between the change of the KMT s clientelist alliances with local factions and the strength 
of its authoritanan rule and concludes that the fracture of the KMT s clientelist alliances 
with local factions was the crucial factor of Taiwan s démocratisation
That is why Chen Ming-tung s study on it own seems weak in explaining why the 
KMT was at first able to exert tight control over local factions as well as the political 
opposition, but was then unable to continue doing so after the 1970s how did local 
factions' support of the opposition trigger Taiwan’s democratic transition: and why did the 
KMT have to restore its coalition ties with local factions after the collapse of the KMT 
authontanan rule despite its attempts to reduce the overall power of local factions in the 
late 1970s and 1980s
Nevertheless my research focuses on how changes in the KMT s factional politics 
and especially its clientelist alliances with local factions contributed to Taiwan’s 
democratic transition This study not only adopts the factionalism approach to investigate 
the KMT’s factional politics, but also take account of the socio-economic institutional, 
and external influence on Taiwan's démocratisation By examining the relationship 
between the change of the KMT’s factional politics and Taiwan's democratic transition, I 
have offered a dynamic study of Taiwan s démocratisation In other words my study 
goes further Chen Ming-tungs work in the sense that I have made systematically
theoretical integration of propositions of the modernisation transition and structural 
approaches to analyse the KMTs factional politics and Taiwan s democratic transition
In short, this study highlights the significance of conflict between KMT elites in 
Taiwan's democratic transition This view offers a convincing explanation to supplement 
the inadequacy of existing theories in the study of Taiwan s démocratisation It also 
provides a dynamic perspective for studying Taiwan s démocratisation Furthermore 
many of the research matenals used in this study have not been previously used in 
English academic literature These factors could be viewed as the three most 
outstanding contributions of this study Admittedly, the Taiwanese case is not sufficient in 
itself to demonstrate the general usefulness of the theoretical proposition delineated 
here It requires further comparative studies of various country cases of démocratisation 
so that the relation between the disunity and conflict of ruling elites and the process of 
democratic transition can be more clearly demonstrated
8.3 The Future of the KMT's Factional Politics
After the end of strongman politics in the late 1980s a plausible hypothesis emerged 
that the KMT could eventually evolve into a factional structure similar to that of the 
Japanese Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) First, local factions broke through the old 
constraints and barriers to the formation of inter-county and inter-city alliances They 
made a series of nationwide coalition moves which undermined the KMT s dominance 
over party and central government agencies Meanwhile, many political subgroups 
based on local factional members emerged in legislatures at all levels
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Moreover, the central KMT leadership separated into mainstream and non­
mainstream factions in the early 1990s as a result of political contention over the party’s 
nomination for Its official candidates for the eighth presidential election A complete 
vertical alignment between KMT factions and local factions seemed to appear The 
similanties of electoral systems (i e the multi-member single-vote constituency system 
which are adopted by both Taiwanese and Japanese governments for elections to 
legislative bodies) is also commonly seen as auspicious for the nse of intra-party 
factionalism
Furthermore, Taiwan may also be seen as resembling the Japanese one-party 
dominant democratic party system since the KMT exercises a predominant role Despite 
the collapse of the KMT’s authontarian rule in the late 1980s and the opposition DPP s 
landslide victory in 1997 local elections the KMT still has a high capacity and opportunity 
to remain in power based on its abundant political and economic resources If so 
competition between intra-party political groups might replace that between parties 
leading to the prevalence of political factionalism within the KMT
Several organisational characteristics of the factional structure of the pre-1993 
Japanese LDP are observable First, factions of the LDP are basically of the generic 
client-group type, but more public and symbolic than personal and private Power tends 
to be dispersed rather than concentrated in one position They are highly institutionalised 
with established headquarters regular meetings, fixed and known memberships and 
regular sources of funds, functioning to help their members with the cost of elections 
Factions develop parasitic ties with business groups which are able to provide abundant 
capital resources for factions to expand their political power Therefore, the LDP is 
based on money factional politics
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Second the national legislative body i e the Japanese Diet is the pnmary political 
arena of LDP factions The overall power of factions is to be measured according to their 
seats in the Japanese Lower House after each election or realignment The formation of 
the cabinet is allocated according to factional electoral strength Even the smallest 
faction receives some positions of secondary importance and seniority* However 
factions also expand horizontally to the party and central government agencies High- 
ranking posts in the party and central government agencies, especially the party's 
Director-General are targets for faction competition The distribution of strategic party 
and government positions depends on the overall power of each faction
Third factional members are pnncipally members of the Diet At the centre 
members are positioned hierarchically from factional leaders down to senior 
parliamentarians and finally the juniors The qualification for being factional leaders 
depends on the capability to channel funds to their followers Besides every Diet 
member has his own permanent campaign organisation i e koenkai in the locality The 
activities of koenkai can be categonsed as two types day-to-day activities and election 
campaigns The activities of the koenkai during the non-election period can be 
charactensed as social and non-political At election time the koenkai turns into an 
effective machine for election campaigning to mobilise votes for electoral victory '
Although koenkais are not part of the party organisation but founded and 
maintained by individual Diet members there is no denying that the strength of the LDP 
depends to a large extent on the organisation of the koenkai4 Within the LDP factional 
structure, there is a complete vertical factional alignment from the central level to the 
local Factional structure displays itself as a web but factions in the Diet are the pivot of 
the central-local vertical alignment and a horizontal part of the parallel relationship with 
the party and central government agencies
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As for the case of the KMT there is not such a complete vertical alignment 
between rts factions at national city-county, and hs/ang-townships levels Both KMT 
mainstream and non-mainstream factions were at least vaguely associated with a 
political tendency or programme Although they attempted to form coalitions with local 
factions and business groups during the years of intra-party factionalism they are far 
less institutionalised to form a complete vertical alignment down to the levels below A 
structural problem for a complete vertical alignment to develop in the KMT can be 
analysed by a comparison between Taiwanese local factions and the LDPs basic 
organisations koenkais They are different from each other in terms of organisational 
purposes institutionalisation and memberships
Though both Taiwanese local factions and LDP koenkais are organisations outside 
the formal structure of institutions i e the KMT and the LDP members of neither local 
factions nor koenkais all actually stand for office themselves However, local factions in 
Taiwan/ the KMT are far less institutionalised compared with koenkai Most importantly 
koenkais are founded by Diet members who are also members of central party factions 
The link between koenkais and central factions is evident However Taiwanese local 
factions are political groups exclusively founded and maintained by local elites Factions 
in the central level have little to do with local factions In reality the separation between 
KMT local departments and organisations of local factions has also caused problems of 
developing a factional structure with complete central-local vertical alignment
Moreover, the nature of legislative factionalism in Taiwan is not quite the same as 
in Japan The Taiwanese Legislative Yuan is less strategically important than the 
Japanese Diet due to the difference of governmental systems of the two countries KMT 
factions in the Legislative Yuan do not have institutionalised means to expand to the 
party and central government agencies Besides there seems to be no close 
congruence between factions in the Legislative Yuan and local factions Most leaders of
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KMT subgroups in the Legislative Yuan are not leaders of local factions to which they 
belong
Furthermore, the patron-client connection organisational strength and discipline of 
KMT political groups in the Legislative Yuan are far weaker than the LDP factions in the 
Diet Individual legislators still rely on their local factions rather than legislative factions in 
seeking party nomination and reelection Most importantly, the KMT centre still retains a 
certain control over factions in the legislative Yuan and the locality based on its Leninist 
charactenstics and traditional party-state structure Factions in both the Legislative Yuan 
and in the locality are unable to dominate major political power although their influence 
have been boosted by Taiwan’s démocratisation
Finally, the KMT in a quite unique way enjoys an independent financial base which 
operates on an unheard-of scale in any representative democracy The KMT s party- 
owned enterprises have grown into one of the largest diversified business groups on 
Taiwan during the 1980s and early 1990s According to Tien Hung-mao and Chu Yun- 
han the KMT has either direct ownership or indirect investment in more than 66 
companies including 9 companies listed in the Taiwan Stock Exchange and 27 public 
companies The book value of the party's stake in these 36 public companies alone was 
worth more than US$ 2 4 billion by the end of 1991 The KMT business empire 
generates more than US$ 160 million of dividends a year6 Its strong financial foundation 
allows the central party authority to run a huge party apparatus retain a 4,000-strong full 
time staff prop up a strong central leadership, continue to entice cooperation from local 
factions, and minimise its dependence on political donations from big business6
Therefore unlike the Japanese case Taiwanese capitalists are far less influential 
in politics The KMT avoided organising businesses or picking out 'national champions” 
in order to prevent the emergence of large consortia before the 1990s Economic 
authorisation was restricted to the upper level of the manufacturing structure and the
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banking sector Under such circumstances, Taiwans economic structure consists of 
mainly middle-sized entrepreneurs In contrast Japanese economic structure comprises 
predominantly multinational businesses and industnal groups that have considerable 
influence over political and economic development Despite dramatic expansion after the 
late 1980s, the political as well as economic strength of Taiwanese capitalists is still 
incomparable with that of their Japanese counterparts
Three institutional factors prevent the KMT from moving to the same factional 
structure as the pre-1993 Japanese LDP First, the LDP was constituted by several 
conservative forces at the beginning of its history (the LDP was established in November 
1955) Its power structure is decentralised depending on a coalition among various 
factions within the LDP The party centre has limited power over its members and also 
factions By contrast, the KMT is a Leninist party From the central to the local levels, the 
party establishes rigid organisational networks enjoying great ability to penetrate social 
organisations and control its party members The power of the KMT is highly centralised 
and this does not encourage the development of a factional structure as In the LDP
Moreover the dissimilanty of party power structure presents another institutional 
constraint In the LDP the power centre is constituted by the elected party elites in the 
Diet The party branch in the Diet becomes the power centre of the party s central 
authority Central decision-making power is held by elected party elites in the Diet In 
contrast, in the KMT case central decision-making is controlled by party leaders at the 
party’s central office rather than its members in the Legislative Yuan The party branch in 
the Legislative Yuan is a subordinate unit of the party centre The party central 
authonties enjoy a certain power over the members and factions in the national 
legislative body 8
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Furthermore, the difference in governmental systems between Taiwan and Japan 
will not allow the KMT to resemble the factional structure of the pre-1993 LDP In a 
parliamentary system, whether the pnme minister can hold on to power depends on 
majority support from the parliament hence is more willing to share power with factions 
within the same party Besides, the cabinet is recruited by members of the majority party 
in the parliament Factions in the parliament are able to expand horizontally to the 
cabinet Cabinet posts provide fertile ground for the development of intra-party 
factionalism In the presidential system however members in the national executive 
body are not necessanly from the national legislative organ Factions in the legislative 
body lack institutionalised channels to move to the national executive unit of the central 
government Also the presidential winner-take-all system with fixed tenure for the chief 
state executive is not conducive to factional consortia 9
All in all. Taiwan could possibly move to one-party dominant democratic system as 
in the Japanese model where a ruling conservative party the LDP dominates the 
political scene through electoral support garnered on the basis of performance if the 
KMT is capable of retaining hold of the ruling power in elections However a similar 
degree of factional structure as the pre-1993 LDP is unlikely to develop in the KMT
The development of Taiwanese local factions in the future is another important 
issue which should be discussed here To what extent démocratisation will affect the 
traditional patron-client relationships in Taiwan s local units seems an interesting 
question for theorists of both patron-client and démocratisation approaches Basically 
most of the literature on patron-client theories agrees that démocratisation and 
clientelism cannot both continue to increase in strength Either démocratisation will 
decrease due to clientelism. or clientelism will diminish in the face of the democratic 
challenge However, the second trend is argued for in most of the literature10
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Several scholars have suggested that démocratisation will result in the decline of 
the strength of clientelist relationships and local factions For example Joseph Bosco 
stated that the local factions will inevitably break up due to increasing levels of socio­
economic development and démocratisation;11 Chao Yung-mao claimed that 
preconditions of démocratisation, ie  socio-economic modernisation will diminish the 
power of local factions;12 Wang Chen-shiuen purported that patron-client relationships 
and local factions will eventually disappear as a result of increasing democratic and 
socio-economic growth;13 Chang-hee Nam mentioned that the growth of group politics 
and the emergence of modem democracy will lead to the objective and impersonal 
implementation of laws that in turn undermine clientelism 4
Carl H Lande one of the leading scholars of patron-client theory also considers 
that démocratisation tends to erode clientelist relationships in modernising societies As 
he pointed out, some components of democracy, such as a political bureaucracy an 
easily taxable populace a market economy, and freedom of association activity make 
clientelist relationships less attractive 15 In particular démocratisation encompasses not 
only economic development and formalised democratic institutions but also widespread 
social changes which will eventually result in changes in public ideas or attitudes toward 
non-democratic structures such as patron-client relationships or local factions 16
However, socio-economic modernisation and démocratisation have not resulted in 
the disappearance of local factions in Taiwan although Taiwan is rapidly democratising 
Local factions are still active In present-day Taiwan showing their remaining popularity in 
some areas, especially in the rural, in electoral contests According to my study in 
Chapter Seven, the influence of local factions has not faded with socio-economic 
modernisation Factional candidates are still more likely to be elected than non-factional 
candidates Their capability to achieve electoral mobilisation in local politics has not 
declined Local factions still enjoy certain popularity in election campaign
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Generally speaking proponents who claimed that socio-economic modernisation 
and démocratisation will result in the breaking up of the patron-client institutions in 
Taiwan's local units ignore the influence of traditionally socio-cultural roots on Taiwanese 
local factions So long as the Confucianist essence of intense familialism and its 
emphasis of “the group over the individual' prevails patron-client relationships and local 
factions may not disappear in Taiwan What is more since the KMT have relied on local 
factions to pursue electoral success for decades, the intertwining interests between the 
KMT and local factions will not disappear in a short time This is re-enforced by evidence 
of the KMT's enthusiastic fortification of its clientelist relationships with local factions in 
recent years The DPP has also developed its own form of patron-client relationships 
with local political forces Political encouragement may actually continue to sustain the 
patron-client structure in Taiwan's local units
As John Duncan Powell mentioned the traditional clientelist relationships will not 
always immediately be destroyed by nsing socio-economic levels and political 
institutionalisation Since clientelist relationships are dependent upon face-to-face 
interaction such relationships can be enforced only by the participants themselves not 
by any outside agency.17 Besides the nature of dyadic alliances also make the clientelist 
relationships flexible and resistant to detnmental destabilising challenges from the 
operating milieu.1*
In fact, even in western industrialised countries such as Britain the United States 
and France, clientelism still exists and works, but in a more delicate way Although the 
dominance of local factions and, closely related to it, the emergence of money politics, 
which have invited increasing public cnticism of the KMT and undermined the KMT s 
populanty have already driven the KMT to re-examine its clientelist alliance relationships 
with local factions in the long-run terms local factions will still exist in Taiwan
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In summary socio-economic development may not always result in the breaking up 
of clientelist alliances Rather, the clientelist relationships can persist in the face of 
increasing modernisation and démocratisation but the functions and services provided 
by local factions may change This suggests that Taiwanese local factions will not 
disappear but exist in different forms with different functions
8.4 Issues for Further Research
The factionalism approach posited here assumes a situation where political elites and 
political institutions rely exclusively upon clientelist ties to structure political action The 
clientelism theory has became one of the most predominant conceptions in the study of 
the KMT authoritarian regime Researchers such as Chu Yun-hen, Chen Ming-tung, and 
Wakabayashi Masatake have all confirmed the significance of clientelism for the KMTs 
political management in the time of authoritanan rule 19 Through the regime patronage 
system, the KMT was able to gain support from local elites and penetrate Taiwanese 
society, so that the KMTs legitimacy could be maintained
With political démocratisation and economic liberalisation, new political situations 
have gone beyond the reach of the research framework delineated in this thesis 
Clientelist relations basically refer to a vertical dyadic alliance between two parties of 
unequal status, power or resources Under authontarian control, local factions acted as 
political clients that offered political allegiance to and exchanged economic privileges 
with the KMT The role of local factions, however, profoundly changed after the collapse 
of authoritanan rule and Taiwan’s economic liberalisation
Though the nature of interest exchange relationships between the KMT and local 
factions did not change, the old patron-client relationship between the KMT central 
authonties and local factions did alter Based on their increased power both political and
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economic, local tactions rose to the national political arena and gradually penetrated the 
KMT party-state apparatus The KMT is no longer capable of directing local factions to 
meet its political needs The weakening of KMT control coupled with the growing 
strength of local factions thus led to the change of the nature of the traditional patron- 
client relationship Local factions have now become the KMT s coalition partners of equal 
status
In addition the emergence of the issue of state-business relationship further 
highlights the insufficiency of the clientelism approach in the study of the KMT s factional 
politics Local factions began to transform themselves by connecting with business 
groups or by becoming businessmen themselves from the early 1970s as electoral 
competition became intense and campaigns became very expensive With Taiwan s 
rapid economic growth and urbanisation local factions expanded dramatically in terms of 
economic strength based on their dominance of regional monopolistic businesses and 
land appreciation (following urbanisation) In the 1990s, local factions developed as 
political-economic blocs
On the other hand, the business community moved from its functional terrain and 
began to expand its political participation after a period of continuous economic 
development The expansion of capital strength brought about a disaffection of the 
business community from the KMT s economic control The business community exerted 
political efforts toward turning the state s policy-making in its favour The growing 
influence of the business community finally drove the KMT to incorporate the business 
community in its political system What is more business groups have gradually became 
the KMT’s significant coalition partners in its efforts to maintain legitimacy in the post- 
Chiang Ching-kuo era 20
The state-business relationship became particularly apparent in the 1990s During 
the intra-KMT factionalism in the post-Chiang Ching-kuo period Lee Teng-hui developed 
closer partnerships with local factions and the business community He allied with the 
two groups to reform the party-state and to neutralise resistance from mainlander- 
oriented members within the KMT More importantly, democratisation means a more 
competitive political system based on elections To consolidate its power base under the 
new environment, the KMT top leadership has little choice but to deepen its reliance on 
local factions and establish its partnership with the business elites Local factions and 
business groups became indispensable coalition partners of the KMT regime under the 
leadership of Lee Teng-hui
As Wang Chung-huan argues, the Lee Teng-hui regime is a new political system 
allied with the capitalist class and local factions On the one hand, the regime has 
developed closer partnerships with the business community to achieve the necessary 
social and economic support for the new KMT regime On the other hand, the regime 
has advanced its alliances with local factions to achieve electoral success in order to 
maintain the KMT’s political authority 21 The strategic alliances among the new KMT 
regime, local factions, and business groups make the relationships among them very 
intricate.
Certainly, the issue of state-business relationship is not new Rather, it previously 
existed on Taiwan’s political stage The state-business relationship, however, became 
particularly evident after the collapse of authoritarian control In summary, the rise of 
both local factions and business groups in to the national political arena and the 
convergence of local factions and the business community have reduced the 
significance of the subject of Taiwan s factional politics As Chen Ming-tung pointed out, 
the study of state-business relationship will replace that of factional politics as one of the 
first research agendas in the study of the KMT regime in the near future 22
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The other issues for further research include a comparative study of various 
country cases of démocratisation upon the factionalism approach as I have previously 
mentioned It would serve as a way to generalise the basic theoretical proposition 
embraced in this study, so that the relationship between the disunity and conflict of ruling 
elites and the process of democratic transition can be more clearly demonstrated What 
is more, the issues of interest politics and parliamentary politics also demand further 
research efforts As Taiwan s démocratisation matures, traditional political patron-client 
structures will inevitably be replaced by a formal and institutional form of organisation 
such as interest groups Therefore, the significance of these two topics will gradually 
increase
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(Taipei: Taiwan Studies Foundation, 1989); Chen Ming-tung, Pai-hsi cheng-chih yu t 'ai-wan 
cheng-chih pien-ch'ien [Factional Politics and Political Dynamics of Taiwan], op. cit.; 
Wakabayashi Masatake. T'ai-wan: feng-lieh-kuo-chiayu min-chu-hua [Taiwan: Divided Country 
and Démocratisation] trans. Hsu P'ei-hsien and Hung Ching-chu (Taipei: Yueh-tan ch'u-pan yu- 
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York: M E. Sharp, Inc., 1996), 214.
21 Wang Cheng-huan, Shei I ’ung-chih I ’ai-wan: ch ’uan-hsing-chung te kuo-chia chi-ch'i yu 
chuan-li-chieh-kou [Who Governs Taiwan? National Apparatus and Power Structure in 
Transition] (Taipei: Chu-liu Book Co., Ltd., 1996), ch. 2.
22 Interview with professor Chen Ming-tung in the Institute of Three Principles Studies at 
National Taiwan University (Taipei) on 26* July 1997.
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Appendix
Major Events of Taiwan's Democratic Development (1986-1998)
1986 29 March The KMT establishes a task force comprised of twelve 
CSC members to suggest measures for political 
reforms after its Third Plenum of the Twelfth Central 
Committee.
28 September The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) is 
established
1987 23 June The Legislative Yuan passes the National Security 
Law during the Period o f National Mobilisation for 
Suppression o f the Communist Rebellion After the 
law becomes effective, the Emergency Decree in 
Taiwan and Penghus will be lifted
15 July The Emergency Decree is lifted in Taiwan areas, the 
National Security Law  is promulgated
1988 1 January Registrations for new newspapers are opened and 
restrictions on the number of pages per issue are 
relaxed
11 January The Legislative Yuan passes the Law on Assembly 
and Parades during the Period o f National M obilisation 
for Suppression o f the Communist Rebellion, which 
allows free demonstrations
13 January Lee Teng-hui is sworn in as President following 
Chiang Ching-kuo’s death
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1989
1990
1991
20 January 
26 January
7 March
17 March
4 July
22 April
1 May
17 May
24 May
21 December 
31 December
The Legislative Yuan passes the Law on the 
O rganisation o f Civil Groups
The Legislative Yuan passes the revised Law on the 
Election and Recall o f Public Officials, and the Law on 
the Voluntary Retirement o f Senior Parliamentarians
The KMT Central Standing Committee passes a draft 
revision of the Temporary Provisions Effective during 
the P eriod o f National Mobilisation fo r Suppression o f 
the Com m unist Rebellion
Thousands of university students stage a sit-down 
protest at the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall Plaza to 
express opposition to the National Assembly's attempt 
to expand its authority
The National Affairs Conference concludes in Taipei, 
after six days of discussions on parliamentary 
reforms, the central and local government systems, 
the Constitution and mainland policy.
The Second extraordinary session of the First National 
Assembly approves the abolishment of the Temporary 
Provisions Effective during the Period o f National 
M obilisation
The declaration of the termination of the Period of 
National Mobilisation for Suppression of Communist 
Rebellion and the abolition of the Temporary 
Provisions become effective
The Legislative Yuan approves the abolition of the 
Statutes for the Punishment o f Insurrection 
The Legislative Yuan approves the abolishment of the 
Statutes for the Purging o f Communists Agents 
Election for the Second National Assembly is held 
All senior delegates to the First National Assembly, 
Control Yuan and Legislative Yuan retire from office
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1992 7 July The Legislative Yuan passes a revision of the National 
Security Law. which would reduce the number of 
black-listed person non grata from 282 to 5.
1 August Taiwan Garrison General Headquarters, the ROC's 
highest security institution on the Taiwan area, is 
disbanded; and the Coastal Patrol General 
Headquarters is established under the Ministry of 
Defence
19 December Election for the Second Legislative Yuan is held
1994 3 December Direct popular elections for Taiwan Provincial 
Governor, Taipei City Mayor, Kaohsiung City Mayor 
are held
1996 23 March Direct popular election for the President of the ROC is 
held.
1997 22 November The first time the DPP won the elections for local 
executives with the highest percentage of popular 
votes.
Sources:
1 “Chung-kuo kuo-ming-tang chieh-tang l-pai-nien da-shih-chi," [The Chronology of the One Hundred 
Anniversary o f the Establishment o f the KMT] C h u n g -y a n g  J ih - p a o  [Central Daily News] (Taipei), 24 
November 1994.
2. Government Information Office, ROC., T h e  R e p u b l ic  c f  C h in a  Y ea rb o o k , 1989. 90, 91. 92, 9 3 . 94. 95  (Taipei: 
Government Information Office, ROC, 1989-1995)
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